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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the effect of corporate governance on earnings quality, 
following changes in corporate governance mechanisms in Korea, launched after the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. It was motivated by two distinctive features of 
Korea’s corporate governance reforms: 1) non voluntary reform (enforced by the 
IMF and the World Bank) and 2) partial transplanting of a common-law regime. 
 
The analysis utilizes panel data of 509 non-financial Korean firms and a total of 
3,054 firm-year observations, listed on the Korean Stock Exchanges (KSE) for the 
period 2000-2005. In terms of methodology, this thesis employed three corporate 
governance mechanisms based on the Korea’s corporate governance reforms: 1) 
Ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership), 2) Internal 
governance (outside directors on the board and audit committee), and 3) External 
governance (external auditor). Following Jonas and Blanchet (2000), this study 
classifies earnings quality, as a proxy of financial reporting quality, into two types of 
approaches for assessing financial reporting quality: user needs and 
shareholder/investor protection. From the standpoint of user needs, earnings quality 
is associated with the relevance of the financial information and measured as 
earnings persistence and value-relevance, while earnings quality in the view of 
shareholder/investor protection is related to reliability of financial information and 
measured as conservatism and accruals quality. 
 
The primary estimation method for the regression equations is pooled-OLS. In order 
v  
to control the potential endogenous relationship between earnings quality and 
corporate governance mechanisms, this study uses a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regression. The robustness of the findings was also tested by GLS Random-Effect 
estimation. 
 
With regard to ownership structure, this thesis finds that: (1) family ownership 
positively affects earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection (accruals 
quality); (2) pure family ownership positively affects both earnings quality associated 
with user needs (persistence) and shareholder/investor protection (accruals quality), 
and affiliated ownership shows mixed results; and (3) foreign ownership also 
increases earnings quality on user needs (persistence and value relevance). 
 
As for the internal governance function, outside directors on boards partially increase 
earnings quality. Outside directors are related to earnings quality on user needs 
(value-relevance) but decrease earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection 
(accruals quality). Earnings quality depends on the background (quality) of outside 
directors on the board. There are negative associations between earnings quality and 
outside directors having high-profile backgrounds (e.g., politicians, government 
officers, and lawyers) and outside directors who are professors and foreigners, 
whereas outside directors who are finance experts and former employees are 
positively associated to earnings quality. Audit committee does not increase both 
earnings quality on user needs and on shareholder/investor protection. This result 
shows earnings quality appears determined by the intention of financial statements 
preparers and less so by regulations or institutions. 
vi  
In terms of the external governance function, higher audit quality (Big N firms) 
positively affects earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection (conservatism 
and accruals quality). As a ‘public watch dog’ function of the capital markets, higher 
audit quality mitigates aggressive and opportunistic financial reporting, and thus 
plays a vital role in the external corporate governance. The positive effect of higher 
audit quality on earnings quality results from increased auditor independence by 
imposing reinforced financial and legal liabilities on the CPA profession in Korea. 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing corporate governance and earnings quality 
literature in emerging markets by testing three key elements of corporate governance 
and four measures of earnings quality. The comprehensive investigation provides 
additional insights into the role of corporate governance in improving earnings 
quality as a proxy of financial reporting quality. In addition, this thesis offers some 
useful insights for regulators and policy makers by testing the effect of Korea’s 
corporate governance reforms on earnings quality.  
 
This study provides evidence that high quality financial reporting (reliable and 
relevant accounting earnings quality) requires well-balanced corporate governance 
mechanisms. Moreover, high quality financial reporting is achieved by financial 
statement preparers (e.g., controlling family shareholders or ultimate owners) not 
simply by regulation. Accordingly, at this stage, Korea’s corporate governance 
reforms do not appear to be working as intended in the Korean environment. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This thesis investigates how corporate governance of a publicly traded firm is 
associated with earnings quality as a measure of financial reporting quality using 
panel data collected from non-financial firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange 
(KSE). Specifically, it examines the relation between earnings quality and various 
corporate governance reforms in Korea, which were implemented in Korea following 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Korea’s corporate governance reform has two 
distinctive features: 1) non voluntary reform (enforced by the IMF and the World 
Bank) and 2) partial transplanting of a common-law regime. The sweeping corporate 
governance reforms after the Asian financial crisis increased the importance of 
corporate governance, but simultaneously raised concerns over the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. These unique features of corporate governance reform in 
Korea present a timely opportunity to engage in research on the association between 
corporate governance and earnings quality.  
 
     This thesis classifies major corporate governance reforms in Korea into three 
major categories: 1) ownership structure (e.g., family ownership and foreign 
ownership), 2) internal governance (outside board of directors and audit committee), 
and 3) external governance (audit quality) and earnings quality into four proxies: 1) 
earnings persistence, 2) value-relevance, 3) conservatism, and 4) accruals quality. 
 
     The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the 
background and motivation of this thesis. This helps to identify the research 
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objectives and the associated research questions discussed in Section 1.3. The data 
and research methodology are summarized in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 outlines the 
academic contributions while Section 1.6 covers its significance. Finally, Section 1.7 
concludes the chapter by describing the structure of remaining chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
    Korean firms are regarded as having opaque accounting information. According 
to the PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ opacity index (2001), Korea ranked 31 out of 35 
sample countries1 on opaque accounting practices. More recently, the IMD World 
Competitive Yearbook (2007) reports that auditing and accounting practice in Korea 
ranked 51 and board of director’s effectiveness over management ranked 54 out of 55 
sample countries. Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) report that Korea is one 
of the most severe earnings opaque2 countries in the world. Thus, Korean firms’ 
earnings quality is lower than in many other countries.  
     
     The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 in emerging markets shared many common 
elements such as volatile capital flows, falling currency value, and financial sector 
fragility. However, the specific causes that triggered the crisis in Korea were from 
two major factors: 1) the weak corporate governance system and 2) the overall loss 
of international confidence in accounting system among foreign investors (Jang and 
Choen 1999). Since most Korean firms were fully controlled by the family owners, 
these owners had dominant power at all levels of management. Korean firms were 
                                                
1 Countries ranked lower than Korea were: Turkey 32; Indonesia 33; Russia 34; and China 35. 
2 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) define earnings opacity as the failure to provide information about the 
distribution of the true, but unobservable, economic earnings of firms. 
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well known to have weaker corporate governance structures. The controlling families 
typically controled all the member firms through pyramid structures and cross 
holdings even when they had small cash flow rights (Jung and Kwon 2001). The 
weak corporate governance in Korea appeared in the form of inaccurate and 
incomplete financial information and insufficient monitoring over the controlling 
families, resulting in low earnings quality.  
 
 At the beginning of 1997, a series of defaults by large business groups started. 
Hanbo Steel, the 14th largest business group in Korea, and KIA group, the 4th largest 
business group, went bankrupt in January and July 1997, respectively. The major 
causes of the series of bankruptcies were the result of aggressively discounted debts 
and boosted asset values due to accounting frauds. All these factors raised the 
concern of international investors who became highly cautious in extending further 
credits and revolving existing credits. Accordingly, investors lacked confidence in the 
transparency and the reliability of the accounting system, and thus underutilized or 
heavily discounted such information in making their investment and lending 
decisions. Low earnings quality caused a loss of confidence among foreign investors, 
resulting in the withdrawal of foreign funds. This resulted in a liquidity crisis and 
ultimately triggered the 1997 financial crisis in Korea (Joo, Moon, Cheon, Lee, and 
Suh 2000). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified that low accounting 
transparency and poor corporate governance of Korean firms contributed to the 1997 
financial crisis in Korea (Jang and Cheon 1999).  
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     After the Asian Financial Crisis, the importance of accounting transparency 
and corporate governance was highlighted in Korea. The Korean government 
embarked on corporate governance reforms as a result of demands made by the IMF 
and the World Bank. Both institutions demanded that the Korean government 
upgrade corporate governance practices to meet international best practices. In 
September 1998, the Korean government signed a US$ 2 billion Loan Agreement 
with the World Bank. In this agreement, the Korean government assented to 
corporate governance reforms such as strengthening the independence of board 
directors and introducing audit committees. The Korean Government took a series of 
amendments to reform the legal framework generally applicable to corporate 
governance. The primary goals of corporate governance reforms were to achieve 
transparency and credibility of financial information of Korean firms. Provided 
below are the major points of the amendments of the legal framework: 
1) The Securities and Exchange Act was amended to require all firms listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) to elect one quarter of members of their Boards of 
Directors as independent “outside directors”. 
2) The Commercial Code was amended to permit the Board of Directors to establish 
committees, including an audit committee, and to delegate certain authority to such 
committees. 
3) The External Audit Act was amended to require the 30 largest business groups to 
prepare “combined financial statements” to significantly increase penalties for 
fraudulent audit reports, and to revise selection procedures for external auditors. 
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     Korean corporate reforms have two distinct features. First, the 
corporate governance reforms were not voluntarily initiated by internal demand but 
by external forces (the IMF and the World Bank). The Korean government had little 
choice to accept the IMF and the World Bank’s requests in order to resolve the 
financial crisis with relief loans. Therefore, Korean corporate governance reform 
process is that many of reforms appear to be mandatory requirements, which differs 
from most developed countries around the world that have voluntary compliance 
regimes (e.g., the UK and Australia). Critics have taken a skeptical view of the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms because the reforms do not reflect 
the cultural uniqueness of Korea and are also likely to adversely impact on the nature 
of any empirical relationship identified. Thus, it is questionable whether the reforms 
will be effective. Second, the Korean corporate governance reforms partially 
transplanted a common-law regime to a code-law system. Jaggi and Low (2000) and 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) argue that different legal systems have 
different types of impact on formulation of corporate governance systems. Thus, it is 
questionable whether Korea’s corporate governance reforms partially transplanted 
from a common-law regime can effectively be implemented. 
 
The Korean economy has some unique features which are suited for this 
study’s investigation. First, Korea was ranked 11th in terms of GDP in the world 
before the IMF bailout and 13th as of 2007, respectively. US exports to Korea in 2007 
were valued at US$ 34.7 billion; that is, 2.6% of total US exports. This figure is 
comparable to US exports to China valued at US$ 65.2 billion (5.6%), Japan US$ 
 6
62.7 billion (5.4%), and Germany US$ 49.7 billion (4.3%)3. In addition, Korea is the 
4th largest trading partner of Australia as of 2007 following China, Japan, and U.S. 
Despite its economic significance in the world economy, Korea is regarded as having 
lower quality in accounting transparency and corporate governance practices. Since 
various corporate governance reforms (e.g., outside directors on the board and audit 
committee) were unheard of prior to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the post-
reform period of Korea is very suitable for testing the effectiveness of corporate 
governance on earnings quality.  
 
Second, even though many code-law countries in Europe and South America 
have previously introduced in similar corporate governance reforms, Korea differs 
from these countries. The Korean economy and business environments have been 
closely linked with the US economy since the 1945 liberation of Korea from Japan. 
However, laws and regulations have remained heavily influenced by Japan as Korea 
was a Japanese colony for 35 years (1910 to 1945). Korean corporate governance 
practices have been revised by adopting common-law regimes, but the core legal 
system still follows a code-law framework. Thus, it seems to be very interesting for a 
common-law regime to take root in Korea. 
 
Third, most Korean firms have been dominated by controlling shareholders 
and their families. Although many emerging countries are characterized by families 
controlling many aspects of the economy, Korean firms have a unique feature with 
                                                
3 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0712.html  
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these controlling families. Korean controlling families do not really own much of the 
firms they control (they own only a fraction of the shares), yet they are still able to 
control firms through either circular or pyramidal equity ownership through the 
affiliated firms. In 2002, families directly owned only about 8.62% of shares among 
the top 10 business groups4, but they were still able to exercise control because they 
owned affiliated firms. Thus, it will be interesting to study Korea’s corporate 
governance reforms to gauge whether these reforms have moderated unique family 
ownership, and hence improved earnings quality.  
 
Finally, the Korean stock market was completely opened to foreign investors 
in May 1998. As consequence of foreign investment liberalization, within five years 
(2004), foreign investors share jumped to 43.6% of the total market value in the 
Korean Stock Exchange. This figure was the 4th highest in the world, following 
Hungary (72.6%), Finland (55.7%), and Mexico (46.4%)5. As a result of this foreign 
investment liberalization, the Korean sample provides a good environment for testing 
the effect of foreign ownership on earnings quality.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
    As mentioned previously in Section 1.1, the main objective of this thesis is to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on earnings quality. Since Adam 
Smith (1776) first introduced the ‘agency problem’ - conflict of interests between 
                                                
4 The Korean Stock Exchange (2003), Ownership by the Chairman of Major Big Groups in Korean 
5 The Korean Stock Exchange (2005), Largest Stockholder and Foreign Stockholder, End of 2004 in 
Korean 
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managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) - in his book, the ‘Wealth of 
Nations’, agency problems in modern firms have been studied extensively in the 
economics, finance, and accounting literatures.  
 
     Gillan (2006) suggests that corporate governance is the central focus in the 
presence of agency problems. Thus, prior researchers have proposed that corporate 
governance mechanisms alleviate agency problems; such as board of directors (Fama 
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997), and audit committees (Klein 2002). Rezaee (2004) defines corporate 
governance as the mechanism by which a firm is managed and monitored, and thus 
effective and balanced corporate governance can achieve the integrity and higher-
quality of financial reporting.  
 
      As discussed above, the IMF considered weak corporate governance as one of 
the factors that contributed to the financial crisis in 1997 (Joo et al. 2000). Since the 
crisis, the Korean government adopted common-law corporate governance regimes 
which did not exist prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and initiated various 
corporate governance reforms. Corporate governance reforms in Korea were aimed at 
enhancing corporate transparency and strengthening monitoring mechanisms thereby 
improving financial reporting quality. The outstanding corporate governance reforms 
in Korea consist of three major areas: 1) ownership structure, 2) internal governance 
function, and 3) external governance function.  
 
     In the ownership structure area, the Korean government prohibits mutual 
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guarantees of debt payment among the top 30 business groups to restrict family 
control via pyramidal structures and to strengthen the civil liability for controlling 
shareholders. The capital market has become fully accessible to foreign investors 
which are granted investment opportunities equal to domestic investors (except for a 
few industries such as electricity, gas, and water supply etc., which are related to 
national security). Thus, the first research question (RQ1) addresses ownership 
structure and can be stated as: 
RQ1: How does ownership structure (family ownership and foreign 
ownership) affect earnings quality? 
 
     As internal governance functions, outside directors on board and audit 
committee were initially introduced as a part of the reform process. Firms listed on 
the KSE are required to have 25 per cent of independent outside directors on the 
board. In addition, the boards of large listed firms (with assets of approximately US$ 
2 billion or more) are required to have more than half of their members as 
independent outside directors and an audit committee should be established. Thus, 
the second research question (RQ2) addresses these research objectives as follows: 
RQ2: Does internal governance functions (outside directors on boards and 
audit committee) increase earnings quality? 
 
     In relation to external governance, the specific research objectives are to test 
whether the high-quality of external auditors has had a significant bearing on 
earnings quality. To address these objectives, the following third research question 
(RQ3) is articulated: 
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RQ3: Does higher audit quality increase earnings quality? 
 
     The following section outlines sample, data and methodology used in this 
thesis to achieve the research objectives as well as summarizes the respective 
findings. 
 
1.4. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
     This study examines annual penal data over a six-year period from 2000 to 
2005. This study uses consecutively listed firms on the Korean Stock Exchange 
(KSE) excluding all financial institutions with two-digit Korean Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code of 65, 66, and 67 (e.g., commercial banks, insurance firms, 
security brokerage firms) for 6 years (2000 to 2005).  
 
     The data for the empirical analysis was obtained from various sources. The 
corporate governance variables including board structure and ownership information 
were hand collected from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART) 
database, provided by the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission (KFSC). The 
financial information on listed firms was mainly from the OSIRIS database, provided 
by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) and from the KIS-VALUE 
database, provided by the Korea Information Service (KIS). All the analysis in this 
study used pooled cross-section and time series data, and the final sample comprised 
509 for the period 2000 to 2005, with a total of 3,054 firm-year observations. Section 
5.2 later in Chapter 5 presents a detailed description of this sample, sampling 
procedure and the data set. 
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     With regard to methodology, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
method is employed to test the association between corporate governance and 
earnings quality in Chapter 5. For endogenous determination of board composition 
and ownership structure (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Cho 1998), a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation technique is used to solve the endogeneity problem, 
following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Choi, Park, and Yoo (2007). Further 
details on the estimation methods are provided Chapter 5. Robustness check is tested 
using the generalized least squares (GLS) Random Effect technique. The 
methodology will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Overall, in answer to RQ1, the empirical results indicate that, on average, 
ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) is positively related to 
earnings quality. More specifically, this thesis finds that: (i) family ownership 
increases earnings quality; (ii) foreign ownership also increases earnings quality. 
With regard to family ownership, this finding is consistent with the alignment effect 
of family ownership provided by Wang (2006) and Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 
(2007).  The positive effect of foreign ownership on earnings quality supports the 
active monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership, consistent with Sachs and Warner 
(1995) and Khanna and Palepu (2000).  
 
In answer to RQ2, this thesis finds evidence that, with few exceptions, internal 
governance functions (outside board of directors and audit committee) of Korean 
firms negatively influence earnings quality. Consistent to previous Korean studies 
(Jeon et al. 2004; Moon et al. 2006), this result shows that the internal governance 
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functions of Korean firms do not effectively monitor the firm’s management and are 
still dominated by controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner).  
 
The finding relating to RQ3 indicates that higher audit quality (Big N) 
increases earnings quality. External auditors play an important role in the capital 
markets as a “public watch dog” function. Specifically, in emerging countries, higher 
audit quality plays a vital role in the external corporate governance (Fan and Wong 
2005). Due to increased auditor independence and the reinforced financial and legal 
liabilities of the external auditor, audit quality in Korea is increased, thereby 
increasing earnings quality. 
 
1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This study contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. First, this 
study contributes to the literature understanding of how common law corporate 
governance practices (e.g., outside directors on board and audit committee) may 
enhance earnings quality when implemented in a code law country (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Salinas, and Shleifer 1999; Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Ball 2001; Ball, Robin, 
and Wu 2003; Oxelheim and Randøy 2003). Korea is a code-law country. Corporate 
governance reforms after the financial crisis in 1997 were premised on common-law 
corporate governance practices centered around transparency, credibility and 
accountability. According to La Porta et al. (1999) and Ball et al. (2000 and 2003), 
common-law countries have stronger legal protection of investors and are more 
market-oriented than those of code-law countries since common law sources are 
geared toward investors, whereas code-law sources are geared toward regulators. In 
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addition, common-law countries have higher quality financial information than code-
law countries (Ball 2001). Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) argue that common-law 
corporate governance is the most demanding corporate governance system due to the 
stricter information and monitoring requirement. However, Coffee (2001) argues that 
assumed superiority of common law to code law is excessively oversimplified. He 
evidences that Scandinavian countries (code-law countries) do significantly better on 
average than common-law countries in restricting the private benefits of control. 
Therefore, this study extends the validity of the traditional view that a common-law 
regime is superior to a code-law regime and the effects of various institutional factors 
on earnings quality. 
 
     Second, this study adds to the literature on the effect of family ownership on 
earnings quality (Warfield, Wild and Wild 1995; Wang 2006). The relationship 
between family ownership and earnings quality is explained using two conflicting 
agency problems: 1) Type I agency problems, the classic owner-manager conflict and 
2) Type II agency problems, conflicts between controlling shareholders and non-
controlling shareholders. In the view of Type I agency problems, family ownership is 
associated with higher earnings quality because family members’ interests are better 
aligned with other shareholders and better monitor management, thereby supplying 
higher earnings quality to financial statement users (Wang 2006). However, in the 
view of Type II agency problems, management entrenchment could occur when 
insider holdings are high, causing moral hazard and information asymmetry problems 
between insiders (owner-manager) and outside investors (Mørck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1988). Ball et al. (2003) argue that common-law East Asian countries (e. g., 
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Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong) have higher quality standards, but 
their earnings quality is not higher than under code-law. Ball et al. (2003) interpret 
this discrepancy in common-law East Asian countries as lower demand for higher 
quality earnings because family ownership dominates incentives to report higher-
quality earnings. Thus, how family ownership will affect earnings quality depends on 
whether the difference in Type I agency problems overrides the difference in Type II 
agency problems or vice versa. In Korea, Type II agency problems may predominate 
Type I agency problems. One of the primary goals of corporate governance reforms 
in Korea is to restrict family ownership through diversifying ownership structure and 
strengthening monitoring functions. Thus, this study will investigate whether 
restricted family ownership can improve earnings quality. Family ownership is 
predominant in a number of countries, especially in East-Asian countries. Hence, the 
results of this study are important not only for the Korean context, but will also 
contribute to understanding of family ownership and earnings quality in other East 
Asian countries. 
 
     Third, this study extends the literature on foreign shareholders as participants 
in the corporate governance mechanism with the expertise for monitoring (Sachs and 
Warner 1995; Kang and Stulz 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). As a large 
institutional shareholder, there are two conflicting views on the foreign shareholders6: 
1) active monitoring and 2) transient hypothesis. According to the active monitoring 
hypothesis, foreign shareholders play an important role in monitoring management to 
                                                
6 Since almost all investments by foreigners in Korea are made through institutions such as foreign 
investment firms, investment trust firms, securities firms, and pension funds, the foreign investor 
means the foreign institutional investor (Cheon 2003).  
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protect their interests (Sachs and Warner 1995) and to resolve their information 
asymmetry (Kang and Stulz 1997). However, in the view of transient hypothesis, 
foreign shareholders are just short-term investors and thus they do not have 
significant incentives to monitor a firm’s management (Graves 1988; Kim, Krinsky, 
and Lee 1997). While local capital market participants in emerging countries fail to 
efficiently check and control firm activities, it has been widely acknowledged that 
foreign shareholders assume important roles in monitoring management as 
institutional shareholders or the outside directors (Sachs and Warner 1995). The role 
of foreign investors as outside monitors of corporate governance activities, it is 
expected, would be even bigger in Korea. The shareholdings of investor groups as of 
the end of 2006 show that foreign investors hold about 37.3% of the total market 
value of Korean listed firms, which is high compared with foreign investors holdings 
in Australia (27%), Japan (26.7%), and the U.S. (13.5%). Foreign shareholders in 
Korean firms are less likely to be related to the firm’s controlling family shareholders, 
and foreign directors tend to represent the foreign investment firms rather than the 
controlling family shareholders (Choi, Park, and Yoo 2007). Therefore, it is likely 
that they have the incentive and expertise to independently monitor the firm. In 
particular, participation of a firm’s board of foreign directors is one of the major 
conditions for investment by foreign investment firms. Accordingly, this study 
provides important evidence that foreign shareholders as an outside monitor in 
emerging market affect earnings quality by focusing on the impact on earnings 
quality exerted by the foreign shareholders through their holdings and participation in 
the board of directors. 
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Fourth, prior literature on earnings quality has developed considerable 
evidence that there are large cross-sectional differences across countries (Fan and 
Wong 2002; Graham and King 2000a; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003). In so doing, 
these studies typically assume that earnings quality is homogeneous across firms 
within a country. This study will show that there are substantial differences in the 
degree of earnings quality among firms within a country, and that corporate 
governance of a firm is an important determinant of earnings quality, thereby 
extending previous studies. 
 
     Fifth, this study provides comprehensive evidence of the relationship between 
earnings quality and corporate governance. Most prior studies have examined the 
effect of audit committee and earnings management (Klein 2002), the relation 
between audit quality and informativeness of reported earnings and earnings 
management (Balsam, Krishinan, and Yang 2003), non-executive directors on board 
and earnings management (Davidson, Goodwin, and Kent 2005). Accordingly, prior 
studies do not comprehensively examine the association between corporate 
governance and earnings quality. High earnings quality results from good corporate 
governance because corporate governance is a monitoring mechanism for assessing 
corporate responsibility and accountability through boards of directors, audit 
committees, management, and auditors to serve and protect investors (Rezaee 2002). 
Earnings quality is the most comprehensive measure of quality of financial reporting 
but is not exclusively defined (Balsam et al. 2003). Following Jonas and Blanchet 
(2000), this study classifies earnings quality into two types of approaches for 
assessing financial reporting quality: 1) user needs and 2) shareholder/investor 
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protection. From the standpoint of user needs, earnings quality is associated with the 
relevance of the financial information and measured as earnings persistence and 
value-relevance, while earnings quality in the view of shareholder/investor protection 
is related to the reliability of financial information and measured as conservatism and 
accruals quality.  By examining multiple measures of earnings quality, it does 
provide good coverage of recognized earnings quality indicators. Thus, this study 
extends prior research by comprehensively exploring the effects of corporate 
governance characteristics on four measures of earnings quality: earnings persistence, 
value-relevance, conservatism, and accruals quality. 
 
Finally, previous research in the Korean context has analyzed the causes, 
effects, and implications of the financial crisis (e.g., Jang and Cheon 1999; Joo et al. 
2000) or examined the impact of the financial crisis on the value-relevance of 
accounting information in Korea (e. g., Graham and King 2000a; Ho, Liu, and Sohn 
2001). Choi, Jeon, and Park (2003) test the role of audit committee and earnings 
management. They focus on the audit committee as a part of corporate governance 
reforms and deal with only two year periods (2000 to 2001). In addition, no previous 
study considers endogeneity problems between corporate governance and earnings 
quality in Korea. Thus, this study will be the first Korean study to comprehensively 
test the effect of corporate governance on earnings quality and the first Korean study 
to provide evidence of the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
quality in a setting where endogeneity is controlled for. In practice, this study will 
indicate whether corporate governance reforms have improved the earnings quality in 
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Korea. Thus, the results from this study can provide regulators and lawmakers with 
important evidence of the benefits of corporate governance reforms. 
 
1.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS THESIS 
     The results from the three research questions and objectives can provide useful 
insights to the policy makers and regulators as well as academics. Specifically, the 
IMF and the World Bank may also benefit from the findings due to the corporate 
governance reform policy action attached to the bailout loan agreement.  
 
     After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the IMF and the World Bank 
demanded various corporate governance reforms under the bailout condition. 
However, some critics argued that there were no differences between the IMF and the 
World Bank’s reforms among countries. The IMF and the World Bank’s reform 
ignored the cultural peculiarities, historical background, and economic features of 
each country. Thus, Korea’s corporate governance reforms by the IMF and the World 
Bank could potentially do more harm than good because the IMF and the World 
Bank’s initiatives may be motivated more by self-interests and the interests of foreign 
international money traders such as the Hermes Hedge Fund and Sovereign 
investment7. 
 
     The results related to RQ1 on earnings quality provide evidence as to whether 
ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) increase earnings 
                                                
7 After liberalization of foreign investment in 1998, Hermes Hedge Fund and Sovereign investment 
bought many Korean firms’ share at discounted price and sold them at higher price without tax (Lee 
and Rho 2006).  
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quality. RQ2 considers whether initially introduced corporate governance 
mechanisms in Korea (outsider directors on board and audit committee) affects any 
influences on earnings quality in the post crisis period 2000 to 2005. Similarly, the 
analysis related to RQ3 highlights whether external governance function (external 
auditor) increase earnings quality. These analyses are important as policy makers and 
regulators are constantly trying to revise legislation to facilitate better monitoring of 
firm’s financial reporting process. Thus, the results help policy makers and regulators 
to formulate better financial reporting regulations. Moreover, this finding should also 
reveal and evaluate the effectiveness of firm s’ corporate governance mechanisms to 
provide high quality of financial reporting. 
 
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
     This section outlines the structure of this thesis. This introductory chapter has 
already introduced the topic and provided the background and motivation which help 
identify the research gaps in existing literature. In light of these gaps, three research 
objectives and their respective research questions were specified. This was followed 
by a brief discussion of the data, methodology, findings, contributions, and 
significance. The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 briefly overviews Korea’s corporate governance practices including 
comparison of pre-crisis with post-crisis. Chapter 3 presents a review of both 
theoretical and empirical studies on corporate governance, as well as on earnings 
quality as a measure of the quality of financial reporting, and then highlights the 
research gaps in the literature and helps in developing the hypotheses relating to the 
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research questions. Chapter 4 demonstrates the empirical research design used to test 
these hypotheses. It starts with a description of the sample, data sources and sampling 
procedure. Then, Chapter 5 presents several regression equations along with their 
respective estimation techniques. It also provides an evaluation of the variables used 
as proxies for corporate governance variables, as well as for earnings quality. The 
chapter concludes with some univariate analysis such as descriptive statistics and 
pair-wise correlation analysis of the variables to provide some initial insights into the 
data. The empirical chapter, Chapter 5, begin with the results from the pooled-OLS 
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis on panel data relating to RQ1, RQ2, and 
RQ3. Then, the robustness of the results is further cross-checked with robustness 
tests including the GLS Random Effect analysis. The chapter concludes with a 
summary discussion of these findings. The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the 
whole thesis. It revisits the research questions and provides a synopsis of the 
methodology, hypotheses and the results. It re-emphasizes the findings from the 
different models by linking their significance. The academic contributions and the 
policy implications of the findings are then identified. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
discussion on the study’s limitations, suggestions for future research and an overall 
thesis conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This chapter reviews corporate governance practices including comparison of 
pre-crisis with post-crisis and corporate governance reforms in Korea. Lower quality 
of financial reporting of Korean firms in the pre financial crisis period was typified 
by the lack of corporate governance practice. Accordingly, the reliability and 
relevance of the financial statements were questionable. After the crisis, the IMF and 
the World Bank demanded that the Korean government introduce regulations to 
improve the quality of financial information and corporate governance practices to 
meet international best practices. Responding to these calls, in March 1998 the 
Korean Financial Supervisory Commission (KFSC) was organized as a special 
committee and was charged with the responsibility of reviewing the Korean 
accounting and auditing systems. The primary goals of the KFSC were to achieve 
transparency, credibility, and international comparability of the financial information 
and corporate governance practices and initiated various corporate governance 
reforms. 
     The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the 
background of corporate governance reforms in Korea. Section 2.3 outlines 
characteristics of Korea’s corporate governance reforms. This identifies the 
uniqueness of Korea’s corporate governance reforms and summarizes the view point 
of critics and supporters of corporate governance reforms in Korea. Section 2.4 and 
Section 2.5 compare corporate governance practice in Korea between the pre-reform 
period and the post-reform period. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the chapter by 
describing the purpose of Korea’s corporate governance reforms. 
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2.2. BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN KOREA 
    On November 1997, in order to resolve the liquidity crisis, the Korean 
government requested relief loans to the IMF and the IMF agreed to provide Korea 
with US$ 55 billion in a bailout package. On March and September 1998, the Korean 
government entered into a loan agreement with the World Bank on 1st Agreement 
(Structural Adjustment Loan: SAL I) and on the 2nd Agreement (Structural 
Adjustment Loan: SAL II), respectively. The World Bank and the Korean 
government signed an agreement outlining key corporate governance reforms under 
the bailout condition: (1) strengthening the monitoring function of boards of directors 
and audit committee, (2) strengthening the independence of the Korean Institute of 
Certified Public Accountant (KICPA), and (3) liberalizing foreign investments. In the 
policy actions attached to the loan agreement, the Korean government immediately 
initiated corporate governance practice reform processes to restore confidence in 
financial reporting. Table 2.1 presents the main corporate governance reforms in 
Korea demanded by both the IMF and the World Bank. 
Table 2.1: Major Corporate Governance Reforms in Korea 
Item Content 
Corporate 
Governance 
• Require listed firms on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) to have at 
least on-fourth of Board of directors to be outsiders 
• Require establishment of audit committees of the boards of directors 
for banks and large listed firms 
• Issued code of best practice for corporate governance 
• Limitation on equity holding of affiliated firms 
• Prohibit cross-debt guarantee and cross share ownership 
Source: Korea Letter of Intent (1998)/ Nowroozi (2000) 
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According to the IMF staff report (1998) and Nowroozi (2000), the principal 
cause of the financial crisis was a lack of enforcement of prudential rules and 
inadequate supervision of the financial system, problems resulting from the limited 
availability of data and a lack of transparency, as well as problems of governance. 
Thus, the primary objective of corporate governance reforms by both the IMF and 
the World Bank was designed to provide more relevant and reliable financial 
reporting, and transparent and accountable corporate governance practices. 
 
2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN 
KOREA 
     Korea’s corporate governance reforms have two distinctive features. First, 
Korean corporate governance reforms were not initiated by domestic needs but 
through external pressure (e.g., the IMF and the World Bank). Second, Korean 
corporate governance reforms partly transplanted a common-law regime into a code-
law framework. 
 
     Given that the Korean government needed to resolve the financial crisis 
through relief loans by both the IMF and the World Bank, the Korean government 
had little choice but to comply with the IMF and the World Bank demands. Namely, 
the Korean corporate governance practices were adjusted to demands made by both 
the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, there was no thought given to the cultural 
and historical background of Korean economic features because the IMF pushed 
similar reform program on all countries which required to be bailed out under the 
IMF relief plan (Choi 2004). Some criticized the corporate governance reforms 
 24
imposed by the IMF and other foreign sources as alien to the structure and culture of 
Korean corporate groups, and thus these reforms were too drastic and left the Korean 
economy vulnerable to international money traders (Choi 2004).   
 
Critics of the corporate governance reforms argued that;  
"Obviously, the IMF is not a Santa Clause but a Trojan horse and international bond 
trader. The number of employees at the IMF is over 2,200 and their average annual 
salary is $98,000. The problem that the IMF has showed in the past is without 
considering each country’s unique culture, economic infra structure, life style, and 
labor history it pushes out its policies (Park 1999, p.27.). "  
 
     Chang and Park (1999) argue that problems faced by Korean firms such as 
higher family ownership are partly true, but they are not as serious as they are often 
thought to be because, in practice, family shareholdings has been on the decline over 
time8. The most serious problem is that the IMF and the World Bank failed to 
understand the nature of the investment-growth dynamics that have characterized the 
Korean economy during the last few decades. The traditional Korean economic 
growth model was export oriented and emphasized a substantially greater degree of 
government intervention, involving cooperation among government and business. In 
addition, Korean firms tend to maximize sales rather than maximize the value of the 
firm. Therefore, such flawed bases and understanding of the Korean economy would 
create that the Korea’s corporate governance reforms made it even worse. For 
example, financial liberalization has led to an increased dominance of large business 
                                                
8 For the top 30 chaebols, family ownership declined from 17.2% in 1983 to 8.72% by 2003 (Source: 
the Korean Stock Exchange 2004) 
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groups by enabling them to mobilize more funds through the bond market and newly-
allowed investment funds (Chang and Park 1999; Shin and Park 1999). Arguably, the 
reforms enabled Korean firms to create incentives and opportunities to increase the 
importance of family ownership, because foreign ownership liberalization and the 
allowance of hostile take-overs have made the Korean firms, specifically business 
groups (so called chaebols), increase pyramidal ownership for defensive purpose 
using their affiliated firms.  
 
     However, Black (2001) criticizes negative views of the reforms and argues that 
critics of the reforms reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the reasons for the 
Korean financial crisis, the extent to which corporate governance failures helped to 
create and exacerbate the crisis, and the extent to which Korean corporate 
governance practices remain well behind international best practices. He argues that 
firms and countries with strong corporate governance will have access to cheaper 
capital and take a competitive advantage over firms and countries with weak 
corporate governance.  
 
     Consequently, the effect of Korean corporate governance reforms is still 
controversial. However, the primary objective of Korean corporate governance 
reforms is to stimulate market transparency and investor confidence (The KFSC 
1998). The reliability of financial accounting information results from a combination 
of good corporate governance practices. Corporate governance reforms to improve 
the quality of accounting information are a costly process, but affect various 
interested parties such as regulators, investors, and shareholders. Thus, it is important 
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to examine the effect of the reform to assess whether the corporate governance 
reforms increase the reliability of financial accounting information for Korean firms.  
 
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE OF PRE-REFORM PERIOD 
2.4.1. Ownership Structure 
        The features of traditional Korean firms are their concentrated share 
ownership within controlling family shareholders and their affiliated firms, and their 
highly diversified business structure. To achieve control of the firms, controlling 
family shareholders can control firms through a chain of ownership relation 
(pyramidal ownership). La Porta et al. (1999) define a pyramid as a hierarchical 
chain by which a family controls a firm and cross-shareholding as a structure through 
which a controlled firm owns shares in its controlling shareholder or in the firms 
along that chain of control. Dominant family control, which results in a lack of 
proper corporate governance mechanism, was considered by both the IMF and the 
World Bank as one of the primary causes of the financial crisis in 1997 (Jang et al. 
2002).  
 
     Figure 2.1 depicts an example of the typical ownership structure of a Korean 
firm – the Samsung, which was the largest firm in Korea in 2001. Ownership 
structure of Samsung displays signs of both pyramid and cross-shareholding 
structures. The Lee family owns equity in core member firms (e.g., Samsung 
Electronics and Samsung Life Insurance) and the affiliated firms are cross-held 
through circular investment. However, cross-shareholding between two firms is 
forbidden in Korea, but it is legal when it involves more than two firms.  
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Figure 2.1: The ownership structure of the Samsung group 
 
Source: Jang (2001) 
 
     Controlling family shareholders manage to ensure control by making their 
affiliated firms borrow from financial institutions and channeling the funds to finance 
investments in other, already existing affiliated firms (Shin and Park 1999). The cross 
payment guarantees, along with cross shareholdings, link member firms to each other 
and reduce the member firms risk of financial distress and bankruptcy by creating an 
internal capital market among firms within the same business group. To expand the 
internal capital market, controlling family shareholders also increase their ownership 
of non-bank financial intermediaries. These borrowings were taken with guarantees 
provided by the affiliates (intra-group cross-debt guarantees) and provided finance 
for the building of pyramidal schemes. Thus, controlling family shareholders can 
effectively control their firm, despite holding a relatively small stake in its capital. 
Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) described such ownership structure as 
controlling-minority structure in which a shareholder exercises control while 
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retaining only a small fraction of the equity claims on a firm’s cash flows. They note 
that such controlling minority structure is possible through dual-class share structures, 
stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties. In Korea, all common shares carry one 
vote and the Korean Fair Trade Law prohibits cross-share ownership. Therefore, 
most of the family’s control power is secured by ownership among affiliated firms 
via pyramidal or circuitous structures. 
 
     Before the Asian financial crisis 1997, the Korean laws strictly prohibited both 
hostile and foreign mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  In addition, foreign 
ownership was restricted until the end of 1997; foreign individual investors were 
forbidden to hold more than 7% of shares, and foreign ownership as a group could 
not exceed 26% of total shares. These laws protected the incumbent controlling 
shareholders from outside investors. 
 
2.4.2. Internal Governance Function 
        Given the separation of ownership and management for a modern 
corporation, the board is created as an internal governance mechanism to represent 
and protect shareholders from managers who may pursue their personal interests or 
otherwise may not act in the best interests of shareholders. However, the lack of 
independence and insufficient monitoring by boards of directors in Korean firms 
resulted in a lower quality of financial reporting. Outside independent directors and 
audit committees were not introduced to Korean firms before 1999. Although the 
Korean Commercial Code mandates shareholders’ general meetings, boards of 
directors and internal auditors, their roles were very constrained. The ultimate owner 
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or the family controlled a firm through its hold on top managerial positions, such as 
CEO or CFO. Internal governance mechanisms in Korean firms did not properly 
monitor firm management because controlling family shareholders dominated boards 
of directors by selecting most of the directors on the board. Thus, an absence of 
internal monitoring mechanisms to control managerial discretion insulated 
controlling families from outside influence, leaving them virtually uncontrolled. 
 
2.4.3. External Governance Function 
         Prior to the reforms, the Korean external audit service market was heavily 
regulated by the government. There were annual ceilings on the number and the size 
of audit engagements audit firms could undertake. The ceiling was determined by the 
size and legal structure of the audit firm and was set at 1.3 times the average number 
of audit engagement per practicing CPA. In addition, audit firms with less than 100 
CPAs were denied access to audit contracts with companies having assets over 800 
billion KRW (US$ 0.8 billion). The maximum audit-service fee in Korea was 
determined by the government and was controlled by the audit-fee schedule, which 
varied according to the assets of the auditee. The audit fee in Korea in 1997 was 
approximately 20% of the fee level in the U.S. and 13% of that in Japan (Choi and 
Joo 1998). Audit firms were required to make a contribution to a joint auditing 
indemnity fund managed by the KICPA up to a limit of 15% of the average annual 
audit fee for the last 3 years.  
 
     Prior to 1981, firms requiring external audits were assigned auditors by the 
government. External auditors were assigned to listed firms and financial institutions 
 30
only. In an effort to improve the quality of audits and to foster the growth of the 
auditing profession in Korea, in December 1980, the government introduced 
competition into the audit market by increasing the demand for independent audits as 
well as increasing the supply of auditors. The External Audit Act extended the 
external audit requirement to almost all public firms. In order to increase the supply 
of auditors, the government increased the number of CPA on a large scale. However, 
with the introduction of competition, management realized a newly-gained power 
over the auditors because the client can replace auditors by taking advantage of 
competition among the auditors for opinion shopping. Thus, when a client manager 
asks for a favorable opinion from the auditor, auditors may have difficulty resisting 
this request. This is because the client manager can easily replace uncooperative 
auditors with unethical, but more cooperative, ones.  Therefore, the threat of 
switching can weaken the ability of auditors to withstand pressure from client 
management to bias the reports in the client’s favor. Park (1990) provides evidence 
that firms that received qualified opinions tended to change auditors more frequently 
than those with clean opinions. Moreover, firms received qualified reports less 
frequently after switching, suggesting that management engaged in successful 
opinion shopping. 
 
     The independence and the professional ethics of external auditors were 
undermined by the following factors: pressure from controlling family shareholders 
because they reserved the right to replace auditors; low audit fees resulted from fierce 
competition among audit firms; erosion of the self-discipline of individual auditors 
since some external auditors were deeply involved with their clients in such issues as 
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the preparation of financial statements or even the decision process of year-end 
accounts under the pretext of consulting services; relaxed quality-control and risk-
management functions within audit firms and loss of the self-regulatory function of 
the KICPA because there have been only a few legal actions against external auditors 
in Korea. Thus, genuine market pressure on the auditing profession did not really 
exist. Until the 1999 accounting scandal of the Daewoo group9, the second largest 
business group in Korea, the financial market in Korea did not respond to audit 
failures.  
 
2.5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE OF POST-REFORM PERIOD 
    In March 1999, the Committee on Corporate Governance (CCG) was formed as 
the private sector committee for improving corporate governance. Three 
subcommittees of the CCG reviewed early drafts of the Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance and provided their written reports to the Committee. The final 
code was drafted and accepted by the Committee in September 1999 after several 
rounds of internal meetings and public seminars. The purpose of the Korean Code of 
Best Practice for Corporate Governance was to establish standards for good corporate 
governance in Korea and to provide guidelines for Korean firms to improve their 
corporate governance practices. These guidelines were the product of a collaborative 
effort among members of the CCG, consisting of fourteen business executives, 
financial experts, auditors, lawyers and academicians, and an advisory group of 
thirteen governance experts from the areas of commercial law, management, and 
                                                
9 The Daewoo group, the second largest business group in Korea, was alleged to have organized 
Asia’s biggest single accounting fraud – false accounting during the Asian financial crisis that 
inflated the value of Daewoo’s equity by US$ 32 billion. 
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financial markets. Disclosure of a firm’s compliance with the Code of Best Practice 
might be incorporated into Korean Stock Exchange listing rules in a similar way to 
the incorporation of the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Code in 
the listing rules of the Australian Stock Exchange. Table 2.2 summarizes major 
corporate governance reform in Korea after the Asian financial crisis. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of corporate governance reforms in Korea 
Date Event/Nature of Reform Comments 
May 1998 Liberalization of foreign equity ownership   
Dec 1998 
New mutual guarantees of debt 
payment are no longer permitted, and 
existing guarantees must be 
eliminated by March 2000 
Effective for the top 30 chaebols 
Jan 1999 At least 25% of the board members are required to be outside directors 
Effective for all firms listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) or the 
Korean Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ) 
Mar 1999 The Committee on Corporate Governance (CCG) is formed The private sector committee 
April 
1999 
Strengthening punishment for fraud 
financial statement disclosure 
Up to 5 years imprisonment or up to 0.5 
billion won (US$ 0.5 million) fines 
Sep 1999 
Promulgation of the Korean Code of 
Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance by CCG 
Spontaneous application 
Dec 1999 Introduction of audit committee Amendment of the Korean Commercial Code 
Jan 2000 
More than 50% of the board 
members are required to be outside 
directors 
Effective for firms with asset value of 
more than 2 trillion won (US$ 2billion) 
listed on the KSE or KOSDAQ 
April 
2000 
Mandatory establishment of audit 
committee 
Effective for firms with asset value of 
more than 2 trillion won (US$ 2billion) 
listed on the KSE or KOSDAQ 
 
2.5.1. Ownership Structure 
        The IMF noted that the foremost hindrance to corporate governance 
improvements in Korean firms lay in the vast latitude the controlling family 
shareholders and their affiliated firms had to control them with a relatively small 
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shareholding (Jang 2002). One of the primary corporate governance reforms is to 
restrict family control through removing cross debt guarantee, reducing circuitous 
equity ownership and unfair transaction among affiliated firms, and diversifying 
ownership structure. 
 
     First, the inter-corporate shareholdings and pyramid ownership structures 
combined created a chaebol system or a business group. The group’s chairman and 
his family members at the top of the pyramid effectively controlled the member firms 
of the group with minimal levels of cash flow rights. Thus, new mutual guarantees of 
debt payment among the firms of the top 30 chaebols are no longer permitted and 
existing guarantees had to be eliminated by March 2000. Moreover, equity holding of 
affiliated firms is limited to no more than 25% of net asset value. 
 
     Second, the Commercial Code was amended in 1999 to provide more 
comprehensively for approval of related party transactions by non-interested 
directors and, for major related party transactions, by non-interested shareholders. 
Korean firms routinely engage in intra-group transactions, or issue shares at a 
discount to insiders. To solve this problem, related party transactions generally 
should be subject to approval by non-interested directors and, for the largest 
transactions, by non-interested shareholders and should be disclosed immediately.  
 
     Generally, controlling family shareholders in Korea have positively 
participated in firms’ management and also serve as top management such as CEO 
and CFO. In 1998, the legal liabilities of controlling shareholders were broadened to 
increase their accountability when involved in management in any form. Since April 
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1999, the penalties for unfaithful or fraudulent disclosure have been raised 
substantially. For example, directors who falsify or alter important matters in 
business reports may be imprisoned for up to five years or receive a fine up to 0.5 billion 
KRW (US$ 0.5 million)10. Civil liabilities can be imposed on majority shareholders as 
well as on CEOs and CFOs in an attempt to secure accounting transparency. For 
instance, after launching corporate governance reforms, the Korean government filed 
civil suits against 52 former directors of troubled firms and criminal lawsuits against 
73 former directors of 27 troubled firms (The Ministry of Finance and Economics 
2002). 
     In December 1997, the ceiling on foreign equity ownership was raised from 
26% to 55% of total shares outstanding. This ceiling was completely eliminated in 
May 1998. The requirement that foreigners had to obtain board approval if they 
wanted to own more than one-third of the outstanding shares was eliminated. With 
their increased equity participation in Korean firms, foreign investors demand 
improvements in transparency and governance practices, while their participation in 
corporate boards increased. As of 2007, foreign investors held 38% of total market 
value in Korean Stock Exchange. The portion of foreign outside directors on board 
was 2.6% (77 people) out of 2,794 outside directors for listed firms on KSE as of 
2007 (The Korean Economic Daily, October 29, 2008) 
 
                                                
10 Article 207-3, The Korean Securities and Exchange Law 
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2.5.2. Internal Governance Function 
    2.5.2.1. Outside Directors on Board 
           The IMF requested that outside directors on board be appointed under 
the force of law in an effort to improve corporate transparency. The role of the board 
of directors has been strengthened and expanded since February 1998 by the 
amendment of the Regulation on the Listing of Securities. Under this regulation, all 
listed firms are mandated to appoint at least one-quarter of their registered directors 
from outside the firm. Beginning in 1999, at least one-quarter of the board members 
(25%) of listed firms are required to be outside directors. This rule was revised in 
January 2000 to require firms listed on the stock exchange or on the Korea Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation (hereinafter KOSDAQ) with asset value of more than 
2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) to have at least 50% of board members as outside 
directors. The KFSC also requires that large financial institutions have more than half 
of their board as outside directors (with a minimum of three outside directors).  
Table 2.3 provides the principal regulatory changes concerning outside directors on 
boards.  
Table 2.3: Regulatory changes concerning the board of directors in Korea 
Year Regulatory Changes 
Feb 1998 • Firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange are required to appoint outside directors 
Jan 1999 • Firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange are required to have 25% of outside directors on board 
Jan 2000 
• Except for firms classified as venture businesses, firms listed on the KOSDAQ 
are required to appoint outside directors. 
• Firms with assets of two trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) or more and financial 
institutions are required to maintain the ratio of outside directors to board size 
at least 50 % or more. 
• Firms with assets of two trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) or more are required to 
set up an outside director nominating committee. 
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         The Korean government objective was to induce the firms to improve 
transparency and oversight role of the board by installing independent outside 
directors on the board. The Securities and Exchange Act, Article 2, defines an outside 
director as ‘a director who does not engage in the regular business of the relevant 
firm’ (Feb 1998, re-regulated on Mar 2001). In addition, the Korean Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate Governance describes an outside director as a director who 
independently participates in important corporate management decision-making, and 
supervises and supports the management as a board member. To enhance their 
independence, outside directors cannot have links or close ties with the controlling 
shareholders or managers, or anyone affiliated with them. In addition, the Regulation 
on the Listing of Securities prohibits individuals from being appointed as outside 
directors when they have equity shares of 1% or more the firm, or shares of 300 
million KRW (US$ 3 million) or more, or whose outstanding balance with the firm 
equals or exceeds 100 million KRW (US$ 1 million)11. 
The requirements for any person prohibited from becoming an outside director 
are as follows (Article 54-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act):  
(1) A person who together with any specially related persons holds the largest 
number of stocks on the basis of the total number of stocks with voting rights of a 
particular securities firm;  
(2) A person that has a special relationship with the largest shareholder; 
(3) The major shareholder (referring to the major shareholder under the provisions of 
Article 188 (1)) of the concerned firm and that person's spouse and lineal 
ascendant and descendant; 
(4) A person who was an officer or an employee (referring to a person who worked 
full-time; hereafter the same shall apply in this paragraph) of the concerned firm 
                                                
11 Article 48-5, the Regulation on the Listing of Securities. 
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or its affiliate (affiliate as provided under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act) or worked as an officer or employee for such relevant securities firm 
within the preceding two years; 
(5) The spouse or lineal ascendant and descendant of an officer of the concerned 
firm; 
(6) The officer or employee of a corporation that has an important business 
relationship prescribed by Presidential Decree with a relevant securities firm, a 
competitive relationship or a cooperative relationship with such securities firm or 
was an officer or employee for such corporation within the preceding two years;  
(7) The officers or employees of a firm in which an officer or employee of the 
concerned firm was a non-full-time director; and, 
(8) A person who has difficulty in faithfully performing their duties as an outside 
director or can affect the management of the firm as prescribed by Presidential 
Decree. 
 
The recommendations of the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance 
concerning outsider directors on boards are as follows (II-4.1): 
An outside director should not have a material relationship with the concerned 
corporation. A person with a material relationship refers to a person who is under a 
contractual agreement and/or is doing business with the concerned companies, 
including a controlling shareholder and related parties of the concerned company. 
Examples of material relationships that present difficulties in appointing an 
individual as an outside director are: 
 
(1) A former officer or staff of the concerned corporation who has retired from or left 
the corporation less than 5 years ago; 
(2) A former or current employee and associate of an external audit company or its 
affiliates, who has audited or performed the work relating to auditing of the 
concerned corporation within the past 5 years; 
(3) An employee or officer of a company to which an employee or officer of the 
concerned corporation serves as an outside director. 
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    2.5.2.2. Audit Committee 
           The quality of financial reporting is essential to all users of financial 
information and interested parties of firms (e.g., shareholders, creditors, employees, 
governments, and consumers etc.). The most important responsibility of audit 
committee is to audit the business conduct of management, thereby confirming the 
quality of financial reporting. 
 
        Audit committees were first introduced in Korea after the Commercial 
Code was modified in December 1999. While the Commercial Code allows firms to 
choose from the statutory (internal) auditor system or audit committee system, the 
Securities and Exchange Act requires firms with assets of 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 
billion) or more to have an audit committee from April 1, 2000.  
 
The requirement for establishment and constitution of audit committee are as 
follows (Article 54-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act): 
(1) Any securities company (limited to the securities company prescribed by 
Presidential Decree taking into account the size of its asset) shall establish an 
audit committee (hereinafter referred to the "audit committee") pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 415-2 of the Commercial Act.  
(2) Not less than two thirds of the total members of the audit committee referred to in 
paragraph (1) shall consist of outside directors. In this case, the chairman of the 
audit committee of any securities company that is either a stock-listed corporation 
or an Association-registered corporation shall be an outside director.  
 
The recommendations of the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance 
concerning audit committee are as follows (III-1.1): 
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(1)  An audit committee is expected, through checks and balances, to bring positive 
results in supervising and supporting the management of large corporations, 
whose business operations have become complex, and financial institutions 
whose stakeholders are diverse, so that they may ultimately maximize the 
corporation’s value. Therefore, it is highly desirable for such corporations as the 
listed corporations, government-invested institutions, financial institutions and 
other corporations, which put a greater emphasis on the public nature of the 
management, to establish an audit committee in the Board. 
(2)  A corporation that establishes an audit committee should not retain the existing 
auditor on the committee, which is required under the Commercial Code. This is 
because the dual systems of an auditor and audit committee would place an 
added burden on the corporation, and considerable inefficiency might result 
from the overlapping authorities of the two systems. 
 
      The Korean Security and Exchange Acts enforce that the chairman of an audit 
committee should be an independent director12 for firms, and independent directors 
must constitute a majority of the boards of banks. In addition, the largest shareholder 
and its affiliated persons together can only exercise their voting rights up to 3% of 
total voting shares issued in electing audit committee members who are not 
independent directors. 
 
     In summary, the audit committee is expected to play a vital role in the 
monitoring function of the board of directors, in particular, in protecting the 
independence and the quality of external auditors, thereby providing higher quality of 
financial reporting.  
 
                                                
12 Article 54-5, the Korean Securities and Exchange Act 
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2.5.3. External Governance Function 
        The IMF requested the KFSC to ensure that large Korean financial 
institutions with assets over 800 billion KRW (US$ 0.8 billion) would be audited by 
audit firms that had entered into audit quality-control contracts with recognized 
international audit firms. In addition, both the IMF and the World Bank demanded 
revision of audit standards with international best practice. Various regulatory and 
protective measures related to the external audit system in Korea have been 
implemented. The Asian financial crisis had a significant impact on the financial and 
legal liabilities and practices of the CPA profession in Korea.  
     In order to strengthen the independence of external auditors in an environment 
where the shareholders meeting, the board of directors meeting, the nomination of 
the statutory auditor, and the day-to-day management were dominated by the firm’s 
largest shareholder, the External Audit Act included in 1998 a new provision that the 
external auditor selection committee should consist of the statutory auditor, 
independent directors, and representatives from the two largest shareholders and 
creditors, respectively. In addition, the government audit-fee schedule was abolished 
in 1999 to enhance the audit quality. Under the government audit-fee schedule, audit 
fees were automatically determined by the KICPA audit fee guidelines without 
considering audit quality.  
 
     Another key factor strengthening the independence of external auditors was to 
impose mandatory rotation of external auditors by partner after six consecutive years 
of audit engagement so as to prevent external auditors from compromising their duty 
or independence because of financial interests or a long relationship with the same 
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client. In addition, the provision of non-audit services such as management 
consulting and audit services provided by the same audit firms has been restricted. 
Table 2.4 summarizes external audit reforms by the Korean government. 
Table 2.4: Summary of External Audit Reform 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Independence 
• Selected by the firm’s largest 
shareholders 
 
• Audit engagement per 1 year 
• External Auditor Selection 
Committee (April 98) 
• Mandatory rotation of 
external auditor by partner 
after 6 consecutive years of 
audit engagement (Jan 98) 
• Engaging a given auditor for 3 
consecutive years (Jan 98) 
Audit Fee 
• Audit fee schedule (The 
KICPA audit fee guideline) 
by the government 
• Abolishing the audit-fee 
schedule (Feb 99) 
Punishment for 
unfaithful & fraudulent 
audit report 
• Imprison up to 2 years or a 
fine up to 10 million KRW 
(US$ 10,000) 
• Imprison up to 3 years or a 
fine up to 30 million KRW 
(US$ 30,000) 
 
    After the crisis, supervisory and regulatory bodies of the Korean government 
have stressed and have actually taken steps to strengthen monitoring power and penal 
actions against the auditing profession. In March 1999, a series of audit failures, 
followed by various legal and financial penalties, forced the Sandong-KPMG13, one 
of the Big 5 audit firms in Korea, to declare voluntary dissolution for the first time in 
the history of Korea’s auditing service industry. In addition, civil liability on auditors 
has been reinforced. For instance, if an external auditor receives an unjust solicitation 
relevant to his/her duties and receives, demands, or promises to receive any money, 
valuables or benefits, they may be imprisoned for up to three years or receive a fine 
                                                
13 The Sandong-KPMG was responsible for auditing the Daewoo group. 
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up to 30 million KRW (US$ 30,000)14. 
 
2.6 .CONCLUDING REMARKS 
    Corporate governance is the system by which corporations are directed and 
managed by providing the structures through which the objectives of the firm are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Namely, corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that managers of 
firms work within for the best interests of shareholders. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the firm and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring (OECD 2004). Thus, good corporate governance is valuable not only to 
shareholders, but also to governments and listed firms themselves. It increases 
shareholder confidence that their interests are being protected and that the firms they 
invest in are well managed. It also helps governments and regulatory bodies to 
improve the investment environment to specify the relationship and distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among various the interest parties of the firm. 
 
     The Korean government has maintained a government-led high-growth 
strategy since the 1970s (Beck 1998). Although the Korean government’s high-
growth strategy helped Korea transform rapidly into an advanced industrial economy, 
it brought some serious adverse side effects. Since Korean firms heavily depended on 
the government, corporate governance practices in Korean firms were deficient. 
                                                
14 Article 4, The External Audit Act. 
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Therefore, the lack of corporate governance in Korea fostered a low quality of 
financial reporting and added to the financial crisis. 
 
     After the financial crisis in 1997, there have been sweeping changes of 
corporate governance practice in Korea. Korean firms are typically managed and 
dominated by controlling family shareholders. In order to restrict dominant family 
control, independent outside directors were required to take a leading role in 
corporate governance, an audit committee was adopted to provide effective 
monitoring function, and the external auditing profession was also strengthened.  
 
    In essence, the primary objective of the Korean corporate governance reforms 
appears to be to transplant a common-law regime, which is a rational and transparent 
system based on high fiduciary standards and accountability for business and 
governments, and respect for and responsiveness to the interests of shareholders and 
investors (Ball 2001), into the code-law rules and practices based on government 
regulation. The major goals of corporate governance reforms in Korea, enhancing 
corporate transparency and strengthening the internal monitoring mechanism and 
market discipline are to improve quality of financial reporting, thereby enhancing the 
international competitiveness of Korean firms. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This chapter reviews the academic literature related to the three research 
questions raised in Chapter 1 on the relationship between earnings quality and 
corporate governance. The objective is to provide motivation for the research on 
which the relevant hypotheses are developed. In this regard, the reminder of this 
chapter is structured as five main sections. 
 
     The first of these, Section 3.2, informs the role of financial reporting and 
definition of financial reporting quality in two types of different approaches for 
assessing financial reporting quality: user needs and shareholder/investor protection, 
following Jonas and Blachet (2000). Financial reporting is a fundamental 
communication tool between a firm and various interested parties (e.g., shareholders, 
stakeholders, employees etc). From the user needs perspective, financial reporting 
plays an important role in useful economic decision-making by providing relevant 
information to financial statement users, while financial reporting, from the 
shareholder/investor protection perspective, reduces information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders/investors and provides reliable information to these 
users.  
 
     Quality of financial reporting is not easily observable and is measured in 
different ways. Section 3.3 discusses various measures of financial reporting quality 
and justifies why earnings quality is used as a measure of financial reporting in this 
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study. Earnings quality, similar to financial reporting quality, is also not a single 
concept. Specifically, section 3.3.3 presents four measures of earnings quality, based 
on the two types of different approaches for assessing financial reporting quality, user 
needs and shareholder/investor protection.  
 
      Earnings quality can be affected by various factors. Section 3.4 reviews how 
legal/judicial regime can influence earnings quality. Section 3.5 presents the 
literature on corporate governance factors affecting earnings quality for the purpose 
of supporting the hypothesis development, relating to research question 1, 2, and 3: 
(RQ1) “How does ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) 
affect earnings quality?”, (RQ2) “Does internal governance functions (outside 
directors on the boards and audit committee) increase earnings quality?”, and 
(RQ3) “Does higher audit quality increase earnings quality?” From this review of 
corporate governance factors, the specific hypotheses relating to RQ1, RQ2, and 
RQ3 will be developed for the area of Korean corporate governance reforms. 
 
     Finally, Section 3.6 presents a summary of this chapter with a list of 
hypotheses corresponding to the three research questions. 
 
3.2. QUANLITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
3.2.1. The Roles of Financial Reporting 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), modern firms can be 
characterized as a nexus (connection) of contracts between suppliers and consumers 
of factors of production. The complex set of contracts that the firm is taken to 
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represent comprises various forms of agency relationships15. Typically two types of 
agency relationships are identified: (1) shareholder-management contracting and (2) 
shareholder-debtholder contracting. Under shareholder-management contracting, the 
agency relationship occurs wherever principals partially delegate their decision-
making authority to the agents. Thus, agency costs can arise when the interests of 
manager (agent) are not aligned with those of shareholders (principal). In order to 
reduce agency costs, managers and shareholders make contracts including 
management compensation contracts which are used to align the incentives of 
management and shareholders. Under shareholder-debtholder contracting, debt 
covenants are made to control the conflict of interest between shareholders and debt 
holders. Debt covenants are written to restrict managers’ actions that benefit the 
firm’s shareholders at the expense of its debt holders. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
argue that contracts between parties to the firm use accounting numbers to reduce 
agency costs, suggesting that accounting information is used to help monitor and 
regulate the contracts between the firm and its many various contract parties. 
Accordingly, contracting parties need measures of performance for contract purposes, 
and thus financial reporting quality is needed to accomplish the efficient performance 
of various contracts with firm. 
 
      The primary role of financial reporting originated from stewardship in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) suggests that stewardship (or 
                                                
15 Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) define agency relationship as “a contract under which one or 
more persons (principals) engage another (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves the delegation of decision-making authority”. 
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accountability) is one of the two main objectives of financial statements (another 
view is decision usefulness). Stewardship is defined as “a feature of the principal-
agent relationship, whereby the agent is assumed to safeguard the resource of the 
principal.” (Belkaoui 1993, p.53) Financial reporting is a key communication device 
between management and the suppliers of debt and equity capital. Therefore, 
financial reporting plays an important role in evaluating management’s stewardship 
to the suppliers of debt and equity capital. 
 
      Since the early 1960s, the role of financial reporting has been focused on 
decision usefulness. Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No.1 of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) states that “financial reporting should 
provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and 
other users in making rational investment, credit, and similar decision (FASB 1978, 
SFAC No.1, paragraph 34).” The IASB states that “the objective of financial 
statements is to provide information about the financial position, performance and 
changes in financial position of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in 
making economic decisions.” (IASB 1989, Framework paragraph 12) Therefore, 
financial reporting has been used as a fundamental and necessary decision making 
tool for both management and investors. 
 
      Specifically, financial statements provide useful information on the 
assessment of future cash flows. The ability to predict future cash flows has been a 
concern of the FASB, as it is reflected in its SFAC No.1, paragraph 37 which states 
that “Financial reporting should provide information to help present and potential 
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investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective cash receipts...Thus, financial reporting should provide 
information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise.” In addition, 
SFAC No.1 paragraph 44 states that “information about enterprise earnings and its 
components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication 
of enterprise performance than information about current cash receipts and 
payments.” According to the IASB Framework paragraph 22, “Financial statements 
prepared on the accrual basis inform users not only of past transactions involving the 
payment and receipt of cash but also of obligations to pay cash in the future and of 
resources that represent cash to be received in the future.” Thus, expected cash flow 
has financial reporting implications for firm investment. 
 
3.2.2. Definition of Financial Reporting Quality 
        The SFAC No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information (FASB 1980) provides guidance to the desirable characteristics of 
financial reporting quality (McDaniel, Martin, and Maines 2002; Schipper and 
Vincent 2003). Both SFAC No.2 and the IASB Framework paragraph 24 suggest 
relevance and reliability as primary decision-specific qualities. However, Schipper 
and Vincent (2003) suggest that relevance and reliability as a financial reporting 
quality are not mutually exclusive and are difficult to be separately measured despite 
representing the desirable characteristics of financial reporting quality. 
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Jonas and Blanchet (2000) propose two types of approaches for assessing 
financial reporting quality: user needs and shareholder/investor protection. User 
needs are closely linked with the decision usefulness of the financial information to 
the users associated with valuation-related issues, while shareholder/investor 
protection is based on full and fair financial information (the SEC’s “investor 
protection” principle), designed to prevent obfuscation of financial information users 
which are related with stewardship issues. 
 
     Jonas and Blanchet (2000) suggest that the two types of approaches for 
assessing financial reporting quality are not mutually exclusive. The fundamental 
distinction between the two types of approach for assessing financial reporting 
quality is that the user needs approach focuses on providing relevant financial 
information to financial statement users for decision making, while the 
shareholder/investor protection approach focuses on providing reliability of financial 
information (information competency16). 
 
     3.2.2.1. User Needs 
            Financial statement users use financial reporting as a decision-making 
tool for the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an 
entity, and thus financial reporting quality can be measured as the usefulness of 
financial statement users in making decisions. The FASB state that “financial 
reporting is not an end in itself but is intended to provide information that is useful in 
making business and economic decisions for making reasoned choice among 
                                                
16 How transparent information can be provided with financial statement users. 
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alternative uses of scarce resources (FASB 1978, SFAC No.1, paragraph 9).” The 
IASB states that “the users of financial statements include present and potential 
investors, employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade creditors, customers, 
governments and their agencies and the public. They use financial statements in 
order to satisfy some of their different needs for information (IASB 1989, Framework 
paragraph 9).” In addition, IASB states the objective of financial reports as “to 
provide information about the financial position, financial performance and cash 
flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic 
decisions.” Turner (1999) suggests that high quality financial statements should 
provide the necessary information for users to make their investment decision.  
 
Relevance: SFAC No. 2 states that “relevant accounting information is capable of 
making a difference in a decision by helping users to form predictions about the 
outcomes of past, present, and future events or to confirm or correct prior 
expectations”. IASB Framework paragraph 26 describes that “information has the 
quality of relevance when it influences the economic decisions of users by helping 
them evaluate past, present or future events or confirming, or correcting, their past 
evaluations.”  
      
      Accordingly, financial accounting information must be relevant when it 
makes a difference to decisions by financial information users. In short, high quality 
financial reporting, by reducing the uncertainty in earnings as an informative signal, 
reduces investment risk. Therefore, financial reporting quality is closely linked with 
the usefulness of financial statement users in making investment decisions.  
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     3.2.2.2. Shareholder/Investor Protection 
          The IASB describes that “financial statements also show the result of 
the stewardship of management, or the accountability of management for the 
resources entrusted to it (IASB 1989, Framework paragraph 14).” An agency 
problem results from the inevitable consequences of the separation of ownership 
from control. Management acquires more various firm information than contracting 
parties such as shareholders, stakeholders, and employees. Hence, contracting parties 
face continuous information asymmetry17. Information asymmetry leads management 
to provide a lower quality of financial reporting, following unintended wealth 
transfer. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), financial statements have a 
function to reduce agency costs, arising out of agency relationships because financial 
reporting plays an important role in ex ante contracting by evaluating management’s 
performance. Financial reporting is a means to alleviating information asymmetry 
between management and firms’ contracting parties (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; 
Ball 2001). Bushman and Smith (2001) suggest that shareholders use financial 
accounting information as an important source to monitor managers. Thus, financial 
reporting is a potentially important means for management to communicate firm 
performance and governance to outside investors, which is critical to the efficient 
functioning of a capital market (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
 
      To facilitate shareholder/investor protection, high quality financial reporting 
should be reliable and transparent18, so as to not mislead financial statement users. 
                                                
17 “One party to a potential transaction has more information than another”. (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986, p.165) 
18 As a contrary concept of transparency, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) define earnings opacity as the 
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Reliability: In describing reliability, SFAC No.2 states that “the reliability of a 
measure rests on the faithfulness with which it represents what it purports to 
represent, coupled with an assurance for the user that it has that representational 
quality.” IASB Framework paragraph 31 describes that “information has the quality 
of reliability when it is free from material error and bias and can be depended upon 
by users to represent faithfully...”  
 
        In short, financial accounting information, to be reliable, should be faithful 
and objective and thus should provide financial information users with assurance of 
financial information that accurately represents the transactions of the firm. 
 
        Rezaee (2002) contends that transparency should be regarded as a form of 
financial reporting quality because of the notorious accounting scandals in the U.S. 
(e.g., Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
emphasized the transparency of reported earnings. Turner (1999) defines financial 
reporting transparency as the extent to which financial information about a firm is 
visible and understandable to investors, market participants, and regulators. Further, 
Turner (2001) states that “transparent financial information allows market 
participants to better evaluate counterparty risks and adjust the availability and 
pricing of funds in ways that can promote efficient financial markets.”  
  
Transparency: “Transparent financial information provides the complete reporting 
and disclosure of transactions, which portray the financial conditions and 
                                                                                                                                        
failure to provide information about the distribution of the true, but unobservable. 
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operational results of the company in conformity with GAAP. Transparency enables 
financial statement users, including investors and creditors, to obtain the right 
information and ensure that financial information is factual and objective” (Rezaee 
2002, p.26).  
 
      According to Pownall and Schipper (1999), accounting transparency reveals 
the events, transactions, judgments and estimates underlying the financial statements 
and their implications. Ball et al. (2003) define transparency as the ability of users to 
‘see through’ the financial statements to comprehend the underlying accounting 
events and transactions in the firm. Hunton, Libby, and Mazza (2006) define 
transparent financial reporting as that from which needed information can be more 
easily extracted and more effectively used to understand firm economics. Thus, 
higher financial statement transparency enables financial statement users to 
efficiently monitor management by providing factual and objective financial 
information, reducing agency problems. 
 
3.3. EARNINGS QUALITY 
3.3.1. Earnings Quality as a Measure of Financial Reporting Quality 
    Quality of financial reporting can be measured in various ways. For 
example, Standard and Poors (S&P) transparency and disclosure index, analyst 
rankings of disclosure quality, and earnings quality are widely used as a proxy of 
financial reporting quality. Figure 3.1 depicts various proxies of quality of financial 
reporting. 
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Figure 3.1: Proxies of Financial Reporting Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
                                    Proxies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frost, Gordon, and Pownal (2006) use the S&P transparency and disclosure 
index score as a proxy for financial reporting quality. The S&P transparency and 
disclosure index score is calculated by the percentage of disclosure items from a list 
of 35 attributes in annual reports items19. Auditor litigation can a proxy for financial 
reporting quality since higher audit quality (e.g., Big N) increases accounting 
information credibility by reducing aggressive and opportunistic financial reporting 
and decreases litigation risk for fraudulent financial reporting (Khurana and Raman 
2004). Many empirical studies (e.g., Sengupta 1998; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 
1999; Botosan and Plumlee 2002) measure financial disclosure quality as analysts’ 
ratings of disclosure quality (the Association of Investment Management and 
Research scores; AIMR scores). The AIMR scores consist of three categories: annual 
published information, quarterly and other published information, and investor 
                                                
19 Overall scores were developed from scores on individual questions. 
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relations and related aspects. The total score is a weighted combination of the three 
category scores. However, S&P disclosure scores and the AIMR scores are indirect 
measures of financial reporting quality, and thus both scores are subjective and noisy 
measures (Cohen 2002).  
 
      FASB 1978, SFAC No.1 paragraph 47 state that “Investors, creditors, and 
others use earnings information to help them (a) evaluate management's 
performance, (b) estimate "earning power" or other amounts they perceive as 
"representative" of long-term earning ability of an enterprise, (c) predict future 
earnings, or (d) assess the risk of investing in or lending to an enterprise.” 
Therefore, earnings quality is the ability of earnings to meet the primary objective of 
financial reporting, providing relevant and reliable information to users such as 
investor, employees, lenders, suppliers and trade creditors, customers, and 
governments (Entwistle and Phillips 2003).  
 
 Earnings quality, as a measure of financial reporting quality, is the primary 
measure provided in financial statements (Lev 1989) and the most comprehensive 
measure for financial reporting quality (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003). In 
addition, earnings are very important to a firm because they are used as a summary 
measure of the performance of a firm by a large variety of users (Dechow 1994). 
Bushman and Smith (2003) suggest that earnings are one of the main guides used by 
investors and managers to identify and evaluate investment opportunities. Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2003) state that earnings quality is used by investors 
 56
as “a conditioning variable to extract valuation-relevant information from earnings 
patterns (p.1)”. Thus, earnings quality is used by future and current investors and 
also used for contracting purposes (Schipper and Vincent 2003). Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) suggest that earnings are one of the most important summary measures 
investors use to assess the firm’s future cash flows. Thus, this study uses earnings 
quality as a measure of the quality of financial reporting. 
 
3.3.2. Definition of Earnings Quality 
        The definition of earnings quality varies by researchers. Bernstein and 
Siegel (1979) classify earnings quality into three concepts: conservatism, 
discretionary costs, and variability of earnings resulting from management decisions 
or the economic cycle. Lev (1989) defines earnings quality as the predictive power of 
financial variables. He explains that higher earnings quality requires that anticipated 
events potentially affecting a firm’s future cash flows are reflected in the firm’s 
current earnings and values. Bricker, Previts, Robinson, and Young (1995) investigate 
earnings quality by analyzing sell-side financial analysts’ reports. The result shows 
that financial analysts consider recurring, consistent and predictable earnings as high 
quality earnings. Schipper and Vincent (2003) define earnings quality as the extent to 
which reported earnings faithfully represent Hicksian income20 (economic earnings) 
and argue that higher quality earnings are closer to Hicksian income. They suggest 
seven measures of earnings quality: persistence, predictability, variability, ratio of 
cash from operations to income, changes in total accruals, discretionary accruals, and 
                                                
20 Hicks defines income (earnings) as the amount that can be consumed during a period, while leaving 
the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period (Hicks 1946, p.172).  
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accruals to cash flows. Francis et al. (2004) classify seven earnings attributes into 
either accounting-based or market-based attributes. They characterize accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability, and smoothness as accounting-based attributes because 
these are measured using accounting information only, whereas value relevance, 
timeliness, and conservatism are referred to as market-based attributes since these are 
based on the relation between accounting earnings and returns. 
 
       As mentioned in section 3.2, financial reporting quality is defined as the 
degree to which financial reporting more accurately represents the relevant economic 
fundamentals of the firms, consistent with the FASB – SFAC No.1 which states that 
one objective of financial reporting is to inform present and potential investors in 
making rational investment decisions. In addition, financial reporting quality is 
defined as the precision with which accounting information is unambiguous, reliable 
and transparent, consistent with the FASB – SFAC No.2 which states that financial 
reporting should be faithful and objective.  
 
     Following two definitions of financial reporting quality, this study proposes 
two definitions of earnings quality. First, if reported earnings provide useful 
accounting information for evaluating the firm’s performance, this will enable 
financial statements users to make better decisions and financial statements may be 
regarded as being high quality. Second, higher quality of earnings reflects a firm’s 
reliability and transparency and represents one of the primary objectives of financial 
reporting, being to mitigate information asymmetries and the uncertainty about a 
firm’s performance.  
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3.3.3. Measure of Earnings Quality 
  McDaniel et al. (2002) and Schipper and Vincent (2003) suggest that 
financial Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information of SFAC No.2 and 
the IASB Framework is an appropriate framework for evaluating financial reporting 
quality. As discussed in section 3.2.2, financial reporting quality can be assessed by 
two types of different approaches proposed by Jonas and Blanchet (2000): user needs 
and shareholder/investor protection. Following Jonas and Blanchet (2000), this study 
classifies earnings quality into the view of user needs measured by earnings 
persistence and value-relevance and the view of shareholder/investor protection 
measured by conservatism and accruals quality.  
 
      In the view of user needs, the purpose of financial statements should provide 
useful information to users in making economic decisions, thereby making a 
difference to their decisions. Schipper and Vincent (2003) propose that earnings 
persistence and value-relevance are derived from a decision usefulness perspective. 
Jonas and Blanchet (2000) emphasize that earnings persistence is specifically based 
on the user needs. Financial reporting users view highly persistent earnings as 
sustainable, which means earnings are more permanent and less transitory. The 
value-relevance of accounting information can be defined as the ability of financial 
statements to summarize information that affects firm value (Francis and Schipper 
1996; Hung 2001). Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) and Schipper and Vincent 
(2003) suggest that value-relevance captures the relevance of earnings. Thus, 
earnings persistence and value-relevance are referred to as measure of earnings 
quality under the view of user needs.  
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     Under the category of shareholder/investor protection, financial information 
should not mislead or confuse financial information users and should be fully and 
fairly disclosed, because information asymmetry occurs between management and 
financial information users. Thus, financial reporting plays an important role in 
monitoring management by emphasizing financial information transparency and 
should have the faithfulness and objectivity (Rezaee 2002; Ball et al. 2000 and 2003).  
 
      In the context of shareholder/investor protection, earnings quality can be 
measured by conservatism and accruals quality. The SEC Recommendation No.8 
defines the criteria for determining financial reporting quality as the degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism of accounting principles and underlying estimates. 
Ball et al. (2000 and 2003) assert that conservatism captures financial statement 
transparency. Watts (2003a) argues that conservatism constrains managerial 
opportunistic behavior and offsets managerial biases with its asymmetrical 
verifiability requirement.  
 
      Accruals quality proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) measures the 
relation between accruals and cash flows, thereby capturing measurement error in 
accruals. Schipper and Vincent (2003) suggest that accruals quality is consistent with 
the representational faithfulness perspective. As one of five components for reliability, 
The IASB Framework paragraph 33 describes faithfulness as that “to be reliable, 
information must represent faithfully the transactions and other events it either 
purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to represent.”  
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In summary, conservatism and accruals quality can be referred to as measure 
of earnings quality under the category of shareholder/investor protection. Figure 3.2 
depicts framework of earnings quality as proxy of quality of financial reporting. 
      
Figure 3.2: Framework of Earnings Quality 
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     3.3.3.1. Earnings Persistence 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2001, p.20) define earnings 
quality as earnings persistence, which means “degree to which earnings performance 
persists into the next period.” Benish and Vargus (2002, p.756) state that “the quality 
of current earnings is the likelihood that the current earnings are sustainable in the 
future.” Accordingly, a highly persistent earnings number is viewed by investors as 
sustainable, that is, recurring, more permanent and less transitory, and therefore 
higher quality (Penman and Zhang 2002; Schipper and Vincent 2003).  
 
      3.3.3.2. Value-Relevance 
             Beaver, Lambert, and Morse (1980) defines value-relevance as the 
explanatory power of accounting information with respect to security prices. In 
addition, value relevance is defined as the ability of financial statements to 
summarize information that affects firm value (Collins, Maydew, and Weiss 1997; 
Hung 2001). Barth et al. (2001) suggest that the value-relevance of accounting 
information depends on relevance as a primary criterion in the FASB’s Conceptual 
Framework. Therefore, higher quality earnings should be value relevant.  
 
Previous research (e.g., Collins et al. 1997; Barth et al. 1998; Ali and Hwang 
2000) measures value relevance as the explanatory power of accounting information 
(earnings and book value of equity) with respect to security prices. 
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     3.3.3.3. Conservatism 
   According to SFAC No.2, conservatism is defined as “a prudent 
reaction to uncertainty and an attempt to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent 
in business situations are adequately considered.” Under conservative accounting, 
expenses or losses are immediately recognised, whereas revenues or gains are not 
until uncertainties surrounding economic events are resolved. For example, 
conservatism is the use of the lower of cost or market value in valuing inventories. In 
addition, conservatism uses the rule that accrued net losses should be recognized on 
firm purchase commitments for goods in inventory. Similar to SFAC No.2, 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) use prudence as the concept of 
conservatism (Grambovas, Giner, and Christodoulou 2006). The IASB Framework 
paragraph 37 states that “prudence is the inclusion of a degree of caution in the 
exercise of the judgements needed in making the estimates required under conditions 
of uncertainty, such that assets or income are not overstated and liabilities or 
expenses are not understated”. Imhoff and Thomas (1989) suggest that higher quality 
is most closely associated with conservative accounting methods and full financial 
disclosure. Basu (1997) defines conservatism as capturing the accountants’ tendency 
to require a higher degree of verification for recognising good news than bad news in 
financial statements. Ball et al. (2000) argue that conservatism is a property of 
accounting income and captures financial statement transparency since the timely 
recognition of economic loss in accounting income attempts to force managers to 
stem the losses more quickly and attempts to reduce investment risk for investors. 
Accordingly, conservatism plays a corporate governance role by monitoring 
management, debt, and other contracts. Conservative accounting income imposes 
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higher verifiability of economic income recognition than that of economic losses 
(Watts 2003a). A higher level of conservatism in the calculation of earnings requires 
greater verifiability of revenues relative to expenses, and this serves to reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of managers to report higher earnings for their own self-
interest. In addition, higher conservatism in the calculation of earnings decreases the 
likelihood that earnings will omit concurrent economic losses, thereby reducing 
investors’ potential losses due to flawed earnings information. LaFond and Watts 
(2008) test information asymmetry and conservatism. They find that conservatism 
reduces the manager’s incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and 
so reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information 
asymmetry generates, thereby increasing firm and equity values. Thus, conservatism 
reduces management’s opportunistic behaviors to increase (decrease) income 
(losses), and therefore increases earnings quality.  
 
    3.3.3.4. Accrual Quality 
           Financial reporting carries information on the firm’s operations, and 
particularly its expected cash flows to investors. Therefore, high quality earnings are 
defined as earnings that predict future operating cash flows. The ability to predict 
future cash flows has been a concern of the FASB, as reflected in SFAC No.1 
paragraph 37 which states that “Financial reporting should provide information to 
help present and potential investors and creditors and other users in assessing the 
amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash receipts....Thus, financial 
reporting should provide information to help investors, creditors, and others assess 
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the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related 
enterprise.” In addition, SFAC No.1 paragraph 44 states that “information about 
enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally 
provides a better indication of enterprise performance than information about 
current cash receipts and payments.” According to IASB Framework paragraph 22, 
“Financial statements prepared on the accrual basis inform users not only of past 
transactions involving the payment and receipt of cash but also of obligations to pay 
cash in the future and of resources that represent cash to be received in the future.”  
 
      Net income (earnings) consists of cash flows from operations and total 
accruals. In accrual accounting, accruals are used to recognize revenues and expenses 
that make accounting information more relevant, but accruals can be manipulated by 
management’s opportunistic behavior. The cash flows are less manipulated by 
management but have less relevance. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that accruals 
are estimates of future cash flows and more represents future cash flows when 
accruals contain lower estimate error. Namely, accruals are recognized as higher 
quality when accruals quickly convert into future cash flow. In addition, Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) suggest that accruals quality would reflect the combined effects, 
resulted from intentional earnings management by managerial opportunistic behavior 
and systematic firm and industry characteristics due to unintentional estimation 
errors. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2003) define earnings quality as the extent to 
which a firm’s past earnings are associated with its future operating cash flows. 
Cohen (2003) suggests that high quality reported earnings are highly associated with 
future cash flows. Thus, high accruals quality improves the informativeness of 
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earnings by smoothing transitory fluctuations in cash flows and will be more 
representative of future cash flows when lower estimation error is embedded in the 
accruals process (McNichols 2002).  
 
3.4. LEGAL/JUDICIAL REGIME AND EARNINGS QUALITY 
   Jaggi and Low (2000) and Beck et al. (2003) argue that different legal systems 
have different types of impact on the formulation of accounting rules and corporate 
governance systems.   
 
A country’s legal/judicial regime can influence earnings quality. La Porta, et 
al. (1998 and 2000) suggest that legal protection of outside investors’ rights is the 
most notable feature of corporate governance and it varies around the world. In effect, 
legal rules protecting investors and the quality of their enforcement differ greatly and 
systematically across countries. These rules vary systematically with legal origin, 
which is common-law or code-law. Their results provide evidence that common law 
countries have stronger outside investor legal protection than that of code-law 
countries. Supporting La Porta et al. (1998)’s research, Beck et al. (2003) empirically 
assess the influence of legal origin on financial development. They come up with two 
reasons why common-law countries have stronger protection of outside investors’ 
rights than code-law countries. First, the legal tradition of common-law regimes 
which emphasize the decentralized nature of state power has evolved to protect 
property rights of individuals. Second, code-law regimes are inflexible and 
inefficiently rigid relative to common-law regime, and thus provide significant gaps 
between legal capability and commercial needs. La Porta et al. (2006) examine the 
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effect of securities law on stock market development. They suggest that securities 
laws of common-law countries emphasize market discipline, private litigation, and 
standardized disclosures, which benefit the stock market. Consequently, common-law 
regimes afford stronger legal protection for investors and are more market-oriented 
than those of code-law regimes. 
 
Ball (2001) argues that these differences between common-law and code-law 
regimes affect the quality of financial reporting. In common-law regimes, 
information asymmetry between management and contracting parties of firms is 
resolved by public financial reporting and disclosure, whereas in code-law regimes, 
information asymmetry is resolved by private communication such as insider access 
between managers and stakeholders. Therefore, common-law regimes have evolved 
well-developed and reliable public financial reporting and disclosure infrastructure. 
This includes: (1) auditor independence from management, since independence from 
management can objectively monitor and observe management without any 
constraint. Accordingly, auditor independence increases quality of financial 
reporting; (2) efficient corporate governance systems to produce reliable public 
information, since provision of fair and faithful financial statements is the primary 
responsibility of the top management. The board of directors and audit committee 
have the responsibility to monitor the financial reporting process and attest to the 
accuracy of financial reporting. Thus, efficient corporate governance can achieve a 
higher quality of financial reporting; (3) a system for setting and maintaining high 
quality and independent financial accounting standards because governments in 
code-law countries establish and enforce accounting standards that are representative 
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of interests of various political groups such as financial institutions, unions, and 
governments. Hence, political influence impairs the quality of financial reporting; (4) 
independent legal systems for protecting and punishing fraud, manipulation and 
failure to comply with accounting standards and disclosure. For example strong 
investor protection and legal punishment such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 can be 
expected to reduce accounting frauds and to impose management’s accountability for 
providing higher-quality financial reporting. Based on well-developed infrastructure, 
common-law financial accounting standards place more emphasis on credibility and 
accountability, compared with code-law accounting standards. Hence, earnings 
quality in common-law countries is generally higher than in code-law countries.  
 
      Ball et al. (2000) classify countries into common-law (shareholder 
governance model) and code-law (stakeholder governance model) regimes 
respectively, and examine properties of accounting information, defined as 
conservatism 21 , in different legal regimes. Common-law regimes focus on 
shareholder rights, and thereby financial accounting practices in common-law 
countries are market-oriented and have evolved into a non-legalistic approach such as 
accounting custom. A purpose of the accounting system in common-law countries is 
to fulfill the decision-making needs of investors and creditors. In contrast, code-law 
regimes are legalistically oriented and tend to protect stakeholders. Governments in 
code-law countries establish and enforce accounting standards that are representative 
of the interests of various political groups such as financial institutions, unions, and 
                                                
21  Ball et al. (2000) interpret that conservatism captures the concept of financial statement 
transparency. 
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governments. Thus, the demand for accounting information is strongly influenced by 
other stakeholders, rather than by stockholders. Empirical results suggest that 
accounting income in common-law countries is significantly timelier than in code-
law countries, due to quicker recognition of economic losses. Hung (2001) 
investigates value-relevance of financial statements across countries with different 
legal regimes. Consistent with Ball et al. (2000), the use of accrual accounting 
increases the value-relevance of financial statements in common-law countries, 
whereas in code-law countries it does not increase the value-relevance of financial 
statements. Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) examine the role of legal institutions 
and earnings management induced by control-ownership disparity of controlling 
shareholders between common-law and code-law countries. They document that 
earnings management induced by the control-ownership disparity is significantly 
limited in common-law countries where there is stronger outside investor protection, 
higher disclosure and accounting quality, compared with code-law countries. 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) analyze corporate transparency determinants, 
interpreted as financial transparency 22  and governance transparency 23 , across 
countries. They find that governance transparency is primarily related to the 
legal/judicial regime and is higher in common-law countries than in code-law 
countries, while financial transparency is significantly related to political regime and 
is higher in countries having lower state ownership of firms and banks. With respect 
to countries’ legal/judicial systems, Bushman and Poitroski (2006) find that earnings 
of firms in countries with strong investor protection and high quality judicial systems 
                                                
22 The intensity and timeliness of financial disclosure, interpreted and distributed by analyst and the 
media. 
23 The intensity of governance disclosure and the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosure used 
by outside investors. 
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report in a more timely fashion than firms in countries with weak investor protections 
and low quality judicial systems. Further, they find that earnings of firms in countries 
with strong public enforcement are characterized by an independent, powerful public 
enforcer are more conservative than firms in countries with weak public enforcement. 
DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007) explore the association between the financial 
reporting environment and the information content of annual earnings 
announcements across 26 countries. They find that annual earnings announcements 
are more informative in countries with higher quality earnings (less earnings 
management), better enforced insider trading laws, and stronger investor protection 
institutions.  
 
3.5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS QUALITY 
    This section presents literature on corporate governance factors and earnings 
quality, which helps in formation of the hypotheses in responding to RQ1, RQ2, and 
RQ3. Section 3.5.1 reviews how corporate governance affects the quality of financial 
reporting. Section 3.5.2 presents the academic literature on the link between 
ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) and earnings quality. 
Then, Section 3.5.3 develops hypotheses (H1a, H1b, and H2), formed to address RQ1 
based on previous empirical findings of literature on ownership structure and Korea’s 
corporate governance reform. Section 3.5.4 reviews the relation between internal 
governance factors (outside directors on board and audit committee) and earnings 
quality. In addressing prior research and Korea’s corporate governance reforms, 
Section 3.5.5 evolves the hypotheses (H3a, H3b, and H4) related to RQ2. In Section 
3.5.6, the association between external governance (audit quality) and earnings 
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quality is reviewed. Section 3.5.7 derives the hypothesis (H5) linked to RQ3 from 
literature review and Korea’s corporate governance reforms.  
 
3.5.1. The Relation between Corporate Governance and Quality of Financial 
Reporting 
         Corporate governance is the system by which corporations are directed 
and managed. It specifies the relationship and distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the providers of capital, the board, managers and other 
stakeholders (employees, consumer, the community and the state) of the corporation 
(OECD 1999). Standard and Poor’s (2000, p.1) define corporate governance as 
“encompassing the interactions between a firm’s management, its board of directors, 
and its financial stakeholders (e.g. shareholders and creditors). According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance is the effectiveness of mechanisms 
that minimize agency conflicts involving managers, with particular emphasis on the 
legal mechanisms that prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders. The 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) states that “Good corporate governance 
structures encourage companies to create value (through entrepreneurism, 
innovation, development and exploration) and provide accountability and control 
systems commensurate with the risks involved (ASX Good Corporate Governance 
Guideline 2003, p.3).”  
 
      The former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Arthur 
Levitt expressed his view of the relation between corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality as follows: 
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“An active and effective board of directors, responsible financial management, 
skeptical and independent auditors, and attentive regulatory authorities all have 
responsibilities to safeguard those who invest in public corporations. Effective 
corporate governance of the financial reporting process is an important tool for 
enabling firms and their auditors to fulfill those responsibilities (Levitt 1998).” 
 
      Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) argues that firms with better corporate governance 
show greater financial reporting quality in terms of lower level of earnings 
management, greater earnings persistence, and higher stock market returns. Rezaee 
(2004) suggests that corporate governance should be the mechanism by which a firm 
is managed and monitored, and thus effective and well-balanced corporate 
governance can improve the integrity and quality of financial reporting. Thus, 
corporate governance plays a crucial role in improving the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
3.5.2. Ownership and Earnings Quality 
    3.5.2.1. Family Ownership 
           Schleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (1999) find that most 
public firms have controlling shareholders who are generally families, the founders 
and their heirs, and the state. Family ownership is common around the world, even in 
the countries with well-developed separation of ownership-management (e.g. U.S. 
and U.K).  Publicly traded firms in more than half of East Asian corporations are 
family controlled (La Porta et al. 1999) and 30% of the S&P 500 in the U.S. are 
family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003).  
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     The effect of family ownership on firm value and earnings quality is 
controversial and is explained using two conflicting agency problems (Ali, Chen, and 
Radhakrishnan 2007): (1) Type I agency problem, the classic owner-manager conflict 
and (2) Type II agency problem, conflicts between controlling shareholders and non-
controlling shareholders. 
 
     In the view of Type I agency problems, family owners have a strong 
monitoring incentive to keep their wealth as long-term investors. Families can reduce 
agency problems between managers and owners by placing one of their members in 
the position of manager (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2003), suggesting that families 
can better oversee managers and control managers’ opportunistic behaviors than 
other shareholders. Since families are long-term investors and want to pass the firm 
on to descendants, family ownership is stable and more able to maintain efficient 
investment strategies to increase firm value (James 1999). Further, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) find that family firms have significantly better firm performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) and lower cost of debt than non-family firms. It implies that 
family ownership has strong incentives to closely monitor managers and is likely to 
have better information on the firm. Wang (2006) examines the impact of family 
ownership on earnings quality. The results show that family ownership is positively 
associated with higher earnings quality (proxied by abnormal accruals, earnings 
response coefficients, and conservatism), suggesting that family ownership has a 
strong incentive to monitor management as long-term investors. Ali et al. (2007) test 
the relation between family ownership and earnings quality using the same sample 
but different earnings quality measures than used in Wang’s (2006) study. Consistent 
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with Wang’s (2006) study, they support that family firms have higher earnings quality 
and better disclosure quality than non-family firms. Thus, higher family ownership 
has incentive to produce higher firm value and earnings quality. 
 
      However, in the view of Type II agency problem, as family shareholdings 
increase, family managers become less constrained by disciplinary forces, and more 
entrenched, and thus higher level of family ownership can provide lower firm value 
and quality of earnings. Mørck et al. (1988) argue that high levels of insider 
shareholding could also induce management entrenchment, thereby causing a moral 
hazard and informative asymmetry between the insiders (controlling family) and 
outside shareholders. Since founding families have stronger incentives to pass the 
firm to their heirs, founding families view their firms as an asset to bequeath to 
family members or their descendents (Anderson et al. 2003). Accordingly, in most 
family firms, family members serve as the firm’s CEO or key member of 
management to maintain family control and transmit positions to their descendants so 
that family shareholdings protect family managers from external influence. (Schlze, 
Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz 2001). In addition, controlling families are generally 
not willing to lose their control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and 
Gutierrez 2001).    
  
      Specifically, in East Asian emerging-market countries, a substantial number 
of firms are owned and managed by controlling families (Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang 2000). Fan and Wong (2002) suggest that controlling family shareholders in 
East Asian countries tend to take advantage of flexibility and discretion over 
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accounting choice and auditor selection to distort the firm’s true earnings 
performance. Ball et al. (2003) find that earnings quality of four East Asian countries 
(Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) is low despite having common-law 
accounting regimes (e.g. IFRS and U.S.GAAP). They interpret that controlling 
family ownership overrides incentives to report higher-quality earnings. Thus, higher 
quality of earnings is determined by the incentives of financial statement preparers 
(controlling family shareholders or family owner), not by legal/judicial or accounting 
regimes.  
 
      As to Korean studies, Joh (2003) and Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) 
investigate Korean firms during the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8 and find that 
firms with concentrated ownership by controlling-family shareholders (Chaebols) 
had lower firm value than firms with less concentrated ownership. Accordingly, 
family ownership is closely related to the Type II agency problem, thereby decreasing 
firm value and quality of earnings.  
 
    3.5.2.2. Foreign Ownership 
           Due to sustained globalization, foreign ownership has become evident 
through major institutional shareholders around the world. For instance, foreign 
ownership accounted for 13.5%24 of U.S firm’s total equity, 35.7% of U.K, 40.1% of 
France, 20.1% of Germany, and 26.7% of Japan as of 2006 (the KFSC 2007). 
 
          The role of foreign shareholders as institutional shareholders is 
                                                
24 In 1970, foreign ownership was only 3% of total U.S. firm’s equity (the NYSE Fact Book). 
 75
explained by two conflicting views on the role of institutional shareholders: 1) active 
monitoring and 2) transient hypotheses. According to the active monitoring 
hypothesis, institutional investors are long-term investors with significant incentives 
to actively oversee managers. Corporate governance mechanisms include external 
markets and institutions, such as the market for control and institutional investors, 
who can monitor and discipline corporate management. The monitoring of managers 
has the characteristics of public goods and, as a result, only outside block 
shareholders that consume large amounts of such goods would be able to monitor the 
managers for the purpose of increasing firm value. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
suggest that outside shareholders with large stakes have an incentive to monitor the 
manager’s decision-making. Furthermore, outside block shareholders who hold their 
shares for an extended period of time tend to monitor management activities more 
efficiently, since they have better access to the company’s internal information 
compared with minority shareholders (Barclay and Holderness 1991). Barclay and 
Holderness (1991) find that share purchase by outside block investors is positively 
related to excess returns. Such an increase may be triggered by the market 
expectation that the existence of outside block shareholders would result in more 
efficient monitoring of managers, which in turn would maximize firm value for the 
shareholders. Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) and Shleifer and Vishiny 
(1997) suggest that large institutional investors can mitigate managerial opportunism 
or exploitation of atomistic investors by controlling insiders. Excluding the public 
sector holdings which may be motivated by non-economic factors, these external 
blockholders can assist in the monitoring of independent directors and contribute to 
firm performance, especially in less liquid market environments (Coffee, 1991). 
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Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) find that institutional shareholders have the resource, 
expertise, and the power to effectively monitor the actions of management and to 
influence the decisions of firms. Thus, the presence of large institutional 
shareholdings inhibits managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits 
towards the manager’s desired level or range of profits.  
 
       On the other hand, the transient investor hypothesis suggests that institutions 
are transient investors without significant incentives to monitor firm management. 
Institutions are likely to sell the firm stock in the absence of current profits instead of 
trying to monitor management to adopt value-increasing policies. Graves (1988) 
argues that fund managers cannot afford to take the long view in their investment 
decisions since they are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of quarterly or annual 
performance measures. Moreover, a firm’s investment in research and development 
(R&D) systematically decreases with institutional ownership. Kim, Krinsky, and Lee 
(1997) also report that there is greater stock return volatility and trading volume 
surrounding earnings announcements with high institutional ownership, supporting 
institutional transience. Based on the transient investor hypothesis, institutional 
investors may actually influence firms to use positive accounting accruals.  
 
      Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that foreign investors assume important roles 
in monitoring management similar to the roles played by large outside shareholders 
in developing countries because foreign investors have positive incentive to protect 
their wealth. Using Indian data, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that shareholding by 
foreign investors is positively correlated with firm value, which implies that the 
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foreign institutional investors are equipped with the incentive to monitor a firm’s 
activities and have advanced firm monitoring systems. Foreign shareholders seem to 
play a valuable monitoring role as a large institutional investor. External monitoring 
by foreign investors as large institutional investors can constrain the opportunities for 
discretionary choices of management in providing financial accounting information, 
thereby increasing earnings quality.  
 
       However, foreign investors are momentum traders and prefer to invest in 
specific firms, such as large firms paying high dividends. Kang and Stulz (1997) find 
that foreign investors in Japanese firms hold shares in large manufacturing firms with 
good accounting performance, lower unsystematic risk, and lower leverage, which 
imply that foreign investors are more knowledgeable and informed of firms than 
domestic investors. Dahlquist and Robertsoon (2001) argue that the extent of the 
deviation for foreign investors from holding the market portfolio is mostly similar to 
institutional investors. They find that foreign portfolio investors underinvest in firms 
with a dominant owner and invest more in large firms, firms paying low dividends, 
and firms with large cash position on their balance sheet in the Swedish market. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) report that domestic investors are less sophisticated 
and take the opposite position to that of more sophisticated foreign investors in the 
Finnish market. They interpret that foreign investors tend to pursue a momentum 
strategy but domestic investors seem to be contrarian. This result implies that foreign 
investors are sophisticated investors but are also transient institutional investors. 
Namely, the positive relationship between firm value (or earnings quality) and 
foreign investors results from foreign investors’ preference to specific firms not 
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foreign investors’ active monitoring incentives of a firm’s management. 
 
3.5.3. Hypotheses Related to RQ1 
     3.5.3.1. Family Ownership and Earnings Quality (H1a and H1b) 
            Type I agency problem describes conflicts between owner and 
manager (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Berle and Means 
(1932) suggest that firm assets may be deployed to benefit managers rather than 
shareholders when shareholders are too dispersed. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out, agency costs of equity can arise when the interests of a firm’s managers are 
not aligned with those of the firm’s shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) claim 
that concentrated ownership helps solve the managerial agency problem proposed 
originally by Jensen and Meckling (1976), because large blockholders have the 
power and incentive to discipline management by holding undiversified and 
concentrated equity. Family ownership as a large blockholder has greater incentives 
to monitor managers, thereby reducing opportunistic behaviors of management. In 
addition, families are long-term investors (James 1999) and have better knowledge 
on their business operations by serving as the firm’s management (Anderson and 
Reeb 2003). Therefore, family ownership plays an important role in corporate 
governance (Anderson and Reeb 2003). Klein (2002) documents evidence that strong 
corporate governance mitigates management’s opportunistic behavior, thereby 
decreasing earnings management. Thus, under the Type I agency problem, family 
ownership as a large blockholder is expected to increase firm value and earnings 
quality. 
 
 79
      Excessive concentration of managers or controlling shareholders’ ownership 
might result in firm value reduction due to management entrenchment or increases in 
expropriation (Mørck et al. 198825). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. 
(1999) argue that family control is common in most countries and the fundamental 
agency problem is conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors 
(Type II agency problem) since controlling shareholders who gain nearly full control 
of the firm, prefer to use assets to generate private benefits of control that are not 
shared by minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that controlling 
shareholders can expropriate wealth by seeking personal benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) and Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) argue that concentrated ownership creates a new 
agency problem because the interests of the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders are not perfectly aligned. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) 
also suggest that controlling shareholders can move resources away for their private 
benefits, such as self-dealing, and divert resources from one subsidiary in which they 
own less to firms in which they own more, resulting in inefficient investment. The 
existence of controlling shareholders raise problems of “tunneling”, which occurs 
when controlling shareholders expropriate the firm’s assets at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sheleifer 2000). Due to 
information asymmetry, controlling shareholders have incentives to mask firm 
performance if truthful reporting increases the likelihood of outsider intervention, 
which in turn limits their ability to extract private benefits from control. Controlling 
                                                
25 Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) show that the positive effects of high ownership concentration 
(aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders) initially dominate but the negative 
effects (management entrenchment) become more serious as the manager ownership increases to a 
high level. 
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family shareholders manage earnings to conceal their asset diversion activities and 
are not willing to dilute their control of the firm. Thus, family ownership, as a 
controlling shareholder, may use its controlling position in the firm to extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders under Type II agency problem, 
suggesting that the existence of family ownership is expected to decrease firm value 
and earnings quality. 
 
      To summarize, family ownership is overlapped with Type I and Type II 
agency problems. Under Type I agency problem, family ownership, as a large 
blockholder, plays a role in monitoring the firm’s management, and increasing the 
quality of financial reporting, whereas under Type II agency problem, family 
ownership, as the controlling shareholder, dominates the firm’s management and 
extracts private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders, decreasing the quality 
of financial reporting.  
 
      Prior studies in countries with dispersed ownership (e.g. U.S. and U.K) test 
agency problems using managerial ownership. The effects of managerial ownership 
on earnings quality are mixed. For instance, Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) find 
that higher managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings 
informativeness and negatively linked with discretionary accruals, suggesting that 
firms with higher degrees of managerial ownership are expected to provide higher 
earnings quality. Unlike the result of Warfield et al. (1995), LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) find that financial reporting conservatism declines with 
managerial ownership because managerial ownership declines, the severity of the 
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agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. However, 
managerial ownership in the U.S. and U.K. usually means shares owned by 
professional management, not by a family. Therefore, research results on managerial 
ownership in the countries with well-developed separation of ownership-
management (e.g. U.S. and U.K.) cannot be directly extended to emerging-market 
countries where managerial ownership consists of shares owned by families and their 
affiliated firms, not by professional management.      
 
        Controlling families also use cross-holdings of affiliated firms to 
strengthen their control. A pyramidal structure consists of a sum of legally 
independent firms controlled by the family through a chain of ownership stakes and 
is more common in countries with poor investor protection, specifically East Asian 
countries (La Porta et al. 1999). The conflicts of interest between controlling 
shareholders and outside minority shareholders are common, when firms are 
organized in pyramids and ultimately controlled by families. (Claessens et al. 2000). 
 
        In Korea, the controlling shareholder, usually the founder and his/her 
family, tends to play a dominant role in decision-making (Lim and Kim 2005). 
Generally, managers are one of family members or fully controlled by controlling 
family shareholders. According to Claessens et al. (2000) 80.7% of listed firms in 
Korea are managed by the controlling family and 42.6% of listed firms are controlled 
by pyramidal ownership structure. This ownership structure in Korea gives 
controlling families dominant power at all levels of firm decision-making processes, 
and makes it easier for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. 
 82
Therefore, in Korea, Type II agency problems between controlling shareholders and 
outside minority shareholders might override Type I agency problems between 
managers and shareholders.  
 
        Prior Korean researches on the impact of family ownership show conflicted 
results. Joh (2003) and Baek et al. (2004) investigate Korean firms during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997/8 and find that firms with concentrated ownership by 
controlling-family shareholders (Chaebols) had lower firm value than firms with less 
concentrated ownership. However, Jung and Kwon (2002) and Moon, Lee, and Ji 
(2006) find that family ownership is positively associated with earnings 
informativeness, firm value, and accruals quality. Thus, the extent to which family 
ownership may affect earnings quality depends on whether Type I agency problem 
overrides Type II agency problem or vice versa (Ali et al. 2007). Based on these 
arguments, the following competing hypotheses on the association between family 
ownership and earnings quality are to be tested. 
 
Hypothesis H1 (related to RQ1) 
H1a: If Type I agency problem predominate, earnings quality of Korean firms is 
positively associated with family ownership. 
H1b: If Type II agency problem predominate, earnings quality of Korean firms is 
negatively associated with family ownership. 
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  3.5.3.2. Foreign Ownership and Earnings Quality (H2) 
         Large outside blockholders can effectively monitor management using 
enough voting control, and thereby reduce agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 
1986). Specifically, in emerging markets, large outside ownership is positively 
associated with firm performance (Sachs and Warner 1995; Mitton 2002; Lemmon 
and Lins 2003). Foreign ownership of Korean firms was very small and did not 
influence firm’s decision until the Korean government opened the capital markets to 
foreign investors in 1992. Since then, foreign ownership gradually increased and 
foreign institutional investors became more major institutional investors after all the 
foreign investors’ ownership limitations were lifted in 1998. For instance, in 2006 
market capitalization by foreign investors was 37.3% of total market value on the 
Korean Stock Exchange. This figure is the 3rd highest in the emerging markets 
following Hungary (77.7%) and Mexico (45.1%). In Korea, the potentially positive 
impact of foreign shareholders can be understood as a special application of the more 
general proposition that large outside blockholders can mitigate family managerial 
opportunism. Therefore, it is expected that the role of foreign investors as outside 
monitors of corporate activities may be even bigger in Korea, because foreign 
investors in Korean firms are less likely to be related to controlling shareholders. In 
addition, foreign investors have a higher burden of monitoring costs due to greater 
information asymmetry (Kang and Stulz 1997; Choe, Koh, and Stulz 2005). Foreign 
investors will therefore positively strengthen their monitoring function to resolve 
information asymmetry.  
 
As to the Korean context, Cheon (2003) finds a significant positive 
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association between foreign ownership and the earnings response coefficient, 
suggesting that foreign shareholders consider earnings quality (measured as 
discretionary accruals) in their investment decisions. By examining the relation 
between information asymmetry and foreign ownership, Ahn, Shin, and Chang 
(2005) find that foreign investors prefers firms with lower discretionary accruals and 
forecast errors and larger analyst coverage (number of analysts). Accordingly, in 
Korea, the active monitoring hypothesis is more representative of foreign ownership 
as large institutional shareholders rather than the transient hypothesis. 
 
       To the extent that external monitoring by foreign investors is intense and 
effective, the opportunities for discretionary choices in providing accounting 
information become more constrained. In order to protect their wealth and to reduce 
monitoring costs, foreign shareholders have stronger incentives and expertise to 
independently monitor firms. Thus, higher proportions of foreign ownership induce 
firms to improve transparency and to decrease opportunistic managerial accounting 
choices and decisions. Based on these arguments, the following is the hypothesis for 
the association between earnings quality and foreign ownership related to RQ1: 
 
Hypothesis H2 (related to RQ1) 
H2: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with foreign ownership 
 
3.5.4. Internal Governance and Earnings Quality 
  3.5.4.1. Outside Directors on Boards 
Outside directors (directors not involved in the direct operations of the 
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firm) assume the role of monitoring management activities on behalf of shareholders. 
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance in Korea describes outside 
directors as “An outside director should be a person who is in a position to make 
decisions independently from the management, controlling shareholders and 
corporation”. The ASX defines independent directors as “independent of 
management and free of any business or other relationship that could materially 
interfere with – or could reasonably perceived to materially interfere with – the 
exercise of their unfettered and independent judgement (ASX Good Corporate 
Governance Guideline 2003, p.19).”  
 
Outside directors have an incentive to monitor managers because their reputation as 
expert monitors is at stake (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) argue that a reputation as an expert monitor is one of the most important 
reasons for the appointment of outside directors. They also find that the manager 
from a firm with good performance is more likely to become an outside director of 
other firms since managers of firms with good performance are expected to function 
as expert monitors, if appointed as outside directors. Monitoring by independent 
directors suggests that corporate boards will become more responsive to investors, 
and the inclusion of outside directors on boards will improve the firm’s compliance 
with the disclosure requirements, which in turn will enhance the comprehensiveness 
and quality of disclosure (Forker, 1992). Beasley (1996) examines differences in 
board configurations between firms that are involved in accounting fraud and those 
that are not, and finds a negative association between ratio of outside directors and 
accounting fraud. Klein (2002) and Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt (2003) supports 
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evidence that firms having a higher proportion of outside directors have lower levels 
of earnings management. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examine the relationship 
between conservatism and board of director characteristics measured by board 
independence and the strength of outside directors’ monitoring incentives. They find 
that ownership by outside directors increases conservatism. This evidence suggests 
that conservatism assists outside directors in reducing the agency costs of firms and 
thus firms select the combination of corporate governance systems that maximize 
firm value.  
 
        Firms with an independent board of directors have also been shown to have 
a lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2004). Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
and LaFond (2006) find that board independence can affect the firms’ credit rating. 
Creditors expect boards of directors to monitor the financial reporting process on 
behalf of creditors because lending agreements are based on accounting based 
covenants. Accordingly, firms with an independent board tend to receive positive 
investment grade credit rating from the bondholders, and thereby there is a negative 
relation between board independence and the firm’s cost of debt. This result suggests 
that independent board directors play an important role in increasing financial 
reporting transparency. 
 
  3.5.4.2. Audit Committee 
The role of audit committees is to ensure that the financial statements are 
reliably prepared and verified by selecting external auditors, overseeing 
responsibility for the firm’s financial accounting process, and monitoring the 
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management, internal auditors, and external auditors (Klein 2002). The audit 
committee should be independent from management, have expertise to understand 
complex financial procedures and auditing, and actively monitor management’s 
behaviour on behalf of shareholders (Choi, Jeon, and Park 2004; Yang and Krishnan 
2005). 
 
        Wild (1996) investigates the association between the presence of audit 
committee and earnings quality measured by the extent to which the market reacts to 
the release of earnings reports. He provides evidence that market reaction to the 
earnings report is more than 20% greater after an audit committee was established. 
Accordingly, the formation of audit committee enhances financial reporting quality 
by efficiently overseeing the financial reporting and audit process. Davidson, 
Goodwin Stewart, and Kent (2005) support that the presence of audit committee is 
inversely related to earnings management for Australian firms. By tasking internal 
oversight function of firm’s accounting process, the audit committee mitigates 
earnings management. 
 
        The Blue Ribbon Committee 26  (BRC) recommends that the audit 
committee should be comprised of directors who have no relationship to the firm that 
may interfere with their independence. The BRC (1999, p.22) states that “several 
recent studies have produced a correlation between audit committee independence 
and two desirable outcomes: a higher degree of active oversight and a lower 
incidence of financial statement fraud.” Klein (2002) tests the relation between audit 
                                                
26 Early drafts of the Korean Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance were largely based on 
the Blue Ribbon Committee. 
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committee independence as measured by the percentage of outside directors on board 
and earnings management. She finds a negative relation between audit committee 
independence and discretionary accruals. Thus, the independence of the audit 
committee is very important to increase earnings quality. 
 
        The BRC (1999) recommends that all audit committee members be 
financially literate and at least one member of audit committee should have related 
financial expertise. Financial expertise is defined as “past employment experience in 
finance or accounting requisite professional certification in accounting or any other 
comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication (the BRC 1999, p.25).” Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2007) 
investigate the association between accruals quality and financial expertise of audit 
committees. They identify three types of financial expertise, which are accounting, 
finance, and supervisory. The results show that accounting expertise is significantly 
and positively associated with accruals quality whereas finance and supervisory 
expertise is not associated with accruals quality. It suggests that the audit committee’s 
expertise is one of the important audit committee characteristics, but the definition of 
financial expertise should be refined to enhance the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. 
 
        Audit committee activity is one of the important characteristics to 
effectively monitor management. In order to monitor management effectively, audit 
committees should hold three or four time meetings a year (Collier and Gregory 
1999). Xie et al. (2003) examine whether the audit committee prevents earnings 
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management. They provide evidence that frequency of audit committee meeting is 
negatively related to discretionary accruals. However, Choi et al. (2004) and Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) do not support Xie et al. (2003) results. Using Korean data, 
Choi et al. (2004) examine three audit committee characteristics (independence, 
competence, and activity). The results demonstrate that independence and 
competence are negatively associated with discretionary accruals while activity is not 
significant. Consistent with Choi et al. (2004), Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that 
activity is not significantly related to earnings management, while the existence of 
financial expertise on the audit committee and the average tenure of audit committee 
directors reduce earnings management. These results imply that the knowledge, 
expertise, and experience of audit committee members are more effective in 
monitoring the financial reporting process, suggesting increased earnings quality. 
 
3.5.5. Hypotheses Related to RQ2 
  3.5.5.1. Outside Directors on Board and Earnings Quality (H3a and H3b) 
  Corporate governance mechanism operates a firm’s management to act in 
the best interests of shareholder (Ferguson 2007). This governance system includes 
outside directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). One important duty of the board of 
directors is to monitor and evaluate management’s activities within the firm. Since 
the careers of inside directors are closely tied to the CEO, the task of monitoring 
management is predicted to fall mainly to the outside directors. Therefore, the role of 
outside directors is important for the resolution of agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, to protect their reputation and to reduce litigation risk by 
monitoring managerial opportunistic behavior.  
 90
        Given the separation of ownership and management in modern 
corporations, boards have been created as an internal governance mechanism to 
represent and protect shareholders from managers who may pursue their personal 
interests or otherwise may not act in the best interests of shareholders. To do this, the 
independence of the board from management or controlling family shareholders is 
crucial, because only then can the board truly monitor and discipline management. In 
Korea, board independence has been very weak because most board directors are 
designated by the controlling family shareholders. Thus, board directors act on behalf 
of controlling family shareholders in Korea.  
 
        Outside directors did not exist in Korea prior to the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. In order to improve the transparency and oversight role of the board, firms 
listed on the KSE are required to have at least 25% of board members as outside 
directors (effective from April 1, 1999). Furthermore, the Korean Securities 
Exchange Act as amended requires all listed firms with an asset value of 2 trillion 
KRW (US$ 2 billion) or more to appoint outside directors in the number of one-half 
of the total registered directors or three, whichever is larger27. The Korean Securities 
and Exchange Act, Article 2, defines an outside director as a director who does not 
engage in the regular business of the relevant firm. In addition, individuals having 
equity shares of 1% or more of the firm, shares of 300 million KRW (US$ 3,000) or 
more, or whose outstanding balance with the firm equals or exceeds 100 million 
KRW (US$ 1,000) cannot be appointed as outside directors (The Korean Securities 
and Exchange Act, Article 48-5). Based on the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, 
                                                
27 The Korea Stock Exchange(1998), “Amendment to the Regulation on the Listing of Securities.” 
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outside directors are defined as independent directors that have no current or 
potential business ties, share ownership or an investment relationship with the firm.  
 
        Outside directors are expected to perform better monitoring than other 
directors because they are independent from management and have incentives to 
keep their reputation as experts (Fama and Jensen 1983). Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 
support Fama and Jensen’s (1983) argument and find the manager from a firm with 
good performance is more likely to become an outside director of other firms. For 
managers, being appointed as outside directors of firms is a positive signal that their 
competency is acknowledged throughout the labor market of outside directors. Thus, 
managers appointed as outside directors are expected to receive good opportunity in 
the labor market and strive to maintain their reputation as expert monitors. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the share prices positively react to the 
nomination of outside directors because appointment of outside directors is a positive 
signal for shareholders. Beasely (1996) finds that accounting fraud decreases with an 
increase in the percentage of outside directors on boards. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) 
report that firms whose outside directors account for more than half of the board’s 
constitution have higher firm value. Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003) show that 
earnings management decreases with outside directors. Beekes, Pope, and Young 
(2004) show that firms with a higher percentage of outside directors tend to 
recognize bad news in a timelier fashion (high conservatism). These results are also 
supported by Garcia Lara, Garci Osma and Penalva (2009). They investigate the 
association between accounting conservatism and board of directors’ characteristics 
using a sample of Spanish listed firms. The results show that earnings of firms with 
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low CEO influence on board decision making are more conservative than firms with 
high CEO influence of board decision making, suggesting that strong boards use 
conservative earnings as a governance tool. 
 
These results suggest that outside directors more faithfully perform the 
checks-and-balances function against managers and inside directors, and more 
effectively monitor management’s opportunistic behavior and the firm’s financial 
accounting process, thereby enhancing earnings quality. Accordingly, the 
introduction of outside directors on boards is expected to increase earnings quality of 
Korean firms. Based on previous research and Korea’s corporate governance reform, 
the following hypothesis H3a addressed to RQ2 is to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis H3a (related to RQ2) 
H3a: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with the proportion of 
outside directors on the board. 
 
         Besides board independence, earnings quality may differently be related 
to the backgrounds of outside directors on board. Xie et al. (2003) classify board 
memberships into four categories: 1) finance directors, 2) corporate directors, 3) 
blockholders directors, and 4) legal directors. They show that board members with 
corporate background reduce earnings management because of their financial 
sophistication. Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) find that firms with foreign outside 
directors (Anglo-American) have a higher valuation in the Scandinavian markets 
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since appointment of foreign outside directors (Anglo-American28) provides positive 
signals for firms within the capital markets. Accordingly, foreign outside directors 
can increase earnings quality through participation in the internal governance process. 
 
        In the Korean context, Choi et al. (2007) examine outside directors’ quality 
and firm value. They categorize the background of outside directors into seven areas: 
1) former politicians or government officials, 2) lawyers, 3) executives of financial 
institutions, 4) accountants, 5) academics, 6) executives of affiliated firm, and 7) 
executives of non-affiliated firms. Interestingly, they find that outside directors 
having financial institution background negatively affect firm value, whereas outside 
directors with academic and executives of non-affiliated firms background positively 
influence firm value. Moon et al. (2006) test the effects of accounting experts as 
outside directors on firm value and accruals quality. They define accounting experts 
as current or former CPA, bankers, and accounting/finance professors. The result 
shows that accounting experts as outside directors increase firm value and accruals 
quality. Thus, earnings quality depends on the backgrounds of outside directors on 
board. Based on previous research, the following hypothesis H3b addressed to RQ2 is 
to be proposed: 
 
Hypothesis H3b (related to RQ2) 
H3b: Earnings quality of Korean firms differs depending on the backgrounds of 
outside directors on the board. 
 
                                                
28 A citizen of either the U.S., the U.K, or Canada. 
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  3.5.5.2. Audit Committee and Earnings Quality (H4) 
         Outside directors on boards are expected to monitor and evaluate a firm’s 
management, while audit committees have the primary responsibility for the quality 
of financial reporting. Therefore, audit committees can be regarded as an effective 
monitoring device for improving the quality of financial reporting.  
 
        In Korea, the audit committee was initially introduced in December 1999 
through an amendment to the Commercial Code. Since April 2000, the audit 
committee is legally required for listed firms with assets of 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 
billion) or more. Listed firms with assets less than 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) 
voluntarily established the audit committees. The Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance in Korea recommends that “an audit committee is expected, through 
checks and balances, to bring positive results in supervising and supporting the 
management of large corporation (III-1.1).” According to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), “Audit committees play a critical role in the financial 
reporting by overseeing and monitoring the participation of management and the 
independent auditor in the financial reporting process (SEC 1999, Release No. 34-
42266).” The Australian Stock Exchange indicates that the purpose of an audit 
committee is “...to be a more efficient mechanism than the full board for focusing the 
company on particular issues relevant to verifying and safeguarding the integrity of 
the company’s financial reporting (ASX Good Corporate Governance Guideline 
2003, p.29).” Thus, the major role of the audit committee is to ensure the quality of 
financial reporting by monitoring the financial reporting process, thereby increasing 
the quality and transparency of financial reporting.  
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        Klein (2002) states that the role of audit committees is to ensure reliability 
of the financial statements, prepared and verified by selecting external auditors, 
overseeing responsibility for the firm’s financial accounting process, and monitoring 
the management, internal auditors, and external auditors. Forker (1992) argues that 
the existence of audit committees may improve internal control and consequently 
regarded them as an effective monitoring device for improving financial reporting 
quality. By efficiently overseeing the financial reporting and audit process, the 
existence of audit committees increases the market reaction to the earnings report 
(Wild 1996). Klein (2002) and Davidson, Goodwin Stewart, and Kent (2005) 
document that earnings management decreases with the presence of an audit 
committee, due to audit committees’ internal oversight function of the firm’s 
accounting process. Based on previous studies and Korea’s corporate governance 
reforms, the following testable hypothesis for the association between audit 
committee and earnings quality related to RQ2 is provided: 
 
Hypothesis H4 (related to RQ2) 
H4: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with the presence of an 
audit committee. 
 
3.5.6. External Governance (Audit Quality) and Earnings Quality 
  3.5.6.1. Auditor Competency 
DeAngelo (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) define audit quality 
as the probability that an auditor will both discover and truthfully report a discovered 
breach, and suggest that the probability of reporting is a function of independence.  
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          Audit quality is typically measured by auditor brand name (e.g., Big N). 
Palmrose (1988) argues that Big N audit firms provide higher audit quality because 
they are more exposed to litigation risk and are regarded as having “deep pockets” 
than non-Big N. Since Big N’s “deep pocket” can be subject to petty lawsuit, Big N 
audit firms have more incentive to provide higher quality audit to avoid litigation due 
to audit failure (Lennox 1999; Heninger 2001). Teoh and Wong (1993) find a positive 
association between auditor brand name (Big N) and the earnings response 
coefficient. It suggests that auditor brand name is significantly associated with 
earnings quality. Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) and 
Reynolds and Francis (2000) argue that Big N audit firms are better able to detect 
earnings management because of their superior knowledge and act to protect their 
reputation. Specifically, in East Asian countries, Big N auditors play an important 
corporate governance role in more effectively mitigating agency problems between 
controlling shareholders (ultimate owner) and minority shareholders than non-Big N 
auditors because of their superior external monitoring ability (Fan and Wong 2005).    
    
In the Korean context, however, there is no difference in earnings quality 
(proxied by discretionary accruals) between Big N and non-Big N auditors (Park, Lee, 
and Won 1999; Jeong and Rho 2004; Choi 2005). They interpret the result as 
meaning that Korea’s auditors have low incentives to provide high-quality audits due 
to lower litigation risk and the dominance of owner-manager in selecting auditors. 
 
        Audit industry specialization can play an important role in audit quality. 
According to Palmrose (1986, p.103), industry specialists are defined as “the largest 
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supplier in each industry, as well as the second-and third-largest suppliers in 
industries in which readily observable differences existed between the second and the 
third or between the third and the remaining suppliers.” Since industry specialist 
auditors have better knowledge to detect errors than nonspecialists (Solomon, Shields, 
and Whittington 1999; Owhoso, Messier, and Lynch 2002), industry specialist 
auditors offer higher audit quality. Grambling and Stone (2001) provide evidence that 
earnings of industry specialists’ auditees more accurately predict future cash flows 
than those of non-industry specialists. Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003) support 
that client firms of industry specialists have higher earnings quality (lower 
discretionary accruals and higher earnings response coefficients) than that of non-
industry specialists. Accordingly, auditor industry specialization is expected to 
increase earnings quality. 
 
In summary, since higher audit quality is more likely to detect and object 
to client firms’ use of aggressive and questionable accounting practices, earnings 
quality is expected to increase as auditor competency improves.  
 
  3.5.6.2. Auditor Independence 
External auditors play an important role in the capital markets as a “public 
watch dog” function. This function requires that auditors should remain independent 
of the audit client and act on behalf of the public, not the audit client. Auditor 
independence is not observable, but it mainly relies on audit tenure and non-audit 
services (Dopuch, King, and Schwartz 2003). 
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         Whether audit tenure (the length of auditor-auditee relationship) affects 
auditor independence is subject to debate. DeAngelo (1981) argues that the client-
specific rents can create an economic dependency on the client, and thereby erode 
auditor independence. In addition, long audit tenure can lead to a personal 
relationship between auditor and manager and economic bonds for the client, thus 
impairing auditor independence. However, long audit tenure can increase client-
specific knowledge, suggesting decrease information asymmetry between auditor and 
auditee (Knapp 1991; Solomon et al. 1999). Based on increased client-specific 
knowledge, long audit tenure has an advantage in detecting mis-statements in 
financial reports, thereby providing higher audit quality. 
 
        Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) examine audit tenure and financial 
reporting quality using two proxies: discretionary accruals and the persistence of the 
accrual components of earnings. They find that short-term audit tenure is associated 
with lower financial reporting quality. Thus, mandatory audit rotation can increase 
audit cost and reduce audit quality, in turn resulting in lower financial reporting 
quality. Ghosh and Moon (2005) report a positive association between earnings 
response coefficients, as a proxy of earnings quality and audit tenure, suggesting an 
improvement in earnings quality from longer audit tenure. Hence, capital market 
participants (e.g., investors and creditors) recognize that long-term audit tenure 
improve audit quality, thereby financial reporting is regarded as more reliable for 
investment decision making. Carey and Simnett (2006) examine the association 
between audit quality and long auditor tenure using Australian data. They proxy three 
measures of audit quality which are issuing a going-concern audit opinion for 
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distressed firms, the discretion and amount of abnormal working capital accruals, and 
beating earnings benchmarks. In contrast to the U.S. evidence, they find that long 
audit tenure is negatively associated with audit quality. This result implies that long 
audit tenure impairs the independence of the auditors due to the personal 
relationships between audit partners and managers, thus reducing audit quality, and 
resulting in lower financial reporting quality. 
 
         The Public Oversight Board of SEC notes that “prospective revenues from 
the provision of non-audit services, extending into the future, create precisely the 
kind of financial stake that produces a conflict of interest capable of impairing 
independence” (POB 2000, p.121). In February 5, 2001, the SEC revised rules on 
auditor independence. New rules on auditor independence require that public firms 
should disclose non-audit fees paid to their audit firms. The SEC’s new rules imply 
that high non-audit fees could erode auditors’ independence, reduce audit quality, 
and result in lower earnings quality.  
 
         Simunic (1984) presents two conditions why the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit service compromises auditor independence. First, losing an audit 
contract simultaneously leads to losing non-audit services in providing joint services. 
Second, the audit firm loses any economic rents derived from non-audit services, if 
the specialized resources from non-audit service cannot be transferred to an 
alternative use. Accordingly, the provision of non-audit service creates economic 
bonding with the auditee. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) demonstrate that high 
non-audit service fees are positively related to the ability of firms to just meet or beat 
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earnings targets as well as the magnitude of discretionary accruals. This result 
implies that the auditor’s economic bond to the client is deepened with the provision 
of non-audit services. This economic subordination by the client erodes auditors’ 
independence, in turn, auditor can acquiesce in earnings management. However, 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) find no significant relationship between 
non-audit fee and earnings benchmarks, as well as discretionary accruals, despite 
replicating Frankel et al. (2003)’s tests. Wallman (1996) examines whether non-audit 
services impair financial reporting quality. He finds that non-audit services do not 
impair auditor independence because auditors more deeply understand clients’ 
information by providing non-audit services, and thus increasing financial reporting 
quality. The non-U.S. studies show conflicting results regarding whether non-audit 
services reduce earnings quality. Using U.K. firms, Ferguson, Seow, and Young 
(2004) provide evidence that non-audit services are significantly and positively 
associated with earnings management. They conclude that non-audit services due to 
higher level of economic bonding by the client weaken auditor independence, and in 
turn, reduce the earnings quality. Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006) examine 
whether non-audit services impair auditor independence using Australian data. In 
contrast to the U.K firms, they find that non-audit services provided by either Big 6 
or non-Big 6 do not reduce conservatism, used as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality.  
 
      Consequently, independence of the auditor constrains management’s 
opportunistic accounting practice, and thus can increase earnings quality by reporting 
detected material misstatements of financial reports. 
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3.5.7. Hypothesis Related to RQ3 
 The external auditor has responsibility to monitor financial reports provided 
by management to financial reports users. High audit quality is more likely to detect 
accounting irregularities, object to the use of questionable accounting practices, and 
limit discretion over accrual choice for client firms (Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds and 
Francis 2000).  
 
 According to Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1995), Big N develop more 
industry-specific skills and expertise than non-Big N to maintain their reputation 
(brand name). Using the U.K. data, Lennox (1999) tests two hypotheses: reputation 
capital hypothesis and deep pockets hypothesis to explain why Big N provide higher 
quality audits. The reputation capital hypothesis argues that large audit firms are 
expected to issue more accurate reports to avoid their reputations being adversely 
affected than small audit firms. Deep pocket hypothesis argues that large auditors are 
more exposed to litigation risk due to “deep pockets”, thus large audit firms have 
more incentive to issue accurate reports than small audit firms. Empirical result 
supports the deep pockets hypothesis because Big N are more subject to litigation 
risk in spite of their superior accuracy. Khurana and Raman (2004) test two 
hypotheses: the deep pocket hypothesis and the reputation capital hypothesis across 
different Anglo-American countries. They compare the U.S. auditees’ ex ante cost of 
equity (proxy for financial reporting credibility) with that of other Anglo-American 
countries (Australia, Canada, and the U.K.). The result provides evidence that Big N 
auditees’ ex ante cost of equity is lower than that of non-Big N. However, this result 
is only significant in the U.S., which suggests that Big N are more exposed to 
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litigation risk in the U.S., and thereby litigation risk is more perceived as audit 
quality than auditor brand name. Basu, Hwang, and Jan (2001) argue that earnings of 
Big N auditees are more conservative than non-Big N auditees because audit 
litigation generally results from overstatement of earnings and assets. Accordingly, 
higher audit quality of Big N is more significantly associated with the deep pockets 
hypothesis than reputation capital hypothesis. Higher audit quality (Big N) increases 
accounting information credibility by reducing aggressive and opportunistic financial 
reporting, and thus decreases litigation risk for fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
        As discussed in Section 3.5.6 of Chapter 3, audit quality is measured by 
auditor independence and competency. In order to enhance auditor independence, the 
external auditor is mandatorily rotated after six consecutive years of engagement. 
The audit partner for an audit firm is also prohibited from being engaged in audit 
services for the same client for more than three consecutive fiscal years. In addition, 
the provision of non-audit services by the external auditor is prohibited. The CPA Act 
in Korea defines non-audit services as bookkeeping or other services related to the 
accounting records of the audit client; compilation of financial statements of the audit 
client; financial information systems design and implementation; internal audit 
outsourcing services; and management consulting service. 
 
        Before the reforms, audit fees in Korea were determined by the audit fee 
schedule (The KICPA audit fee guideline) controlled by the government. Audit fees, 
under the KICPA audit fee guideline, were automatically determined based on the 
assets of the client firms without considering audit quality. In order to increase 
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auditor competency, the KICPA audit fee guideline was abolished in February 1999. 
Thus, abolishing the audit fee guideline is expected to strengthen auditor competency, 
thereby increasing audit quality.  
 
        Auditor litigation against Big N in Korea has increased since 1999. The 
business and audit failures of the Daewoo group, the second largest business group in 
Korea, have heightened the interest of many regarding earnings and audit quality. In 
March 1999, one of Big N audit firms in Korea, Sandong-KPMG, was sued by 
investors for its sloppy audit work on the Daewoo group, and thereby Sandong-
KPMG went into voluntary dissolution. Notably, this is the first failure in the history 
of the Korean auditing service industry. The Daewoo group bankruptcy triggered 
multiple lawsuits against external auditors, specifically Big N.  
 
     Table 3.1 presents the state of audit litigation after 1995. Before 2000, the 
number of audit litigations was only 5, while it was 24 after operationalising 
corporate governance practices (2000-2004). Moreover, the number of audit 
litigations against Big N is 21 (87.5%) after 2000.  
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Table3.1: The state of audit litigation in Korea 
 Year Big N Non-Big N Total 
1995 1 0 1 
1996 0 2 2 
1997 1 1 2 
1998 2 1 3 
1999 1 1 2 
The Pre-Reform Period (A) 
Sub-Total (%) 5 (50%) 5 (50%) 10 (100%) 
2000 1 0 1 
2001 3 0 3 
2002 6 1 7 
2003 7 2 9 
2004 4 0 4 
The Post-Reform Period (B) 
Sub-Total (%) 21 (87.5%) 3 (12.5%) 24 (100%) 
(A) + (B) Total (%) 26 (76.5%) 8 (23.5%) 34 (100%) 
 
Source: The Korean Financial Supervisory Commission (2004) 
 
        This result implies that Big N audit firms in Korea are more exposed to 
litigation risk than non-Big N audit firms, and thus Big N audit firms are expected to 
provide higher audit quality in order to avoid litigation risk, supporting the deep 
pocket hypothesis. Basu (1997) states that conservatism significantly increases in 
higher auditor litigation periods29. Khurana and Raman (2004) provide evidence that 
higher audit quality (e.g. Big N) increases accounting information credibility by 
reducing aggressive and opportunistic financial reporting, and thus decreases 
litigation risk for fraudulent financial reporting. Based on previous research and 
Korea’s corporate governance reform, the hypothesis H5 for the relation between 
audit quality and earnings quality related to RQ3 can be stated as follows: 
 
                                                
29 Basu (1997) categorizes higher auditor litigation period into (1) 1966-75 and (2) 1983-86, a period 
of increased auditor’s damages. 
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Hypothesis H5 (related RQ3) 
H5: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with higher audit 
quality provided by Big N30audit firms. 
 
3.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
    This chapter reviewed the existing literature on earnings quality as well as on 
corporate governance factors and formulates hypotheses relating to the three research 
questions as presented in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. The hypotheses are developed 
based on the institutional setting in Chapter 2 and literature reviews. From this 
discussion, seven specific hypotheses are formulated. A summary of these research 
questions along with their respective hypotheses is summarized in Table 3.2. 
                                                
30 As of 2005, Korean Big 4 audit firms are: Samil-PWC, Samjung-KPMG, Hanyoung-Ernst&Young, 
and Ahnjin-Deloitte. 
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Table3.2: Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
RQ1: How does ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) affect earnings 
quality? 
 
H1a, H1b, and H2 are associated with the relationship between ownership structure and earnings quality: 
   H1a: If Type I agency problems predominate, earnings quality of Korean firms is positively related 
to family ownership. 
   H1b: If Type II agency problems predominate, earnings quality of Korean firms is negatively 
related to family ownership. 
   H2: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively related to foreign ownership. 
 
RQ2: Does internal governance functions (outside directors on boards and audit committee) 
increase earnings quality? 
 
H3a, H3b, and H4 are associated with the relation between internal governance function and earnings 
quality: 
   H3a: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with the proportion of outside 
directors on the boards. 
   H3b: Earnings quality of Korean firms differs depending on the backgrounds of outside directors 
on the boards. 
   H4: Earnings quality of Korean firms is positively associated with the presence of an audit 
committee. 
 
RQ3: Does higher audit quality increase earnings quality? 
 
H5 are associated with the relation between external governance function (higher audit quality) and 
earnings quality: 
   H5: Earnings quality is positively related to higher audit quality. 
 
 
     The following chapter, Chapter 4 will discuss the sample and the data set used 
to test the above hypotheses as well as the empirical models and statistical 
methodology.  
 107
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This chapter provides the data and research methodology for testing the 
hypotheses associated with the three research questions developed in Chapter 3, 
summarized in Table 3.1 in Section 3.6. The rest of this chapter is structured into four 
sections. 
 
    The first section, Section 4.2, describes details on the sample, data sources, 
sampling procedures, their composition and coverage used in this study. The second 
section, Section 4.3, provides research methodology related to answering the three 
research questions in this study. Specifically, sub-section 4.3.1 explains the four 
measures of earnings quality used as dependent variables. In sub-section 4.3.2, the 
three main corporate governance functions are measured as independent variables. 
Sub-section 4.3.4 specifies the regression models and estimation methods for testing 
the seven hypotheses H1a to H5 linked with three research questions. The third section, 
Section 4.4 covers endogeneity issues, the relation between corporate governance and 
earnings quality and provides estimation methods to treat endogeneity (e.g., two-
stage least square regression; 2SLS). Finally, Section 4.5 concludes with an overview 
of this chapter. 
 
4.2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
4.2.1. Sample Selection 
        This study investigates annual panel data over a six-year period from 2000 
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to 2005 (6 years) of Korean firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE). In 
order to test the impact of corporate governance reforms launched after the Asian 
financial crisis and earnings quality in Korea, the starting year of the sample choice is 
2000. Before 1 January 1999, accounting guidelines for financial institution that 
differ from GAAP had been issued and revised each year by the Korean government. 
Thus, financial statements of Korean financial institutes lacked consistency over the 
years. Based on this, all financial institutions with two-digit Korean Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) Code31 of 65, 66, and 67 (e.g., commercial banks, 
insurance firms, and security brokerage firms) are excluded.  
 
4.2.2. Data Sources and Collection Procedures 
        Data in this study are obtained from three sources: The Korean Stock 
Exchange (KSE), Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System 32  (DART; 
http://dart.fss.or.kr), developed by the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission; 
OSIRIS33: Publicly listed companies worldwide provided by the Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP); and KIS-VALUE database provided by the Korean 
Information Service (KIS)34. 
 
                                                
31 SIC is a two -digit code classifying all industries into 20 major industry groups administered by the 
Korean National Statistical Office. The two-digit code designates each major industry group. This 
description is available on web source:  
  http://www.nso.go.kr/eng2006/e06___0000/e06a__0000/e06a__0000.html. 
32 As a public database, DART is an electronic disclosure system that mandatorily enforces firms to 
submit Business Reports (equivalent to the US 10-K) to the Korean Financial Supervisory 
Commission (KFSC), the equivalent to the SEC in Korea, within 90 days from the fiscal year-end, 
where it becomes publicly available to investors and other users online. 
33 The financial statements information of Korean firms on OSIRIS is provided by the Korean 
Information Service (KIS). 
34 KIS is a credit rating agency in Korea and provides corporate financial and ownership information 
on publicly traded firms as well as privately held firms. KIS also receives financial and ownership 
information of Korean firms from the Korea Financial Supervisory Board and checks the integrity 
of the data. It provides the most comprehensive database available in Korea. 
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      At the first data collection stage, ownership data (e.g., family and foreign 
ownership) and corporate governance data (e.g., board size, the number of outside 
directors on board, backgrounds of outside directors on board, the presence of audit 
committee, and external auditor’s name etc) of the sample firms are manually hand 
collected from business reports that are available through the DART system 
(http://dart.fss.or.kr) provided by the KFSC. Annual business reports, equivalent to 
Form 10-K in the U.S., contain firm specific information such as a description of the 
remunerations of officers, identification and distribution of major shareholders sorted 
by name, relationship and shareholding, firm’s corporate governance information 
such as boards’ minute book, and audited financial statements. Financial statements 
data and stock data are obtained from OSIRIS and KIS-VALUE database respectively. 
At the second stage, list status and name of sample firms is confirmed from the KSE 
web (http://kind.krx.co.kr) using the KSE stock index code. Finally, firms’ name on 
the KSE is used to match information among DART filings, OSIRIS, and KIS-
VALUE. Then, all extracted data were classified into the SIC code. The validity of 
the information in OSIRIS and KIS-VALUE was randomly cross-checked by 
referring to firms’ business reports, available in the DART system. The final sample 
consists of a total of 3,054 firm-years observations (509 firms x 6 years) over the six 
year period (2000 to 2005).  
 
      Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the sample selection criteria and total number of 
firm-year observations. Panel B reports the number of sample firms by year, 
classified into SIC code and industry name. 
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Table4.1: Sample Selection Procedure and Final Sample Size 
This table presents the sample selection criteria, total number of sample firms and total firm-year 
observation. The data are obtained from three sources: OSIRIS, KIS-VALUE, and DART system. The 
final sample consists of 509 firm-year observations. 
Panel A: Summary of sample selection criteria 
Criteria: Descriptions                                            Number of firm-year 
Firms listed on the KSE                                                           644 
Less: Financial institutions (e.g. SIC 65,66,and 67)                                      (52)  
Less: Delisted firms                                                              (54) 
Less: Firms with missing Data                                                      (29) 
Total sample firms                                                              509 
Panel B: Number of sample firms, classified into SIC code and Industry 
No SIC code and Name Industry Group 
Number 
of Firms 
(n=509) 
Ratio 
(%) 
1 
05. Fishing  
15. Manufacture of Food Product & Beverages 
16. Manufacture of Tobacco Products 
Fishing & Food 41 8.06% 
2 
17. Manufacture of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing Apparel 
18. Manufacture of Sewn Wearing Apparel and Fur Articles 
19. Tanning & Dressing of Leather, Manufacture of Luggage, and 
Footwear 
Textile & Footwear 36 7.07% 
3 
20. Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products  
21. Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 
22. Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Record Media 
29. Manufacture of Other Machinery & Equipment 
36. Manufacture of Furniture; Manufacturing of Articles 
Wood Product & 
Other Machinery 53 10.41% 
4 
23. Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel 
24. Manufacture of Chemicals  & Chemical Products 
25. Manufacture of Rubber & Plastic Products 
Chemical & Rubber-
Plastic 104 20.43% 
5 
26. Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 
27. Manufacture of Basic Metals 
28. Manufacture of Fabricate Metal Products, Except Machinery 
& Furniture 
Non-metallic 
Products 68 13.36% 
6 
30. Manufacture of Computers & Office Machinery 
31. Manufacture of Electrical Machinery & Apparatuses 
32. Manufacture of Electronic Components, Radio, TV & 
Communication Equipment & Apparatuses 
33. Manufacture of Medical, Precision & Optical Instruments, 
Watches & Clocks 
Electronic & Electric 
Manufacture 63 12.38% 
7 34. Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailer & Semi trailers 35. Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment Motor 36 7.07% 
8 45. General Construction General Construction 34 6.68% 
9 
50. Sale of Motor Vehicles & Motorcycles; Retail Sale of 
Automotive Fuel 
51. Wholesale Trade & Commission Trade, Except of Motor 
Vehicles & Motorcycles 
52. Retail Trade, Except Motor Vehicles & Motorcycles 
Wholesale & Retail 35 6.88% 
10 
10. Mining of Coal, Crude Petroleum & National Gas 
40. Electricity, Gas, Steam & Hot Water Supply 
60. Land Transport; Transport Via Pipelines 
61. Water Transport 
62. Air Transport 
63. Supporting & Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of 
Travel Agencies 
64. Post and Telecommunications 
72. Computer & Related Activities 
74. Processional, Scientific, & Technical Services 
87. Motion Picture, Broadcasting & Performing Arts Industries 
Others 39 7.66% 
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     To summarize, the sample used in this study comprises firm-year observations 
that satisfy the following three conditions: 
(1) Financial statements data is available from OSIRIS: Publicly listed companies 
worldwide provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) and 
stock data is available from KIS-VALUE provided by the Korean Information 
Service (KIS).  
(2) Corporate governance data (information on ownership, auditor, outside directors 
on board, and audit committee) is available from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and 
Transfer System (DART; http://dart.fss.or.kr), developed by the Korean Financial 
Supervisory Commission (KFSC). 
(3) All financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks, insurance firms, security 
brokerage firms) are excluded because accounting methods and the format of 
financial statements are different to other industries and are subject to different 
regulatory requirements.  
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4.3. METHODOLOGY FOR THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ON EARNINGS QUALITY (RELATED TO RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3) 
    This section provides the empirical models employed to test the seven 
hypotheses linked to the three research questions: (RQ1) “How does ownership 
structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) affect earnings quality?”, (RQ2) 
“Does the internal governance function (outside directors on board and audit 
committee) increase earnings quality?”, and (RQ3) “Does higher audit quality 
increase earnings quality?” raised in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. Specifically, Section 
4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 discuss measurements of the four earnings quality (dependent 
variables), the corporate governance factors (independent variables) and control 
variables. In Section 4.3.4, empirical models and estimation methods relating to 
examining hypotheses for the association between ownership structure (H1a, H1b, and 
H2), internal governance functions (H3a, H3b, and H2), and external governance 
function (H5) in answering to three research questions are summarized. 
 
4.3.1. Measure of Earnings Quality (Dependent Variable) 
       As discussed in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3, earnings quality as a proxy of 
financial reporting quality is classified into two categories: 1) user needs and 2) 
shareholder/investor protection. In the view of user needs, earnings quality is 
measured as earnings persistence and value-relevance, while earnings quality under 
the shareholder/investor protection is measured as conservatism and accruals quality. 
To address the association between earnings quality and corporate governance, 
earnings quality is set as the dependent variable. 
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   4.3.1.1. Earnings Persistence 
         Earnings persistence indicates how much of current earnings will persist 
into the future and continue from period to period. Early research (Kormendi and 
Lipe 1987 and Sloan 1996) estimates earnings persistence as the slope-coefficients of 
regression of current earnings on previous earnings.  
 
         As the first earnings quality proxy, this study measures earnings 
persistence for a firm by estimating the following time-series model for the period 
1995 to 2005 following Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, and Nabar (2006) and Ali et al. 
(2007).  
 
               ttt EarningsEarnings εβα ++= −11              (Equation 4.1) 
          where for year t, and Earningst is earnings before extraordinary items in 
year t scaled by total assets in year t-1; Earningst-1 is earnings before extraordinary 
items in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1; εt is the residual error; 
 
        Earnings persistence is measured as the slope-coefficient ( 1β ), from 
Equation (1). Value of 1β  close to one implies highly persistence earnings, while 
value of 1β  close to zero indicates highly transitory earnings. High quality earnings 
are persistent, recognized by financial statement users as sustainable, less transitory, 
and more permanent (Sloan 1996; Richardson 2003). Therefore, large (small) values 
of the slope-coefficient ( 1β ) correspond to more (less) persistence. 
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  4.3.1.2. Value-Relevance 
Value relevance, as the second proxy for earnings quality under the user 
needs category, is defined as the explanatory power of accounting variables (earnings 
and book value of equity) for stock returns (Ali and Hwang 2000).  
 
   In order to measure the value-relevance of accounting information, this 
study uses Collins et al.’s (1997) methodology that adopts Ohlson’s (1995) valuation 
framework with price as a function of both earnings and book value of equity.  
 
              titititi EPSBVP ,,2,10, εββα +++=             (Equation 4.2) 
          where, for firm i and time t, and Pi,t is the price of a share at the end of 
each year; BVi,t is the book value per share at the end of each year; EPSi,t is the 
earnings per share during the year; εi,t is the residual error.  
 
          The explanatory power of regression (R2) is used as the metric to 
measure the value-relevance of earnings and book value. Large (small) 
2R correspond to more (less) value-relevant earnings. 
 
  4.3.1.3. Conservatism 
 Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define conservatism as the degree of 
differences between book value and market value. Using a theoretical model 
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established by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), the ratio of book-to-market ratios (MTB) 
as a measure of conservatism is suggested by Beaver and Ryan (2000) and Ahmed et 
al. (2002). According to Basu (1997, p.4), conservatism is defined as “the 
accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good 
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses.” Under conservative accounting, 
expenses or losses are immediately recognised, whereas revenues or gains are not 
until uncertainties surrounding economic events are resolved.  
 
         Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) investigates two important measures of 
conservatism, MTB and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, proposed by Basu 
(1997). They observe that asymmetric timeliness of earnings appears to measure 
conservatism more efficiently than MTB because a persistence of MTB becomes 
weaker over long horizons. The most popular and general model to measure 
conservatism is Basu’s (1997) reverse regression stock return model. However, 
Basu’s (1997) model has some potential limitations. First, it cannot distinguish 
transitory gain or loss components in earnings from random error in accruals (e.g. 
miscounting inventory) and from some types of earnings management (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). That is, Basu’s (1997) model only reflects the stock market’s 
reaction to bad news and good news for a firm and does not recognize firm’s 
substantial accounting earnings change due to conservatism. Second, after the Asian 
financial crisis, almost all Korean firms suffered financial distress, and thus financial 
indexes (e.g. stock price, or stock return) were significantly decreased or discounted. 
Thus, Basu’s (1997) model, association test between earnings and stock return, 
cannot identify whether a higher level of conservatism results from increase 
 116
conservative accounting methods or worse firms’ financial status (Choi 2007).  
 
         In order to overcome potential limitation of Basu’s (1997) research, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) estimate conservatism using the relation between cash flows 
from operations and accruals. They argue that the incremental association between 
accruals and negative cash flows over the association between accruals and total cash 
flows represents the degree of conservatism. This study measures conservatism using 
Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) accruals-based test of loss recognition model. 
titititititi CFONCFOCFONCFOACC ,,,3,2,10, * εβββα ++++=  
 (Equation 4.3) 
        where for firm i and time t, and ACCi,t is Accruals (Net Income + 
Depreciation - Cash Flow from Operations) 35; NCFOi,t is a dummy variable, which 
takes 1 if CFOi,t is negative, otherwise 0; CFO is cash flow from operations; εi,t is the 
residual error. Since the magnitude of accruals’ components varies with firm size, 
each component is scaled by average total assets36. 
 
        Conservatism is measured by the incremental coefficient on the association 
between accruals and negative cash flows over the association between accruals and 
total cash flows. Thus, for a large (small) value of the incremental coefficient ( 3β ), 
the degree of conservatism corresponds to more (less) conservative earnings. 
 
                                                
35 Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
36 To avoid the problem of an exceptionally small deflator, average total assets are used as scale 
variable (Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003). 
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  4.3.1.4. Accruals Quality 
         In prior work (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Mikhail et al. 2003), accruals 
are estimates of future cash flows, and earnings will be more representative of future 
cash flows when accruals contain a lower estimation error. The Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model embodies the intuition that current accruals are estimates of future cash 
flow realizations, and that accruals quality is an inverse function of the precision of 
these estimates. Accruals quality is estimated based on the work of Dechow and 
Dichev (2002), who regress working capital accruals on cash from operations in the 
prior, current, and future period, and measure accruals quality as the standard 
deviation of the residual (unexplained portion of the variation in working capital 
accruals) from the regression. Thisis an inverse measure of earnings quality, and thus 
a greater standard deviation of the residuals implies lower earnings quality.  
 
          McNichols (2002) criticizes Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model on the 
basis that it does not consider various factors in forming expectations about current 
accruals and operating cash flows. McNichols (2002) argues that Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) model best captures uncertainty in accruals but does not consider 
management opportunistic intention over accruals since accruals can be impaired by 
managers’ discretion. To address this limitation, McNichols (2002) insert two control 
variables, 1) change in sales revenue and 2) gross property, plant, and equipment that 
could influence the relation between accruals and cash flows based on the Jones 
model (1991) in developing more powerful approaches to estimating accruals quality 
in the presence of management discretion. By incorporating two independent 
variables from the Jones Model (1991) into Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model, 
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McNichols (2002) improves the explanatory power of the model and decreases error. 
 
           Accruals quality is measured following Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper (2005), who adopted the modified Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model by 
McNichols (2002). 
 
 
tititititititi PPEREVCFOCFOCFOTCA ,,5,41,3,21,1, εβββββα ++Δ++++= +−  
(Equation 4.4) 
           where , for firm i and time t, and TCA is total current accruals37; CFO is 
cash flow from operations, scaled by average total assets; ∆REV is change in revenue 
scaled by average total assets; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. Since the 
magnitude of accruals’ components varies with firm size, each component is scaled 
by average total assets. 
 
          Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimate accruals quality as the standard 
deviation of the residual using the past eight years time-series regression for each 
firm. However, in Korea, the direct application of Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
has some limitations because the number of Korean firms is relatively small and 
firms’ financial data are not sufficiently cumulated to use long time-series regression 
(Nah 2004). In order to solve these limitations, this study estimate the model in 
equation (4.4) using pooled-OLS for all firms in the same year within each industry 
                                                
37 Total current accruals (TCA) is calculated following Francis et al. (2005): (Change in non-current 
assets – Change in current liabilities excluding short-term debt and taxes payable – Change in cash 
+ Change in short-term debt in current liabilities)   
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with at least 20 observations based on the Korean Information Services (KIS) 10-
industry classification, following Srinidhi and Gul (2007) and Francis et al. (2005) 38. 
In addition, accruals quality for each firm is measured as the absolute value of firm-
level residuals39 ( ti ,ε ) from industry level pooled-OLS of total current accruals on 
lagged current, and future cash flows plus the change in REV and PPE40.  
 
          Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest that higher accruals quality is 
recognized when accruals quickly convert into cash flows. Thus, in equation (4.4), 
the error term ( ti ,ε ) captures the extent to which accruals do not convert into cash 
flow realizations and cannot be explained by the change in revenue and PPE, which 
is used as a measure of accruals quality. Accordingly, lower earnings quality is 
characterised by the larger absolute value of the residuals. Therefore, large (small) 
values of the absolute value of the firm-level residuals ( ti ,ε ) correspond to poor 
(good) accrual quality.  
 
4.3.2. Measure of Corporate Governance Functions (Independent Variable) 
       As discussed in Chapter 2, the IMF pointed out dominant controlling family 
                                                
38 Srinidhi and Gul (2007) and France et al. (2005) use the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
classification. Similar to the Fama and French (1997), Korean Information Services (KIS) classify 
industry having fewer than 10 sample firms are merged into similar industry because industry 
having fewer than 10 sample firms can not provide sufficient estimations. 
39 In the original Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s model, accruals quality is measured as the standard 
deviation of firm-level residuals. However, they suggest the absolute value of firm-level residuals 
as alternative measure of accruals quality when sufficient long time-series data to estimate the 
standard deviation of residuals can not be used. Srinidhi and Gul (2007) use the absolute value of 
residuals as alternative measure of accruals quality, following Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s 
suggestion. 
40 Industry-group regression model is assigned that same accruals quality value, which is likely to 
cause dependency/serial correlation problems in the pooled-OLS model. Alternatively, in this study, 
accruals quality (the absolute value of residuals) is also measured by pooled firm-year regressions. 
Replicating the analysis (not reported) using this alternative measure does not change the results.  
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shareholders and lack of corporate governance mechanisms are the primary factors 
that contributed to the financial crisis in Korea. The major goals of corporate 
governance reforms were aimed at enhancing the reliability, credibility, and 
transparency of financial information through restricting controlling family 
ownership, inducing foreign investors, and strengthening internal monitoring by 
outside directors on board and audit committees and external monitoring by external 
auditors. Accordingly, the earnings quality of Korean firms is hypothesized to be 
closely associated with ownership structure (e.g. family ownership and foreign 
ownership), internal governance (outside directors on board and audit committees), 
and external governance (auditor). 
       
  4.3.2.1. Ownership Variables 
         In order to test the impact of family ownership on firm value and earnings 
quality, three different types of family ownership variables are used: (1) family 
ownership (FAMILY), (2) pure family ownership (PUREFAM), and (3) affiliated 
ownership (AFFIL).  
 
        Jang et al. (2002) suggest that controlling family ownership using 
pyramidal structures is the most common features of Korean firms. Previous Korean 
studies (Joh 2003; Kim and Yi 2006) show that a higher affiliated ownership was 
prevalent in Korea, thereby exacerbating agency problems and leading to low firm 
performance and earnings quality. Thus, it is important to classify family ownership 
into pure family ownership and affiliated ownership because pure family ownership 
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and ownership-control disparity can differently affect firm value and earnings quality.  
 
General approach, identifying family entrenchment effects (Type II agency 
problems) is to use a squared family ownership term (a non-linear relationship). 
However, in my opinion, affiliated ownership is a more suitable approach to test 
entrenchment of family ownership (Type II agency problems) than a squared family 
ownership. First of all, the ownership structure of many Korean firms is 
characterized by a large wedge between control (voting rights) and ownership (cash 
flow rights) of controlling shareholders, which is considered a major source of 
agency problems in most emerging markets. This large wedge resulted from 
affiliated ownership. Second, previous research has documented little systematic 
evidence on whether affiliation ownership affects firms value (Joh 2003) and 
earnings management (Kim and Yi 2006). In this study, I decomposed family 
ownership into two categories; 1) pure family ownership and 2) affiliated ownership. 
Thus, firm specific family ownership data provides a potentially between test the 
Type II agency problems than a squared family ownership model41. 
 
         This study defines family ownership (FAMILY) as the percentage of 
equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and his/her family members and 
specially related shareholders with the largest-shareholder and its family, including 
stock held by affiliated firms, following The Korean National Tax Law Act and the 
                                                
41 This study also tests a non-linear impact of family ownership on earnings quality using a squared 
family ownership model and reported it in Appendix III. The results are almost identical with those 
reported in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 on page 159 to 162 and is referred to in footnote 52 on page 163. 
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Korean Stock Exchange Law42. The Korean National Tax Law states that the 
controlling shareholder ownership is the total number of shares held by the largest 
shareholder, his/her relatives43, specially related person, and affiliated firms44. The 
Korean Stock Exchange Law defines the largest shareholder as a person who together 
with any specially related persons45 holds the largest number of stocks on the basis 
of the total number of stocks with voting rights of a firm46.  
 
       As a definition of family ownership, family ownership can be decomposed 
into pure family ownership and affiliated firm’s ownership. Pure family ownership 
(PUREFAM) is defined as the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest 
personal shareholder and his/her families, subtracting affiliated firm’s ownership 
from family ownership. Following Kim and Yi (2006), affiliated ownership (AFFIL) 
is measured as the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms under the 
control of the largest personal shareholder and his/her families.  
 
         Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is percentage of equity shares held by all 
foreign shareholders as of the end of the year, and calculated as the total number of 
shares held by foreign shareholders divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
 
                                                
42  Ownership data are obtained from firm’s business report on DART system which disclose 
shareholder’s name and holding ratio by types of shareholders such as the largest shareholder and 
his/her family members, affiliated firms, institutional shareholders, and foreign shareholders etc. 
43 A spouse, a blood relative within eight degrees of kinship, or an in-law within four degrees of 
kinship 
44 Article 20, The Korean National Tax Law Act  
45 “The major shareholder of the concerned company and that person's spouse and lineal ascendant 
and descendant; The spouse or lineal ascendant and descendant of an officer of the concerned 
company.”(Article 54-5-(4), The Korean Stock Exchange Law) 
46 Article 54-5, The Korean Stock Exchange Law 
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  4.3.2.2. Internal Governance Variables 
  The board variables are the ratio of outside directors and the background 
of outside directors. Outside directors are defined as independent directors that have 
no current or potential business ties, share ownership or an investment relationship 
with the firm, following the Korean Securities and Exchange Act. Outside directors 
on board (OUTBOD) are measured by the ratio of outside directors to the board size 
(total number of registered directors).  
 
 In order to investigate the association between backgrounds of outside 
directors on board and earnings quality, professional backgrounds of outside directors 
are decomposed into eight categories: 1) politician, 2) government official, 3) lawyer, 
4) financial expert, 5) professor, 6) former employee, and 7) foreigner. Seven 
categories of outside directors on board are measured as dummies. 
 
       As discussed in Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2, the audit committee was 
initially introduced as a major part of Korea’s corporate governance reforms. In order 
to test whether introducing an audit committee increases earnings quality, audit 
committee (AUDCOM) is measured as a dummy variable that indicates the presence 
(one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. 
 
  4.3.2.3. External Governance (Audit Quality) Variable 
         As discussed in Section 3.5.6 of Chapter 3, audit quality is typically 
measured as auditor brand name (e.g., Big N). Thus, audit quality (AUDIT) is 
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measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s auditor is Big N 
audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.3.3. Measures of Control Variables 
       This section presents measurement of control variables that may affect 
earnings quality. The following five variables are included to control for potential 
influences on earnings quality: 1) firm size (SIZE), 2) leverage (LEV), 3) firm with 
negative earnings (LOSS), 4) growth prospects (GRW), and 5) profitability (ROA). 
 
      Firm Size (SIZE): Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that managers of large 
firms are politically sensitive and more likely to have discretion due to their 
complexity. Therefore, large firms may more easily manage earnings than small firms. 
However, large firms are expected to disclose more information (e.g., public 
disclosure and private development of non-accounting information) than small firms. 
In addition, large firms are under many regulations and political visibility, and thus 
large firms are unlikely to manage earnings (Bartov, Gul, and Tsui 2001). To control 
for size effects and these offsets, the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets is included as a proxy for firm size.  
 
      Leverage (LEV): Firms with high leverage may have incentives to manage 
reported earnings due to their concerns over debt covenants or private lending 
agreement violations (Dhaliwal, Lee, and Farger 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). 
However, firms with high leverage are required to exercise strong and positive 
control and oversight due to higher debt, thereby providing higher quality of financial 
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information. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets.  
 
     Firms with negative earnings (LOSS): negative net income could be the result 
of high financial reporting quality from the accounting conservatism perspective. In 
addition, negative net income captures the diminished value-relevance of earnings.  
Firm with negative earnings is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s 
previous year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise 
 
     Growth Prospects (GRW): Growth firms are expected to increase firm value 
and earnings quality but can be regarded as risky firms which inflate their earnings 
(Krishinan 2003). To control these offset effects on earnings quality, growth 
prospects are included and measured as a firm’s market to book ratio of equity, 
calculated as market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
 
     Profitability (ROA): Return on assets (ROA) is shown to be positively 
correlated with the level and the magnititude of accruals (Kasznik 1999; Haw et al. 
2004). Thus, high profit firms are predicted to increase their earnings by managers’ 
operational discretion or accounting discretion. As a measure of profitability, ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets.  
 
4.3.4. Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
  4.3.4.1. Empirical Models 
         The following regression equation, Equation 4.5 is formulated to examine 
seven hypotheses for ownership structure (H1a, H1b, and H2), internal governance 
 126
function (H3a, H3b, and H4) and external governance function (H5) given the 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
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(Equation 4.5) 
         
        where, subscripts i denotes individual firms (i = 1,2,…,509) and t means 
time period (t = 2000, 2001,…2005). β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are estimated parameters. ε is 
the error term. The definitions of the variables and the relevant hypothesized (or 
expected) signs in regression Equations 4.5 is summarized in Table 4.2.
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Table4.2: Summary of Definitions, Sources and Predicted Signs of Variables for Equation 4.5 
This table summarizes the definitions, sources and predicted signs of the variables in regression Equations 4.5 related to the testing of seven hypotheses H1a-1b, H2, 
H3a-3b, and H4. Column 1 shows the list of variables and their definitions are in column 2. Columns 3 to 6 show coefficients along with their predicted signs in 
regression Equations 4.5 for four earnings quality: 1) earnings persistence, 2) value-relevance, 3) conservatism, and 4) accruals quality. Finally, column 7 displays 
source(s) of the variable. The expected sign of the regression coefficient is shown for each variable in Panel B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Definitions Persistence Value-Relevance Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality Sources 
Panel A: Earnings Quality 
(Dependent variables) 
      
Earnings Persistence the slope-coefficient (β1), from Equation (4.1)     
OSIRIS/ 
KIS 
Value-Relevance the explanatory power of regression (R
2), from Equation 
(4.2)     
OSIRIS/ 
KIS 
Conservatism the coefficient (β3), from Equation (4.3)     
OSIRIS/ 
KIS 
Accruals Quality the absolute value of firm-level residuals ( ti ,ε ), from 
Equation (4.4) 
    OSIRIS/ KIS 
Panel B: To test hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H2 (Ownership Structure)      
Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest 
shareholder and family and associated shareholders who 
are under the control of the largest-shareholder family, 
including stock held by affiliated firms 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFFAM) 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest 
personal shareholder and his/her families +/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL) the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms under the control of the largest-shareholder family - - - + DART 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
the percentage of equity shares held by all foreign 
shareholders and calculated as the total number of shares 
held by foreign shareholders divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding 
+ + + - DART 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Definitions Persistence Value-Relevance Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality Sources 
Panel C: To test hypotheses H3a, H3B, and H4 (Internal Governance Function)      
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
the ratio of outside directors on the board size (total 
number of registered directors) + + + - DART 
Politician (POL) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
member of the board sit on a parliament or political party, 
and zero otherwise 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Government official (PUB) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
member of the board has worked for government, and zero 
otherwise 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Lawyer (LAW) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
member of the board is lawyer (or law-related job), and 
zero otherwise 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Financial expert (FIN) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
member of the board has accounting, tax, or finance 
experience (e.g., CPA, CFA, tax attorney, or Banker), and 
zero otherwise 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Professor (PRF) a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one member of the board is professor, and zero otherwise +/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Former employee (FRM) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one 
member of the board was worked current firm or related 
firm, and zero otherwise 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Foreigner (FOR) a dummy variable that indicates the presence (one) or absence (zero) of registered foreign citizens on the board
 
+/- +/- +/- +/- DART 
Audit Committee (AUDCOM) a dummy variable that indicates the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee + + + - DART 
Panel D: To test hypotheses H5 (External Governance Function: Audit Quality)      
Audit Quality (AUDIT) a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise + + + - DART 
 
 129
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Definitions Persistence Value-Relevance Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality Sources 
Panel E: Control Variables      
Firm Size (SIZE) the natural log of the total assets +/- +/- +/- +/- OSIRIS 
Leverage (LEV) total debt/total assets - - +/- +/- OSIRIS 
Firms with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s 
previous year’s net income was negative, and zero 
otherwise
 
- - +/- +/- OSIRIS 
Growth prospects (GRW) market to book ratio of equity
 
+ + +/- +/- OSIRIS 
Profitability (ROA) Return on Assets (net income/total assets)
 
+ + +/- +/- OSIRIS 
Year dummies (YEAR) Five individual dummy variables which equals either one or zero for each year from 2001 to 2005. +/- +/- +/- +/- N/A 
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    4.3.4.2. Estimation Methods 
           This section explains the primary estimation method. This study 
utilizes panel data set. Baltagi (2005, pp. 4-9) proposes the advantage of a panel data 
set (cross-sectional time-series) as that panel data provides more degrees of freedom, 
more efficiency and variability, more robust information, less collinearity among 
variables, and also permits control of unobserved firm heterogeneity.   
          The primary estimation method of the regression Equation 4.5 will be 
pooled OLS following Francis et al. (2005) and Ashbaug-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and 
LaFond (2007). The robustness check will be employed by estimating Equation 4.5 
with Generalized Least Square (GLS) Random-Effects technique as a panel data 
technique. A GLS Random-Effect technique is used to address the possibility of a 
spurious relationship between the dependent and independent variables due to the 
exclusion of unmeasured explanatory variables that nonetheless still affect firm 
behavior. 
          The firm Fixed Effect (FE) technique has important limitations for this 
study. Since FE eliminates the effect of cross-sectional variation, this is of special 
concern for family ownership including pure family ownership and affiliated 
ownership, which is an important component of corporate governance in cross-
sectional results, but which has little time variation. Second, the business group 
dummy instrument is virtually constant across time and is therefore unavailable with 
firm FE. Thus, this study employs the GLS Random-Effect technique. 
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4.4. ENDOGENEITY ISSUES BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
EARNINGS QUALITY 
    Corporate governance mechanisms are typically endogenous variables rather 
than exogenous variables. Durnev and Kim (2004) suggest that corporate governance 
mechanisms are endogenously determined by firm-level economic factors such as 
investment opportunities, firm size, firm risk, and controlling shareholders’ 
ownership. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that board composition may depend 
on firm performance and thus may need to be determined endogenously. In an out-of-
equilibrium state, board characteristics will directly influence firm performance, 
whereas in equilibrium, board characteristics and firm performance are caused by 
other factors (e.g. the CEO’s previous performance). Accordingly, even if board 
characteristics could contribute to firm value, given their correlation with many other 
unidentifiable variables, it will be difficult to isolate their own effect. Cho (1998) 
suggests that ownership structure is endogenously determined and firm value could 
be a determinant of the ownership structure rather than being determined by 
ownership structure. Thus, endogeneity issues should be considered because 
corporate governance variables are correlated with each other and also other various 
economic variables (Black, Jang, and Kim 2006).  
 
      In Korea, corporate governance mechanisms were exogenously determined 
because many regulations for corporate governance mechanism (e.g. restriction of 
family ownership, liberalization of foreign ownership, installation of outside board of 
directors on board and audit committee, and enhancing external auditor 
responsibility) were regulated by the Korean government after the Asian Financial 
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Crisis. However, the endogeneity of corporate governance variables should also be 
considered since endogeneity makes it difficult to isolate causal relations between 
earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms, reverse causality, in which 
earnings quality predicts governance. Bhagat and Black (2002) find a negative 
correlation between firm performance and board independence but show that poor 
performing firms increase the number of independent directors on the board. Black et 
al. (2006) suggest that firms with high market value may choose weaker corporate 
governance because of less necessity for outside capital, but at the same time, better 
corporate governance could increase firm value. Thus, the relation between earnings 
quality and corporate governance could involve reverse causation. 
 
 4.4.1. Two Stage Least Square Regression (2SLS) 
       In equation (4.5) assuming that corporate governance variables are 
exogenous, earnings quality is estimated as a function of corporate governance and 
other firm-specific variables. However, if corporate governance variables are in fact 
endogenously determined, the results might be misspecified.  
        
      In dealing with the potential endogenous relationship between earnings 
quality and corporate governance mechanisms, this study uses a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) regression following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Choi et al. 
(2007). 
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Equation (4.7) 
    
      A 2SLS regression is estimated by regressing three endogenous corporate 
governance variables (family ownership, foreign ownership, and outside directors on 
board) on earnings quality. At the first stage, the endogeneity is estimated by using 
four instrumental variables (IV): 1) lagged family ownership, 2) lagged foreign 
ownership, 3) lagged outside directors on board, and 4) business group dummy 
variable) plus two control variables: 1) Capital asset investment ratio (PPE) and 2) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQD) in Equation (4.6). Capital asset investment ratio (PPE) is 
calculated as the firm’s property, plant, and equipment divided by sales. Firms with 
high PPE ratio might be more easily and directly monitored by outside investors than 
firms with high intangible asset investment ratio, and therefore could have weaker 
internal governance (a substitution effect), but alternatively firms with high PPE 
could have stronger governance due to easier monitoring (a complementary effect). 
Thus, PPE affects governance, through either substitution or complementary effects 
(Black et al. 2006). Liquidity ratio (LIQD) is measured by firm’s total current assets 
divided by total current liabilities. High liquidity ratio represents higher financial 
stability and more investment opportunities for the firm. Cho (1998) finds a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and liquidity because a firm’s manager 
with high liquidity ratio has a larger proportion of the firm’s shares.  
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      Then, at the second stage, predicted values for three endogenous corporate 
variables (InstCG) are used in the second stage regressions of earnings quality, 
Equation (4.7).  
 
 4.4.2. Instrumental Variables 
      When the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms 
(endogeneity), OLS regression would be biased and inconsistently estimated. To 
address possible endogeneity, identifying a good instrumental variable is required. 
Instrumental variable is a variable that does not appear in the equation with an 
endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge 2002). Thus, a good instrumental 
variable should be exogenous, uncorrelated with or not to be influenced by the 
dependent variable (earnings quality), and should be correlated with the independent 
variable (corporate governance characteristics). 
 
       This study addresses the endogeneity issue by using lagged ownership 
variables (family and foreign ownership) and lagged outside directors on board 
following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Choi et al. (2007). In addition, this 
study uses a business group dummy variable (B_GROUP; takes the value of one if 
firms with asset of 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) or more; and zero otherwise) as the 
exogenous instrumental variable following Black et al. (2006).  
 
The variables suggested as appropriate instruments for ownership structure 
are its first lagged level (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). In this study, lagged equity 
ownership is actually an appropriate instrument. First there is very strong correlation 
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between ownership measures and their lagged values. For example, the correlation 
coefficients between the contemporaneous and lagged levels of the variables FAMILY 
and FOREIGN are 0.8816 and 0.9156, respectively. Second, given the radical inflows 
of foreign investment since the foreign investment liberalization in 1998, the 
endogeneity of foreign ownership is difficult to dispute.  
 
Almost all the variables in governance studies including board structure are 
endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Bhagat and Black 2002). Thus, the board 
structure determinant analysis suffers from the endogeneity problem. However, in 
Korea, the installation of outside directors was done in a relatively short period 
because the Securities and Exchange Act was enacted in 1999, mandating that all 
firms listed on KSE should have 25% of outside directors on board. Outside directors 
on boards in Korea came as a result of government regulations rather than through 
voluntary decision by the firms. Lagged values of board independence are included 
as instrumental variables in the respective board structure determinants regression 
equations on the assumption that lagged variables by definition are not jointly 
determined with contemporaneous variables (John, Mehran and Qian 2006). 
 
     To address endogeneity, business group dummy variable is used as the 
exogenous instrumental variable that is correlated with corporate governance, but 
does not directly predict earnings quality because the Korean government rules have 
placed additional restriction on firms that are business groups detailed above. Black 
et al. (2006) justify why a business group dummy variable is an appropriate 
instrumental variable. First, in Korea, various corporate governance reforms (e.g. 
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restriction of family ownership, removal of ceiling on foreign ownership, the 
installation of outside directors, and audit committees,) were enacted by the Korean 
Securities and Exchange Act in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. That is 
corporate governance reforms resulted from government regulations not from the 
firms’ voluntary choice. Specifically, business groups in Korea (listed firms with 
assets of 2 trillion KRW) are subject to many government regulations. For example, 
business groups must appoint outside directors in the number of one-half of the total 
registered directors and establish an audit committee. In addition, two thirds of audit 
committee members should be outside directors and the chairperson should be an 
outside director. Thus, a business group (asset size > 2 trillion KRW) is an important 
determinant of corporate governance in Korea and the legal enforcements on 
corporate governance for business group is an exogenous event. The effect of these 
legal requirements on corporate governance can be safely regarded as exogenous. 
Second, there are direct connections between firm size (the natural logarithm of total 
assets) and firm value (Dunev and Kim 2004), whereas a business group dummy 
captures the discontinuous effect of size on corporate governance and thereby 
indirectly affects earnings quality. Consequently, this feature of Korean governance 
rules provide rational theoretical framework for using a business group dummy at 2 
trillion KRW as a suitable instrumental variable, which meets the conditions for an 
effective instrumental variable: exogenous; correlated with governance, but 
otherwise unrelated to earnings quality. 
 
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
    This chapter provides details of the data and empirical methodology to examine 
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seven hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. 
    Section 4.2 presents sample selection and data sources and collection procedures. 
The main sources of data are OSIRIS and KIS-VALUE for accounting and financial 
variables and DART database from the KFSC for governance variables. 
 
    Section 4.3 describes four measures of earnings quality as dependent variables, 
three main corporate governance functions as independent variables (ownership 
structure, internal governance, and external governance), and control variables. 
Specifically, sub-section 4.3.3 proposes empirical models as well as corresponding 
estimation methods related to testing seven hypotheses (H1a-1b, H2, H3a-3b, and H4) in 
answering to three research questions. 
 
    Section 4.4 discusses endogeneity issues involving the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings quality and proposes a two-stage least square 
regression as a methodology to treat endogeneity. 
 
    The next chapter will report and discuss the results of the hypotheses testing 
using the empirical methods proposed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
    This chapter presents the results for the empirical testing of the hypotheses, H1a, 
H1b, and H2, related to RQ1: “How does ownership structure (family ownership and 
foreign ownership) affect earnings quality?”, H3a, H3b, and H4, linked to RQ2: “Does 
internal governance functions (outside directors on board and audit committee) 
increase earnings quality?”, and H5, related to RQ3: “Does higher audit quality 
increase earnings quality?” The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. 
 
     Section 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5.3 reports the results of four 
earnings quality (Equation 4.1 to 4.4) in Korea during the sample periods (2000 to 
2005). Section 5.4 then presents the empirical results of the pooled-OLS estimation 
of Equation (4.5) for the testing of seven hypotheses (H1a to H5). The findings for 
2SLS estimates of Equation (4.7) are also discussed in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, the 
robustness of the results, as reported in Section 5.4, is tested with panel estimation 
technique (GLS Random Effect). Finally, Section 5.7 concludes this chapter by 
summarizing the findings of the seven hypotheses tests and outcomes.  
 
5.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
    The univariate analysis in this section includes the descriptive statistics as well 
as the correlation analysis of the four earnings quality metrics and corporate 
governance variables. In Panel A of Table 5.1, the descriptive statistics for the four 
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earnings quality measures are presented as dependent variables. As for earnings 
quality from the user needs perspective, the mean (median) of persistence in the 
sample is 0.3136 (0.2628), and the mean (median) of value-relevance is 0.4527 
(0.4518). The mean (median) value of earnings persistence is very similar to the U.S. 
study (Ali et al. 2007). Ali et al. (2007) reports the mean (median) value of earnings 
persistence in the S&P 500 firms during the sample period 1995 to 2002 is 0.32 
(0.33). The mean (median) value of value-relevance (the adjusted R2) is roughly 
similar to Australian study reported by Wong (2008), for a sample of 918 firms in the 
ASX, reporting a mean (median) adjusted R2 from firms specific regression of 0.4377 
(0.4145). Turning to earnings quality from the shareholder/investor protection 
perspective, conservatism has a mean (median) value of 0.1930 (0.0791), and 
accruals quality has a mean (median) value of 0.0756 (0.0227), respectively. The 
mean (median) value of accruals quality in this study is relatively higher than those 
of the Australian study (Wong 2008), reporting a mean (median) value from firm-
specific regression of 0.0269 (0.015). Namely, accruals quality of Korean firms is 
lower than that of Australian firms.  
 
      Panel B of Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the three categories of 
corporate governance (e.g., ownership structure, internal governance, and external 
governance) used as independent variables. As for ownership structure, the average 
family ownership (FAMILY) is 0.3513, which is relatively low, compared to other 
East Asian countries, where the average family ownership of Hong Kong is 0.489 
(Ng 200547), Singapore is 0.571 (Chau and Gray 2002), and Malaysia is 0.43 (Tam 
                                                
47 Ng (2005) use managerial ownership as proxy of family ownership in Hong Kong because the 
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and Tan 2007), respectively. To illustrate different effects of family ownership 
constitution on earnings quality, this study decomposes family ownership into pure 
family ownership (PUREFAM) and affiliated ownership (AFFIL). The mean value of 
PUREFAM, shareholdings by an individual person or his/her family is 0.206, while 
AFFIL 48, shareholding by affiliated firms under the control of controlling family 
shareholders is 0.145. This feature is roughly similar to the values reported by Kim 
and Yi (2006)49. Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) has the mean value of 0.08 and the 
median value is 0.0079. The severe difference between mean and median of foreign 
ownership implies that foreign ownership is concentrated in specific firms. This 
feature of foreign ownership supports that foreign shareholders prefer large 
manufacturing firms with good accounting performance, lower unsystematic risk, 
and lower leverage but underweight smaller and highly leveraged firms (Kang and 
Stulz 1997).  
 
      Panel C of Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of internal governance 
function variables. The mean of outside directors on board (OUTBOD) is 0.307450, 
which means that 30.74% of the board is outside directors on the average. This 
feature is comparable with 0.346 of Singapore firms (Bradbury et al. 2006) but 
significantly low, compared to 0.584 of the U.S firms, reported in Klien (2002).     
As for quality of outside directors, outside directors from financial experts (FIN) 
have the highest mean value (0.3985) in the seven background categories of outside 
                                                                                                                                        
correlation between managerial ownership and family ownership is almost one (0.978) 
48 Kim and Yi (2006) use affiliated ownership as a proxy of ownership-control disparity called 
‘wedge’. 
49 They report that affiliated ownership in Korean firms is 0.111 during the sample period 1992 to 
2000. 
50 In this study, the average number of board member is 6.22 people, and the average number of 
outside directors is 1.99 people. 
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directors. Following FIN, the mean value of professor (PRF) is 0.2757 and lawyer 
(LAW) is 0.2089, respectively. This specific background preference of outside 
directors is consistent with Choi et al. (2007). Interestingly, PRF ranked the 2nd 
highest in the seven background categories. According to the CGS (2008), outside 
directors who were professors accounted for 23.6% of directors as of 2007. This 
unique feature results from the Confucian tradition of respecting and trusting 
academic expertise. The mean value of outside directors from former employees 
(FRM) is 0.1320. Consistent with Choi et al. (2007), the mean value of outside 
directors who are foreigners (FOR) is 0.0488. Namely, 5% of Korean firms appoint 
foreigners as outside directors on their boards. Outside directors who are politicians 
(POL) have the lowest mean value (0.0285) in the seven background categories of 
outside directors. The mean value of the presence of audit committee (AUDCOM) is 
0.1310, which indicates that 13% of sample firms in this study operate an audit 
committee. This feature is significantly low, compared to 83% of Australian firms, 
reported in Davidson et al. (2006). The installment of an audit committee was a 
specific mandatory requirement only for large business groups (asset size > 2trillion 
KRW). In this study, 8% of sample firms (247 firm-year observations) are classified 
as business groups and mandatorily operate audit committee, while 5% of sample 
firms (152 firm-year observations) voluntarily operate an audit committee. 
 
      In Panel D of Table 5.1, the descriptive statistics of audit quality, measured as 
Big N, are reported. As for audit quality (AUDIT), the mean value of AUDIT is 
0.6588. This value means that 66% of sample firms in this study appoint Big N as 
external auditors. This feature is quite different from the findings of U.K and U.S., 
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where 80-90% of public firms are audited by Big N. 
 
      The descriptive statistics in Panel E of Table 5.1 indicate five control 
variables. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, 
and the mean (median) value is 19.230 (19.043). The mean (median) value of 
leverage ratio (LEV) is 0.5356 (0.4919). This value is relatively high, compared to 
other countries. For example, the average leverage ratio of Singapore firms is 0.234 
(Bradbury et al. 2006) and Australia is 0.448 (Davidson et al. 2005). However, 
compared to the pre-Asian financial crisis period in Korea, this feature is 
significantly reduced. According to Baek et al. (2004), the average leverage ratio of 
Korean firms was 0.721 during the period 1997 to 1998. The mean of firms with 
negative earnings (LOSS) is 0.2164, which indicates that 21% of sample firms in this 
study reports negative earnings. Firm’s growth prospect (GRW), measured as market 
to book ratio has a mean (median) value of 1.2683 (0.3865). As for the profitability 
of sample firms, the mean (median) value return on assets (ROA) is 0.0135 (0.0306). 
Overall, accounting profitability of Korean firms was low during the sample period. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the distribution of variables by showing mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min.), first quartile (1st Quartile), median (Median),
 second quartile (3rd Quartile), skewness (Skew.), and kurtosis (Kurt.). See Tables 4.2 for variable definitions. 
Variables Mean SD Min. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Panel A: Earnings Quality:          
Earnings Persistence 0.3136 0.7032 -4.6343 -0.0659 0.2628 0.6523  11.188  2.5188 34.983 
Value-Relevance  0.4527  0.2531 0.0003 0.2395 0.4518 0.6479 0.9920  0.1243 -0.9655 
Conservatism 0.1930  6.4358 - 77.772 -0.0214 0.0791 0.1862 54.415  -0.2212 36.017 
Accruals Quality  0.0756 0.1991  1.48E-05 0.0082  0.0227 0.0637 3.6321  9.2922 121.50 
Panel B: Ownership Structure:           
FAMILY   0.3514 0.1923 0.0000 0.2251 0.3589 0.4858 0.9295 -0.05356  -0.4217 
PUREFAM  0.2064 0.1683 0.0000 0.0269 0.2028 0.3268 0.7882  0.3668 -0.7758 
AFFIL   0.1447  0.1770 0.0000 0.0000 0.0694 0.2507 0.8866 1.2824 1.0592 
FOREIGN  0.0806 0.1443 0.0000 0.0004 0.0079 0.0922 0.9930  2.4366  6.4668 
Panel C: Internal Governance:          
OUTBOD   0.3074 0.1188 0.0000 0.2500  0.2857 0.3333 0.8333 0.4146  2.2583 
POL  0.0285 0.1664 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5.6686 30.133 
PUB 0.1185 0.1045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.3606 3.5709 
LAW  0.2089 0.4066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.4321 0.0509 
FIN  0.3985 0.4897 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4147 -1.8281 
PRF  0.2757 0.4469 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0039 -0.9923 
FRM 0.1320 0.3385 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.1749 2.7302 
FOR  0.0488 0.2155 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 4.1890 15.5480 
AUDCOM  0.1310 0.3374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000  2.1876  2.7857 
Panel D: External Governance:          
AUDIT  0.6588 0.4742 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 -0.6699  -1.5512 
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Table 5.1 continued 
Variables Mean SD Min. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Panel E: Control Variables:          
SIZE 19.230 1.4564 12.091 18.270  19.043 19.962  24.890 0.7487 1.0363 
LEV 0.5356 0.7275 0.0169 0.3443 0.4919 0.6451 26.477 29.335 1019.6 
LOSS 0.2164 0.4119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.3771 -0.1035 
GRW 1.2683 6.9120 0.0002 0.1626  0.3865 0.9060 288.00 27.708 1021.3 
ROA 0.0135 0.2134 -4.5242 0.0043  0.0306 0.0648 1.5087 -5.8747 104.39 
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    Table 5.2 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations statistics among 
variables. Two earnings quality proxies from the user needs perspective exhibit 
significant positive correlation (0.0132, p<0.01). This evidence suggests relatively 
overlap between earnings persistence and value-relevance. Thus, these two variables 
are suitable for the proxies of the user needs perspective. It is noted that conservatism 
is significantly negatively correlated with earnings persistence (-0.0336, p<0.10) and 
value-relevance (-0.0334, p<0.10), respectively. Under conservative accounting 
practice, expenses (loss) are immediately recognized, while revenues (gains) are not 
until uncertainty surrounding economic events is resolved. Thus, the negative 
correlation between conservatism and persistence and value relevance suggests that 
conservative accounting practice can distort revenue-expense matching, thereby 
diminishing earnings persistence and value-relevance despite reducing uncertainty. In 
addition, those earnings quality measures are representing different dimension of 
earnings quality and could provide a relatively more comprehensive evidence on the 
linkage to corporate governance. 
 
      With respect to ownership structure variables, there is a strong negative 
correlation between PUREFAM and AFFIL (-0.3863, p<0.01). This could be 
interpreted that these two types of ownership are a substitutes. In addition, this might 
result from constraint on the family’s ability to invest as well as on the affiliated 
firms due to the Korean Fair Trade Act that restricts the amount of equity investment 
a firm can make into affiliated firms. As discussed in Sub-section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2, 
the Korean Fair Trade Act prohibits cross-holding between affiliated firms. It also 
imposes a ceiling (25% of net asset value) on the amount of equity investment that 
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can be invested in other affiliated firm’s equity. PUREFAM is positively correlated 
with GRW (0.0472, p<0.05) and ROA (0.0339, p<0.01) but negatively correlated with 
LEV (-0.1156, p<0.01) and LOSS (-0.1263, p<0.05), respectively. These correlations 
support the alignment effects for family ownership. FOREIGN is significantly 
positively correlated with AFFIL (0.0761, p<0.01), SIZE (0.5075, p<0.01), GRW 
(0.3066, p<0.01), and ROA (0.1065, p<0.01) but significantly negatively correlated 
with LEV (0.0761, p<0.01) and LOSS (0.0761, p<0.01). Consistent with the feature of 
foreign ownership represented in Chapter 5.2, these correlations also support foreign 
shareholders’ investment preferences, concentrating on large firms and financial 
stable firms (Dahlquist and Robertsoon 2001). In addition, the negative correlation 
with PUREFAM (-0.1351, p<0.01) indicates that foreign shareholders do not prefer 
firms having a controlling family shareholder, presumably due to higher agency costs. 
 
With regard to internal governance variables, OUTBOD and AUDCOM are 
strongly positively correlated with SIZE (0.4564, p<0.01; 0.6104, p<0.01), 
respectively. As discussed in Sub-section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2, listed firms should have 
at least 25% of outside directors on board, and listed firms with asset value of more 
than 2trillion KRW (the Korean currency) are mandated to have at least 50% board 
members as outside directors on board and audit committee. In addition, large firms 
are required to demonstrate a greater degree of monitoring due to their complexity. 
Accordingly, the positive correlation between internal governance function 
(OUTBOD and AUDCOM) and SIZE results from the regulation regarding outside 
directors on board in Korea and the indigenous characteristic of large firms. 
OUTBOD and AUDCOM are positively correlated with FOREIGN (0.0.2916, 
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p<0.01; 0.3981, p<0.01) and negatively correlated with FAMILY (-0.0329, p<0.05; -
0.438, p<0.05) and PUREFAM (-0.1426, p<0.01; -0.1779, p<0.01), respectively. This 
represents that outside blockholders (FOREIGN) prefer firms having a strong internal 
governance function (OUTBOD and AUDCOM), whereas controlling family 
shareholders (FAMILY and PUREFAM) might reduce monitoring functions. The 
internal governance function (OUTBOD and AUDCOM) are positively correlated 
with GRW (0.0521, p<0.01; 0.0497, p<0.01). This correlation result implies that high 
growth firms necessitate a higher degree of management oversight by internal 
governance function due to the possibility of inflated earnings. 
 
 With consideration of the external governance variable, AUDIT is positively 
correlated with AFFIL (0.1001, p<0.01) and FOREIGN (0.1551, p<0.01) as well as 
SIZE (0.2890, p<0.01) but negatively correlated with PUREFAM (-0.0772, p<0.01). 
These correlations are consistent with the internal governance function (OUTBOD 
and AUDCOM). In addition, AUDIT has significantly positive correlation with 
OUTBOD (0.1299, p<0.01) and AUDCOM (0.1955, p<0.01). This correlation 
suggests that firms with strong internal governance functions also require higher 
audit quality. Namely, firms with higher board independence and audit committee 
prefer to appoint Big N as the external auditor.  
 
While there are many coefficients that are statistically significant, there are few 
that are sufficiently large to cause any serious problems of multicollinearity.
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Table 5.2: Correlation Statistics 
The table shows Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlation statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Tables 4.2 for variable definitions. 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Persistence  1.000 0.0398*** -0.0458** 0.0061 0.0651 0.1048*** -0.0430** 0.0915*** -0.0162 -0.0582*** 0.0157 -0.0277 
2 Value-Relevance 0.0132***  1.000 -0.0194** 0.0109 -0.0278 0.0025*** -0.0186 0.0077*** 0.0140 0.0315 -0.0138 -0.0469** 
3 Conservatism -0.0336* -0.0334*  1.000 -0.0017 0.0217 0.0190 0.0163 0.0094 -0.0414* -0.0618*** -0.0021 -0.0308 
4 Accruals Quality 0.0235 0.0279 -0.0202  1.000 -0.0915*** -0.1851*** 0.0870 0.2551*** 0.2229*** 0.0783*** 0.1181*** 0.1183*** 
5 FAMILY -0.0011 -0.0293 0.0210 -0.1067*** 1.000 0.5022*** 0.5800*** 0.0171 -0.1026*** -0.0621*** 0.0442** -0.0451*** 
6 PUREFAM 0.0483** -0.0034 0.0137 -0.1486*** 0.5137***  1.000 -0.2800*** -0.0679*** -0.1665*** -0.1280*** 0.0137 -0.0350*** 
7 AFFIL -0.0461** -0.0246 0.0084 0.0247 0.5909*** -0.3863***  1.000 0.1772*** 0.0867*** 0.0700*** 0.0601*** 0.0206 
8 FOREIGN 0.0570*** 0.0214*** 0.0015 0.2457*** -0.0116 -0.1351*** 0.0761***  1.000 0.2446*** 0.0663*** 0.1199*** 0.1765*** 
9 OUTBOD -0.0089 0.0145*** -0.0030 0.2573*** -0.0392** -0.1426*** 0.0927*** 0.2916***  1.000 0.0984*** 0.1915*** 0.2332*** 
10 POL -0.0453** 0.0310 -0.0474** 0.0855*** -0.0615*** -0.1338*** 0.0601*** 0.0445** 0.1205***  1.000 -0.0076 -0.0197 
11 PUB 0.0198 -0.0118 -0.0021 0.0756*** 0.0477** 0.0187 0.0349* 0.1096*** 0.2224*** -0.0076  1.000 0.2332*** 
12 LAW -0.0484** -0.0443** -0.0001 0.1028*** -0.0423** -0.0349** -0.0111 0.1883*** 0.2551*** -0.0197 0.0716***  1.000 
13 FIN 0.0229 0.1620*** -0.0292 0.0615*** -0.0126 -0.0069 -0.0050 0.1258*** 0.2613*** -0.0242 -0.1029*** -0.0169 
14 PRF -0.0159 0.0227 0.0023 0.1193*** -0.0432** -0.0656 0.0151 0.1569*** 0.2866*** -0.0057 0.0236 0.0357 
15 FRM -0.0164 0.0514*** 0.0201 0.0301 0.0625*** 0.0310 0.0362* 0.0704*** 0.1022*** -0.0245 -0.0413** -0.1030*** 
16 FOR -0.0229 -0.0416** 0.0268 0.1666*** -0.0116 -0.0764*** 0.0598 0.3869*** 0.1798*** 0.0089 -0.0013 -0.1034*** 
17 AUDCOM -0.0199 -0.0079 -0.0043 0.3527*** -0.0438** -0.1779*** 0.1210*** 0.3981*** 0.5511*** 0.1009*** 0.1873*** 0.1832*** 
18 AUDIT 0.0304 -0.0288 0.0069 0.0714*** 0.0269 -0.0772*** 0.1001*** 0.1555*** 0.1299*** -0.0289 0.0947*** 0.0576*** 
19 SIZE 0.0230** 0.0069*** -0.0287 0.3881*** -0.0293 -0.2038*** 0.1605*** 0.5075*** 0.4565*** 0.1272*** 0.2503*** 0.2393*** 
20 LEV 0.0175 0.0008 -0.0408** 0.0295 -0.1412*** -0.1156*** -0.0435** -0.0575*** -0.0564*** 0.0102 -0.0187 -0.0269 
21 LOSS -0.0677*** 0.0117 -0.0262 0.0098 -0.1790*** -0.1263*** -0.0738** -0.1638*** -0.0476** -0.0053 -0.0659*** -0.0413** 
22 GRW 0.0441** 0.0305 -0.0026 0.0956*** 0.0553*** 0.0472** 0.0157 0.3066*** 0.0521*** -0.0285 0.0162 0.0316 
23 ROA 0.0465** -0.0211 0.0221 0.0201 0.0984*** 0.0765*** 0.0339* 0.1065*** 0.0196 -0.0053 0.0255 0.0282 
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Table 5.2 continued 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 Persistence 0.0390* 0.0038 -0.0138 -0.0164 -0.0119 0.0253 0.0433*** -0.1030*** -0.0883*** 0.1347*** 0.1143*** 
2 Value-Relevance -0.0179** 0.0230 0.0459*** -0.0442 -0.0090 -0.0276*** -0.0158** -0.0045 0.0124 0.0040 -0.0382 
3 Conservatism 0.0033 0.0203** -0.0202 -0.0022 -0.0208 0.0299*** 0.0038 -0.0279 -0.0506 0.0240 0.0438 
4 Accruals Quality 0.0804*** 0.1589*** 0.1024*** 0.1001*** 0.3555*** 0.1426*** 0.5262*** 0.2243*** 0.0164 0.0163 -0.0090 
5 FAMILY -0.0148 -0.0631*** 0.0607*** -0.0041 -0.0569*** 0.0325 0.0190 -0.2594*** -0.1715*** 0.1632*** 0.1532*** 
6 PUREFAM -0.0016 -0.0533*** 0.0429** -0.0835*** -0.1615*** -0.0803*** -0.1764*** -0.2791*** -0.1316*** 0.1825*** 0.1187*** 
7 AFFIL 0.0315 0.0275* 0.0456*** 0.0794*** 0.1502*** 0.1210*** 0.2574*** -0.0729*** -0.1050*** 0.0770*** 0.0709*** 
8 FOREIGN 0.1282*** 0.1868*** 0.0727*** 0.2651*** 0.3660*** 0.1806*** 0.5582*** -0.1804*** -0.2032*** 0.4928*** 0.2750*** 
9 OUTBOD 0.2129*** 0.2691*** 0.1200*** 0.1642*** 0.5002*** 0.1104*** 0.3171*** 0.0795*** -0.0181 0.0889*** -0.0136 
10 POL -0.0242 -0.0057 -0.0245 0.0089 0.1009*** -0.0289 0.1008*** 0.0444*** -0.0053 -0.0311** 0.0049 
11 PUB -0.1029 0.0236*** -0.0413** -0.0013 0.1873*** 0.0947*** 0.2135*** -0.0068 -0.0659*** 0.1206*** 0.0596*** 
12 LAW -0.0169 0.0357 -0.1034*** 0.0648*** 0.1832*** 0.0576*** 0.2061*** -0.0138 -0.0413 0.01071*** 0.0823*** 
13 FIN 1.000 -0.1094 -0.1030*** 0.0345** 0.2026*** 0.0254** 0.1449*** 0.0616*** -0.0355 -0.0185 0.0166*** 
14 PRF -0.1094*** 1.000 -0.0824*** 0.0496 0.2601*** 0.0828*** 0.2389*** 0.0034 -0.0359** 0.1247*** 0.0054*** 
15 FRM -0.1030*** -0.0824*** 1.000 0.0761*** 0.0885*** 0.0817*** 0.1379*** 0.0057 -0.0028 0.0431*** -0.0432 
16 FOR 0.0345** 0.0496** 0.0761 1.000 0.1799*** 0.0580*** 0.1612*** -0.0488*** -0.0404*** 0.1397*** 0.0773 
17 AUDCOM 0.2026*** 0.2601*** 0.0885*** 0.1799*** 1.000 0.1955*** 0.4994*** 0.1728*** -0.0049 0.1080*** 0.0089 
18 AUDIT 0.0254 0.0828*** 0.0817*** 0.0580*** 0.1955*** 1.000 0.2911*** 0.0737*** -0.0540*** 0.0530*** 0.0623*** 
19 SIZE 0.1620** 0.2875*** 0.1393*** 0.2134*** 0.6104*** 0.2890*** 1.000 0.1349*** -0.1644*** 0.2346*** 0.1072*** 
20 LEV -0.0194 -0.0304 -0.0170 -0.0239 0.0205 -0.0323 -0.0626*** 1.000 0.3074*** -0.4233*** -0.3957*** 
21 LOSS -0.0355** -0.0359* -0.0028 -0.0404** -0.0049 -0.0540*** -0.1507*** 0.1771*** 1.000 -0.2932*** -0.7133*** 
22 GRW -0.0269 0.0161 0.1118*** 0.0939*** 0.0497** 0.0288 0.1398*** -0.0554*** -0.0984*** 1.000 0.4037*** 
23 ROA 0.0287 0.0063 0.0105 0.0351* 0.0244 0.0763 0.1454*** -0.4053*** -0.4716*** 0.0464**  1.000 
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5.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EARNINGS QUALITY 
  As discussed in Chapter 3, this study institutes four proxies of earnings quality 
as dependent variables: earnings persistence, value-relevance, conservatism, and 
accruals quality. This section presents descriptive statistics and empirical results of 
the pooled-OLS estimation for the four proxies of earnings quality in Korean firms 
during the period 2000 to 2005. Table 5.3 reports the summary of variables and 
definition for the four proxies of earnings quality. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Variables and Definition for Earnings Quality 
Earnings Persistence (Eq. 4.1): Earningsi,t = α + β1 Earningsi,t-1 + εi,t  
Variables Definition 
Earningsi,t Current year earnings before extraordinary items scaled by previous year total assets 
Earningsi,t-1 Previous year earnings before extraordinary items scaled by previous year total assets 
Value-Relevance (Eq. 4.2): Pi,t = α + β1 BVi,t+ β2 EPSi,t + εi,t 
Variables Definition 
Pi,t The price of a share at three month after fiscal year-end 
BVi,t The book value per share at the end of each year 
EPSi,t The earnings per share during the year 
Conservatism (Eq. 4.3): ACCi,t = α + β1 NCFOi,t+ β2 CFOi,t + β3 NCFOi,t * CFOi,t + εi,t 
Variables Definition 
ACCi,t 
Accruals (Net Income + Depreciation - Cash Flow from Operations) scaled by average total 
asset 
NCFOi,t A dummy variable, which takes 1 if CFOi,t is negative, otherwise 0 
CFOi,t Current cash flow from operations scaled by average total asset 
Accruals Quality (Eq. 4.4): TCAi,t = α + β1 CFOi,t-1+ β2 CFOi,t + β3 CFOi,t+1+ β4 ∆REV i,t + β5 PPE i,t + εi,t 
Variables Definition 
TCAi,t 
Total current accruals (∆Current Asset - ∆Cash - ∆Current Liabilities + ∆Short-term Debt) 
scaled by average total asset 
CFOi,t-1 Previous cash flow from operations scaled by average total asset 
CFOi,t Current cash flow from operations scaled by average total asset 
CFOi,t+1 Future cash flow from operations scaled by average total asset 
∆REVi,t Change in revenue scaled by average total assets 
PPEi,t Gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets 
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  5.3.1. Earnings Persistence 
  The first proxy of earnings quality, earnings persistence, based on the user 
needs perspective captures current earnings performance in relation to last year’s 
earnings performance (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Ali et al. 2007). Thus, earnings 
persistence is measured by regressing current earnings on previous earnings. 
 
       Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics on current earnings and previous 
earnings. For earnings in the panel A of Table 5.4, in the pooled-sample, mean and 
median of current earnings are 0.056898 and 0.038151, and mean and median of 
previous earnings are 0.051619 and 0.039255 respectively. This suggests that 
fluctuation between current and previous earnings in Korean firms is less significant. 
Panel B of Table 5.4 shows correlation between current and previous earnings. The 
correlation coefficient between current and previous earnings is 0.148383 which 
shows that the two variables are not highly correlated. Panel C represents pooled-
OLS results of earnings persistence for firm-years during the period 2000 to 2005 
from Equation (4.1). Earnings persistence is measured as the slope-coefficient (β1), 
from Equation (4.1). Value of β1 close to one implies highly persistence earnings, 
while value of β1 close to zero indicates highly transitory earnings. Therefore, large 
(small) values of the slope-coefficient (β1) correspond to more (less) persistence. In 
Panel C of Table 6.2, the value of slope-coefficient (β1) is 0.061033 which is 
significant at 0.01 levels. This result proposes that earnings of Korean firms are 
highly transitory (not persistent), and thus the earnings quality of Korea firms is very 
low. 
 
 152
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results for Earnings Persistence 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
Variables Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev 
Earningsi,t 0.056898 0.038151 20.08633 -5.451114 0.561925 
Earningsi,t-1 0.051619 0.039255 61.25647 -28.55483 1.366138 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix on Variables 
Variables Earningsi,t Earningsi,t-1 
Earningsi,t 1  
Earningsi,t-1 0.148383 1 
Panel C: Pooled-OLS of Earnings Persistence for Firm-Year between 2000 to 2005 
Equation (4.1) Dependent Variable = Earningsi,t 
Independent 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistics 
Adj R2  
(F-statistics) 
Constant ? 0.053698 5.327562*** 
Earningsi,t-1 +/- 0.061033 8.278307*** 
0.022018 
(68.53037***) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 levels 
 
5.3.2. Value-Relevance 
Value-relevance is defined as the explanatory power of accounting 
information with respect to security prices (Collins et al. 1997; Ali and Hwang 2000). 
In order to measure the value-relevance, this study use Collins et al.’s (1997) 
methodology that adopts Ohlson’s (1995) valuation framework that price is a 
function of both earnings and book value of equity.  
 
      Panel A of Table 5.5 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
Equation (5.2). The mean value of stock price, book values, and earnings per share 
(EPS) for the Korean firms is 20,872 KRW, 33,436 KRW, and 2,324 KRW 
respectively. All mean values of each variable have positive values. This implies that 
sample Korean firms in this study might consist of financially stable firms because 
sample Korean firms are consecutively listed firms on the KSE for six years. Thus, 
survivorship bias might be introduced. Panel B of Table 5.5 is the correlation matrix 
among variables. As expected, book value and EPS are highly correlated with stock 
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price. Specifically, the correlation between book value and stock price (0.714159) is 
higher than correlation between EPS and stock price (0.379261). Panel C represents 
pooled-OLS results of the value-relevance for firm-years from 2000 to 2005 from 
Equation (3). Following Collins et al. (1997), the explanatory power of regression 
(R2) is used as the metric to measure the value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
Large (small) R2 correspond to more (less) value-relevant earnings. In Panel C, 
overall book values (0.534096) and EPS (0.501651) are significantly related to stock 
price at the 0.01 level, respectively and the value-relevance (R2) is 52 percent. 
Namely, earnings and book values of Korean firms jointly explain about 52 percent 
of Korean firms’ stock price during the period 2000 to 2005. However, the value-
relevance (R2) of Korean firms is significantly lower than that of U.S. firms. Collins 
et al. (1997) find the value-relevance (R2) of U.S. firms is 75 percent during the 
period 1983 to 1993. This result suggests that the earnings quality of Korean firms is 
relatively low. 
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results for Value-Relevance 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
Variables Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev 
Pi,t 20872.37 5690.000 1223000 42.0000 72361.42 
BVi,t 33473.35 15677.51 1302344 -840062.0 90503.62 
EPSi,t 2325.783 795.0000 550012.0 -226179.0 17174.30 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix on Variables 
Variables Pi,t BVi,t EPSi,t 
Pi,t 1   
BVi,t 0.714159 1  
EPSi,t 0.379261 0.389751 1 
Panel C: Pooled-OLS of Value-Relevance for Firm-Year between 2000 to 2005 
Equation (4.2) Dependent Variable = Pi,t 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-statistics 
Adj R2  
(F-statistics) 
Constant ? 1865.913 1.927977 
BVi,t +/- 0.534096 49.06907*** 
EPSi,t +/- 0.501651 8.743647*** 
0.521717 
(1661.763***) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 levels 
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 5.3.3. Conservatism 
       Ball and Shivakumar (2005) estimate conservatism using the relation 
between cash flows from operations and accruals. They argue that the incremental 
association between accruals and negative cash flows over the association between 
accruals and total cash flows represents the degree of conservatism. This study 
measures conservatism using Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) accruals-based test of 
loss recognition model51. 
 
      Panel A of Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics for the variables. In Panel A 
of Table 5.6, the mean value of total accruals are negative (-0.058061). Total accruals 
are calculated as (Net Income + Depreciation – Cash Flows from Operation), 
following Givoly and Hayn (2000). Negative mean value of total accruals suggests 
that net income of Korean firms might be low, which reflects low management 
outcome of Korean firms. Panel B of Table 5.6 presents the correlation matrix of 
variables. Consistent with previous research (Dechow 1994; Ball and Shivakumar 
2005), total accruals and cash flows from operation is negatively correlated (-
0.764219), while the interaction term between negative cash flows from operation 
using an dummy and cash flows from operation is positively correlated to total 
accruals (0.123939). Panel C of Table 5.6 presents the empirical result of the pooled-
OLS of conservatism for firm-years during the sample periods 2000 to 2005 from 
Equation (4.3). As expected, the coefficients of current cash flows from operation 
                                                
51 As mentioned in sub-section 4.3.1.3, Choi (2007) criticized that Basu (1997) model not suitable for 
Korean study because many financial indexes were discounted after the crisis. This study tests 
conservatism using Basu’s (1997) reverse regression stock return model. However, the results are 
not consistent with those in Basu (1997). Prior Korean study (Kim and Bae 2007) also shows same 
results with this study. The results are also not consistent with many U.S. studies (Lobo and Zhou 
2006; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007), suggesting that Basu (1997) model is not suitable for Korea. 
Thus, this study discards the Basu (1997) model. 
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(β2) are negative and significant at the 0.01 level (-0.422235), while the interaction 
term between negative cash flows from operations and current cash flows from 
operations (β3), the degree of conservatism is positive and significant at the 0.01 level 
(2.430263). A large (small) value of the incremental coefficient, the degree of 
conservatism (β3) corresponds to more (less) conservative earnings. From Equation 
(4.3), the degree of conservatism is 2.430263, which means conservatism of Korean 
firms is relatively high. As a benchmark, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) report that the 
degree of conservatism (β3) of U.K firms is 0.34 during the period 1990 to 2000.  
 
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results for Conservatism 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
Variables Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev 
ACCi,t -0.058061 -0.053803 10.41256 -8.385954 0.461583 
NCFOi,t 0.225933 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.418264 
CFOi,t 0.111629 0.092013 19.50507 -1.328057 0.835842 
NCFOi,t* CFOi,t -6.08E-12 0.000000 0.000000 -1.75E-09 4.63E-11 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix on Variables 
Variables ACCi,t NCFOi,t CFOi,t NCFOi,t* CFOi,t 
ACCi,t 1    
NCFOi,t 0.083627 1   
CFOi,t -0.764219 -0.085011 1  
NCFOi,t* CFOi,t 0.123939 -0.237868 0.059503 1 
Panel C: Pooled-OLS of Conservatism(Accruals-based test of loss recognition) for Firm-
Years between 2000 to 2005 
Equation (4.3) Dependent Variable = ACCi,t 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistics Adj R
2  
(F-Statistics) 
Constant ? -0.015134 -2.522612** 
NCFOi,t ? 0.068468 5.323431*** 
CFOi,t - -0.422235 -67.86858*** 
NCFOi,t* CFOi,t + 2.430263 15.85560*** 
0.616449 
(1610.962***) 
 **Significant at level 0.05 
***Significant at level 0.01 
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      Higher conservatism might be impacted by the Korea’s corporate governance 
reforms. Strong legal punishment such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (the SOX) 
imposes management accountability for providing higher-quality of financial 
reporting and this may have had an international impact. Watts (2003a) indicates that 
government regulation of financial reporting induces conservatism since regulators 
are more likely faced with criticism when firms overstate net assets than when firms 
understate net assets. Watts (2003b) argues that courts generally tend to punish 
overstatement of earnings/assets more than understatement because shareholders are 
more likely to suffer losses when earnings/assets are overstated. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) argue that the demand for higher quality financial statements is reflected in 
the greater legal obligations of issuers, managers, and auditors to recognize economic 
losses in a more timely fashion. Lobo and Zhou (2006) document evidence that the 
SOX increased conservatism by imposing significant criminal penalties on 
management (e.g. CEOs and CFOs). Thus, strong legal punishments are expected to 
reduce management discretion over financial reporting, thereby increasing 
conservatism. The result in this study supports and corresponds with previous 
research. 
 
 5.3.4. Accruals Quality 
       Accrual quality for each firm is measured as the absolute value of firm-level 
residuals ( ti ,ε ) in a pooled-OLS for firm-years during the sample period 2000 to 
2005 from the Equation (4.4), which regress as total current accruals on cash from 
operations in the prior, current, and future period plus the change in revenue and PPE. 
The absolute value of the residuals implies the unexplained portion of in the current 
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accruals, that are not associated with the cash flows. Therefore, large (small) absolute 
values of residuals ( ti ,ε ) correspond to poor (good) accrual quality. 
 
    Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results for Accruals Quality 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
Variables Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev 
TCAi,t 0.004230 0.008320 5.289029 -4.395345 0.249055 
CFOi,t-1 0.096020 0.081050 14.80435 -2.242710 0.601072 
CFOi,t 0.097613 0.081000 14.80435 -2.242710 0.612496 
CFOi,t+1 0.099184 0.081022 14.80435 -2.242710 0.622997 
∆REV 0.036957 0.063411 14.05034 -27.88084 0.865703 
PPE 0.476971 0.640986 58.25766 3.49E-05 2.238711 
|ε i,t| 0.067935 0.011582 4.570304 1.31E-05 0.247422 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix on Variables 
Variables TCAi,t CFOi,t-1 CFOi,t CFOi,t+1 ∆REV PPE 
TCAi,t 1      
CFOi,t-1 0.197854 1     
CFOi,t 0.122342 0.887967 1    
CFOi,t+1 0.218785 0.877495 0.907919 1   
∆REV -0.006221 0.201822 0.294169 0.239442 1  
PPE 0.144112 0.733125 0.678550 0.636143 0.203272 1 
Panel C: Pooled-OLS of Accruals Quality for Firm-Year between 2000 to 2005 
Equation (4.4) Dependent Variable = TCAi,t 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-statistics 
Adj R2  
(F-Statistics) 
Constant ? -0.003727 -0.714578 
CFOi,t-1 + 0.110011 4.488590*** 
CFOi,t - -0.279002 -10.82999*** 
CFOi,t+1 + 0.234752 10.65189*** 
∆REV + 0.004599 0.832600 
PPE - -0.005262 -1.485217 
0.091549 
(52.55626***) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
      Panel A of Table 5.7 presents descriptive statistics of the variables; current 
accruals, cash flow from operations, revenue change, and property, plant, and 
equipment. Similar to Panel A of Table 5.6, the mean value of current accruals and 
previous, current, and future cash flow from operations have positive values. This 
result also might arise from the sample constitution, thereby implying the possibility 
of survivorship bias. Panel B of Table 5.7 provides the correlation matrix among 
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variables. As expected, previous, current, and future cash flow from operations are 
highly correlated, but not highly correlated with current accruals. Panel C of Table 
5.7 shows the result of Equation (4.4). Consistent with previous research (Dechow 
and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Srinidhi and Gul 2007), the coefficients of 
previous and future cash flow from operations (β1 and β3) are positive and significant 
at 0.01 level, while the coefficient of current cash flow from operations (β2) are 
negative and significant at 0.01 level. In addition, the coefficient of future cash flow 
from operations (β3) is relatively higher than that of previous cash flow from 
operations (β1). this can be interpreted as the future cash flow from operations in 
Korean firms being more associated with current accruals, compared to previous cash 
flow from operations. Changes in revenue (∆REV) and gross property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE) are statistically not significant.  
 
      In Panel A of Table 5.7, the measure of accruals quality (the absolute value of 
residuals) has a mean value of 0.067935 and a median value of 0.011582, 
respectively. As a benchmark, Dechow and Dichev (2002) report mean (median) 
values of 0.028 (0.020), and Francis et al. (2004) inform mean (median) values of 
0.026 (0.019). This result indicates that accruals quality of Korean firms is relatively 
lower than U.S. firms. However, this result might be attributed to the difference in 
the time period and sample firms. Dechow and Dichev (2002) use total 1,725 firms 
over 13 years (1987 to 1999), and Francis et al. (2004) use total 3,917 firms over 27 
years (1975 to 2001). This study has a cross-section of 509 firms over 6 years (2000 
to 2005). 
 
 159
5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
    This section reports the multivariate regression results for the testing of the 
seven hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2, H3a, H3b, H4, and H5, related to three research 
questions. In this regards, Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 present on the results of estimating 
Equation 4.5 as in Sub-section 4.3.4.1 of Chapter 4 are estimated using pooled-OLS 
estimates of the association between earnings quality in the view of user needs (e.g., 
persistence and value-relevance) and in the view of shareholder/investor protection 
(e.g., conservatism and accruals quality) and corporate governance variables, 
respectively. Year dummies are included to reduce any time dependence in the 
selected variables. 
 
      In Panel B of Table 5.8 and 5.9, three measures of earnings quality, 
persistence, value-relevance, and accruals quality seem to be well fitted with a 
statistically significant F-statistics (p<0.01) but conservatism is not52. Specifically, 
the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the association between corporate governance 
and accruals quality is the highest (0.188766 and 0.188503) among four proxies of 
earnings quality. Namely, the largest corporate governance effects are observed for 
accruals quality. This result is consistent with Francis et al. (2004)53. The average and 
the maximum variance inflation factors (VIF) for all models are within tolerances54. 
                                                
52 Alternatively, this study examines the association between corporate governance and conservatism 
using Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model that includes interaction terms with the corporate 
governance directly as a means of identifying their impact on the speed of cash flow loss 
recognition. The results, provided in the Appendix IV, are almost similar to the main results shown 
in the Chapter 5. 
53 Francis et al. (2004) find that cost of equity is the most significantly affected by accruals quality, 
compared with other six proxies of earnings quality (e.g., persistence, predictability, smoothness, 
value-relevance, timeliness, and conservatism).  
54 The VIF is calculated as 1-(1 - R2)-1. Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price (2000) suggest that a VIF in excess 
10 indicates the presence of multicollinearity that may be causing problems in estimation (pp.238) 
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Thus, multicollinearity among the regressors for all earnings quality should not be a 
concern. 
     Several control variables represent significant relation with earnings quality. 
Firm size (SIZE) is significantly positive with earnings persistence (0.026335) at the 
0.05 level. In the association with conservatism and accruals quality, SIZE is 
negatively related to conservatism (-0.254787 and -0.276369) at 0.05 level and has 
positive values (0.037451 and 0.037477) with accruals quality at 0.01 level. This 
means that earnings of large firms are more persistence, while their earnings are more 
inflated or managed by management discretion due to their political power and 
organizational complexity (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Leverage (LEV) is 
positively related to earnings persistence (0.034104 and 0.037698) at 0.10 and 0.05 
level. The positive association between LEV and earnings persistence suggest that 
firms with high leverage are actively operated (Ross 1977), and debt holders of firms 
positively affect firm’s earnings by monitoring firm’s management (Choi et al. 2007). 
Negative earnings (LOSS) is positively related to both value-relevance (0.024674 and 
0.025322) and accruals quality (0.020633 and 0.020642) at 0.10 level and 0.05 level, 
respectively. The positive association between value-relevance and LOSS suggests 
that stock price more significantly respond to negative earnings. Negative earnings 
increases estimated errors of accruals, thereby decreasing a firm’s accruals quality. 
The positive value of the coefficient of LOSS on accruals is consistent with this 
expectation. The coefficient of a firm’s accounting profitability (ROA) on earnings 
persistence has a positive value (0.142398 and 0.139726) and is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. This association shows that high accounting profitability 
increases earnings persistence.  
 161
Table 5.8: Regression Results for the association between Earnings Quality (Proxy of 
User Needs) and Corporate Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures 
of earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under 
the control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed 
into pure family ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal 
shareholder and his/her families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by 
affiliated firms under the control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity 
shares held by foreign shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The 
backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) 
Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former 
employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the 
presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log 
of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to 
book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. 
YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error 
term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Persistence Value- Relevance Persistence 
Value- 
Relevance 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
-0.020436 
[-0.301322] 
-0.024544 
[-0.999496] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
0.152552* 
[1.787197] 
-0.009353 
[-0.301625] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
-0.147745* 
[-1.884427] 
-0.036057 
[-1.266593] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.492023*** 
[4.505009] 
0.196690*** 
[4.970664] 
0.517302*** 
[4.732817] 
0.199062*** 
[5.016834] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
0.137270 
[0.960209] 
0.173143*** 
[3.340702] 
0.157340 
[1.101365] 
0.175299*** 
[3.377368] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.189072** 
[-2.448361] 
0.033840 
[1.206801] 
-0.167599** 
[-2.166171] 
0.035599 
[1.265680] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.043416 
[1.031738] 
-0.026276* 
[-1.722037] 
0.034078 
[0.809275] 
-0.027135** 
[-1.773581] 
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.105087*** 
[-3.130010] 
-0.034026*** 
[-2.804534] 
-0.110993*** 
[-3.306558] 
-0.034593*** 
[-2.846123] 
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δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
0.002419 
[0.083920] 
-4.47E-05 
[-0.004286] 
0.002249 
[0.078055] 
-0.000498 
[-0.047758] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.029472 
[-0.926979] 
-0.027300** 
[-2.372775] 
-0.032075 
[-1.010155] 
-0.027583** 
[-2.396106] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.061521 
[-1.552846] 
0.042487*** 
[2.966431] 
-0.067337 
[-1.600864] 
0.04195*** 
[2.925982] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.219581*** 
[-3.444227] 
-0.038164* 
[-1.665223] 
-0.212424*** 
[-3.335347] 
-0.037550 
[-1.637422] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.122616** 
[-2.421036] 
0.002250 
[0.122314] 
-0.119422** 
[-2.361338] 
0.002539 
[0.137995] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.015234 
[0.552082] 
0.012457 
[1.249721] 
0.021938 
[0.794131] 
0.013040 
[1.304492] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.020628* 
[1.644213] 
0.001157 
[0.252942] 
0.026335** 
[2.082631] 
0.001645 
[0.356431] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.034104* 
[1.798725] 
0.006658 
[0.977968] 
0.037698** 
[1.988291] 
0.006957 
[1.020341] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.057412 
[-1.604946] 
0.024674* 
[1.906960] 
-0.050636 
[-1.415658] 
0.025322* 
[1.953322] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.002943 
[1.509762] 
-0.000368 
[-0.526181] 
0.002857 
[1.467696] 
-0.000375 
[-0.536472] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.142398* 
[1.893961] 
0.037109 
[1.374290] 
0.139726* 
[1.861313] 
0.036927 
[1.367423] 
α Constant 
-0.177707 
[0.033346] 
0.445318*** 
[5.156268] 
-0.132400 
[-0.550831] 
0.433248*** 
[4.941501] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.021861 0.045944 0.025009 0.045829 
 F-statistics 4.096425*** 7.564636*** 4.399307*** 7.262720*** 
 Average VIF (max) 1.455 (2.137) 1.464 (2.148) 1.461 (2.178) 1.468 (2.186) 
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Table 5.9: Regression Results for the association between Earnings Quality (Proxy of 
Shareholder/Investor Protection) and Corporate Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is the 
percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under the 
control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed into 
pure family ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal shareholder 
and his/her families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms 
under the control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The backgrounds of outside directors 
on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) 
Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner 
(FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of 
audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is 
Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is 
total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative 
earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was 
negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, 
δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Conservatism Accruals Quality Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
-0.124369 
[-0.196404] 
-0.070881*** 
[-3.704517] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
-0.800050 
[-1.002376] 
-0.070372*** 
[-2.896138] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
0.328817 
[0.448520] 
-0.072091*** 
[-3.273917] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.301389 
[0.295557] 
0.052259 
[1.496921] 
0.203620 
[0.199231] 
0.052323 
[1.498295] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
-0.368982 
[-0.276454] 
0.132246*** 
[3.277269] 
-0.445402 
[-0.333446] 
0.132275*** 
[3.270521] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-1.456633** 
[-2.020269] 
0.016927 
[0.824257] 
-1.538586** 
[-2.126710] 
0.017049 
[0.827631] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.122438 
[0.311651] 
-0.022085* 
[-1.882379] 
0.158542 
[0.402667] 
-0.022068* 
[-1.874635] 
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
0.082032 
[0.261708] 
-0.008735 
[-0.922746] 
0.103916 
[0.331096] 
-0.008729 
[-0.920231] 
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δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.249841 
[-0.928621] 
-0.019026** 
[-2.315876] 
-0.232138 
[-0.861874] 
-0.019006** 
[-2.305336] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
0.262544 
[0.884566] 
-0.014369 
[-1.592982] 
0.271803 
[0.915593] 
-0.014394 
[-1.593242] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
0.292105 
[0.789766] 
-0.024872** 
[-2.180328] 
0.314954 
[0.850878] 
-0.024947** 
[-2.181330] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
1.115053* 
[1.873261] 
0.062357*** 
[3.459265] 
1.088807* 
[1.828304] 
0.062406*** 
[3.460796] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
0.274747 
[0.581027] 
0.086436*** 
[6.057219] 
0.263050 
[0.556253] 
0.086487*** 
[6.056281] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.318699 
[1.237174] 
-0.019579** 
[-2.469131] 
0.293611 
[1.136811] 
-0.019579** 
[-2.464569] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
-0.254787** 
[-2.175163] 
0.037451*** 
[10.35240] 
-0.276369** 
[-2.337369] 
0.037477*** 
[10.24180] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
-0.216036 
[-1.220378] 
0.008003 
[1.580344] 
-0.230340 
[-1.299250] 
0.008003 
[1.578531] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.374989 
[-1.122864] 
0.020633** 
[2.034914] 
-0.402626 
[-1.203943] 
0.020642** 
[2.032910] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.004820 
[0.264815] 
-0.000444 
[-0.576649] 
0.005142 
[0.282535] 
-0.000443 
[-0.575334] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
-0.189270 
[-0.269626] 
0.017532 
[0.783556] 
-0.179512 
[-0.255743] 
0.017490 
[0.781442] 
α Constant 
5.101237** 
[2.305708] 
-0.649761*** 
[-9.519010] 
5.640327** 
[2.509675] 
-0.650361*** 
[-9.359444] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.007238 0.188766 0.007818 0.188503 
 F-statistics 1.003130 28.01316*** 1.036645 26.79439*** 
 Average VIF (max) 1.458 (2.137) 1.446 (2.253) 1.460 (2.178) 1.368 (2.304) 
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 5.4.1. Results for Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure (H1a, H1b, and H2) 
       As discussed in Sub-section 3.5.3.1 of Chapter 3, family ownership might 
cause an overlap with Type I and Type II agency problems55. When family accounts 
for a large proportion of shares in the firm, family have strong incentives to oversight 
management closely to protect their wealth as long-term investors. In addition, 
family can command greater loyalty and better information on business when family 
actively participates in management. This makes it harder for management to divert a 
firm’s resources into activities that diminish shareholder value, thereby increasing 
earnings quality (H1a). If significant share ownership allows a family to become 
entrenched and the family become involved more in activities for their own benefit, 
then family ownership is negatively related to earnings quality since family exercise 
discretion more opportunistically for their own interests (H1b). 
 
       In Panel A of Table 5.8 and 5.9, from the perspective of family ownership 
measured as the largest shareholders and their families and affiliated firms, the 
coefficient of FAMILY (-0.070372) is only significant for accruals quality at the 0.01 
level, while the coefficients of FAMILY are negatively associated with the other three 
proxies of earnings quality but are not significant. Therefore, it can be observed that, 
at least in the case of one measure, family ownership increases earnings quality, 
suggesting that family ownership reduces information asymmetry by positively 
monitoring management, consistent with Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007).  
 
      Family ownership can be decomposed into pure family ownership 
                                                
55 As a preliminary test of non-linearity, Appendix III is presented and shows almost identical results 
to the model used in this study.  
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(PUREFAM) and affiliated ownership (AFFIL). Almost all controlling family 
shareholders in East-Asian countries including Korea typically obtain effective 
control through pyramidal structures and cross shareholdings, even though their cash 
flow rights are relatively low. This separation of control and ownership often makes 
controlling shareholders entrenched so that they pursue their own interests at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Fan and Wong 2002; Mitton 2002; Claessens et al. 
2003). Therefore, pure family ownership and affiliated ownership might differently 
affect earnings quality. Consistent with this prediction, PUREFAM is positively 
related to persistence (0.152552) and negatively linked with accruals quality (-
0.070372) at 0.10 and 0.01 level, respectively. Accordingly, pure family ownership 
increases earnings quality not only on the user needs perspective but also on the 
shareholder/investor protection perspective. This result strengthens the alignment 
effect of family ownership in Korea. However, as for value-relevance and 
conservatism measure, PUREFAM is statistically not significant despite consistency 
with expected sign. Overall, the relation between family ownership and earnings 
quality supports the alignment effect of family ownership, and thus H1a is accepted.  
 
      The impact of affiliated ownership (AFFIL) on earnings quality provides 
mixed results. As expected in negative relation between AFFIL and earnings quality, 
AFFIL is negatively associated with persistence (-0.147745) at the 0.10 level. Value-
relevance also negatively linked to AFFIL (-0.036057) but the coefficient is 
statistically not significant. This result is consistent with the evidence of previous 
Korean studies (Joh 2003; Baek et al. 2002). They provide evidence that a higher 
affiliated ownership was prevalent in Korea, thereby exacerbating agency problems 
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and leading to low firm performance. Nevertheless, the association between earnings 
quality on shareholder/investor protection and AFFIL is inconsistent with prior 
Korean study (Kim and Yi 2006). They find that high affiliated ownership increases a 
firm’s earnings management (measured as discretionary accruals) since affiliated 
ownership provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities 
to hide adverse consequences of their self-serving behavior. However, in this study, 
the coefficient of AFFIL on accruals quality is statistically significant and negative (-
0.072091) at the 0.01 level. Namely, affiliated ownership increases earnings quality 
on shareholder/investor protection. This result can be explained by introducing 
combined financial statements as a part of Korea’s corporate governance reforms. 
The Korean accounting standards require firms that have subsidiaries56 to prepare 
consolidated financial statements. However, because of the unique chaebol (a large 
family controlled industrial conglomerate) ownership structure, several consolidated 
financial statements are issued within the same chaebol. This is because chaebol 
affiliates57 are under common control and they constitute a single economic entity. In 
chaebols, parent firms do not control58 subsidiary firms, but one large shareholder 
controls all the other related firms. One large shareholder controls all of the firms in 
the chaebol by cross share holding between affiliated firms, and by using the family's 
voting rights. For instance, a parent-subsidiary relationship exists when a firm, as the 
largest shareholder, directly or indirectly owns more than 30% of another firm's 
                                                
56 A subsidiary is defined as a largest owner either alone or together with any of related persons owns 
more than 30% of another firm’s voting interests (Article 1-3, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act). 
57 An affiliate means any firm that belongs to a business group regardless of the ownership relation 
(Article 2-3, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act). 
58 1) A single person, either alone or together with any of related persons owns 30% or more of total 
outstanding shares or 2) Considered to exercise a dominant influence over the firm (Article 3, 
Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act) 
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voting rights.  
 
      According to Korean accounting standards, consolidated financial statements 
were mandatory for such an ownership relationship. However, an affiliate is any firm 
that belongs to a chaebol regardless of the ownership relation. Thus, an affiliate that 
is not a subsidiary of another affiliate is excluded from consolidated financial 
statements although it is under the common control of the chaebol. To control these 
problems, combined financial statements have been required since the beginning of 
January 1999. In combined financial statements, all affiliates substantially 
controlled59 by the same person are involved in one business group. Thus, it is 
possible to control effectively intra-group balance, intra-group transactions, and 
resulting unrealized profits and losses. The combined financial statements include 
information not only on the controlling family ownership but also on the current 
status of the cross-shareholdings among subsidiaries by indicating the investment and 
invested amount between the subsidiaries of the same chaebol group. That is, 
combined financial statements, which show intra-affiliate transactions, are mandatory 
for only the thirty largest chaebol firms60. The combined financial statements include 
all domestic and foreign affiliates that are under the effective control of an individual 
owner and the owner’s relatives. The combined financial statements include 
information not only on the controlling family ownership but also on the current 
status of the cross-shareholdings among subsidiaries by indicating the investment and 
                                                
59 A person, through a contract or agreement with another major shareholder, has appointed/dismissed 
the chief executive or has appointed or may appoint fifty percent (50%) or more of the officers; A 
person, either directly or indirectly through a related person, exercises a controlling influence over 
major business decisions or executions, such as organizational readjustment and investments in 
new firms (Article 3-2-a, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act) 
60 The 30 largest chaebols must provide consolidated financial statements separately from combined 
financial statements. 
 169
invested amount between the subsidiaries of the same chaebol group. The concept of 
effective control is consistent with IFRS61. Thus, this result, the negative association 
between AFFIL and accruals quality, supports that controlling family shareholder’s 
opportunistic earnings management via affiliated ownership is limited due to Korea’s 
corporate governance reforms.  
 
      Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is significantly positive with earnings quality 
on user needs. The coefficient estimates of FOREIGN on persistence are 0.492023 
and 0.517302 at the 0.01 level, respectively. The relation between value-relevance 
and FOREIGN also has significant positive coefficient at the 0.01 level at 0.19669 
and 0.199062. In the association with earnings quality on shareholder/investor 
protection, FOREIGN is not statistically significant both for conservatism and 
accruals quality. Overall, the relation between foreign ownership and earnings quality 
supports the active monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership as institutional 
shareholder, and thus H2 is accepted. However, the positive affect of foreign 
ownership on earnings quality requires more detailed interpretation. Foreign 
ownership does not provide evidence of a positive association between earnings 
quality on shareholder/investor protection. Both conservatism and accruals quality 
reflect a firm’s potential accounting earnings change by management, while earnings 
persistence and value-relevance can be used to explain firm value. Accordingly, no 
statistical significance between FOREIGN and earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection can be interpreted. Foreign shareholders may be less 
likely to actively monitor due to a lack of substantial information on firm’s 
                                                
61 Sub-paragraph (a) to (d), Paragraph 13, IAS 27. 
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management. However, the strong positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and earnings quality on user needs might reflect foreign shareholders’ investment 
preference for financially stable firms. As shown in Table 5.1, the severe difference 
between mean and median level of foreign ownership can indirectly support this 
result. Thus, the positive impact of foreign ownership on earnings quality should be 
carefully accepted. 
 
 5.4.2. Results for Earnings Quality and Internal Governance (H3a, H3b, and H4) 
      To get the evidence on the condition under which outside directors on boards 
positively affect earnings quality, the fourth hypothesis (H3a) is tested. The results are 
shown in Panel A of Table 5.8 and 5.9. The impact of outside directors on boards on 
earnings quality provides mixed results. In relation to the user needs view of earnings 
quality, OUTBOD is positively related to value-relevance. The coefficients of 
OUTBOD on value-relevance are 0.173143 (p<0.01) and 0.175299 (p<0.01), 
respectively. Value-relevance of earnings is considered when earnings are useful and 
reflect the information contained in stock price or returns (Barth et al. 2001). The 
major role of outside directors on the board is monitoring and evaluating the firm’s 
management. Consistent with expectations, outside directors increase the value-
relevance of earnings. However, OUTBOD is positively related to accruals quality, a 
proxy of earnings quality in the view of shareholder/investor protection. The value of 
coefficients on OUTBOD is 0.132246 (p<0.01) and 0.132275 (p<0.01), respectively. 
This result is not consistent with Xie et al. (2003) in which they use discretionary 
accruals as a proxy of earnings quality. In the Korean context, however, Moon et al. 
(2006) do not find any positive statistical significance between outside directors on 
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boards and accruals quality. The positive relation between OUTBOD and accruals 
quality in this study can be interpreted in three ways. First, the appointment of 
outside directors on board in Korea is still affected by controlling shareholders. Xie 
et al. (2003) argue that the presence of the director nomination committees increases 
independence of outside directors. In Korea, the director nomination committee is 
only required for firms with asset value of more than 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion). 
Namely, independence of outside directors is relatively low in Korean firms. In the 
sample in this study only about 30 firms have such a committee. Second, the 
proportion of outside directors on board is very small. Black et al. (2006) find that 
Korean firms with high proportion of outside directors (more than half of the board’s 
constitution) have higher firm value. However, many Korean firms maintain outside 
directors to the minimum. As discussed in Sub-section 2.5.2.1 of Chapter 2, all listed 
firms are mandated to appoint minimum one person, or at least one-quarter of their 
registered directors from outside the firm. Only firms with asset value of more than 2 
trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) are required to have more than half of their board as 
outside directors (with a minimum of three outside directors). As of 2007, the 
average number of outside directors on board in Korean firm is 2.29 (the CGS 2008). 
Thus, the impact of outside directors in Korea is limited. Third, many Korean firms 
expect outside directors to be a safeguard, thus want a specific person who was 
formerly a high-profile figure to be an outside director. For example, “According to a 
public notice by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and the Korea Exchange 
(KRX), listed companies including KT, Hyundai Motor Group, Shinsegae Co. Ltd. 
and SK Telecom Co. Ltd., have recommended several former qualified outside 
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directors from the highly bureaucratic, legal circles and supervisory institutes.”62 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that more outside directors on board reduce firm 
value when politically related outside directors (e.g., politician, environmentalists, 
and consumer activists) are participants in board. This common practice of 
appointing outside directors in Korean firms would also restrict their roles as outside 
directors possibly decreasing earnings quality. To summarize, outside directors 
positively affect earnings quality on user needs but negatively affect earnings quality 
on shareholder/investor protection. Given outside directors’ roles, earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection is more weighted than earnings quality on user needs. 
The role of outside directors in Korea is weak, thus outside directors limit increase 
earnings quality. Accordingly H3a is only partially accepted.  
 
     As suggested above, the quality or backgrounds of outside directors might 
differently affect earnings quality. In Panel A of Table 5.8 and 5.9, the value of 
coefficients δ1 to δ8 presents the results of eight professional categories of outside 
directors. The coefficient estimates of POL are negatively related to both persistence 
(-0.189072 and-0.167599) and conservatism (-1.456633 and -1.538586) at 0.05 level, 
respectively. This result supports Agrawal and Knoeber’s (1996) argument discussed 
above. In addition, this result strengths the reason why outside directors in Korea are 
less effective. As discussed in above, many Korean firms expect outside directors to 
be high-profile figures to prevent external disturbance or political constraint over 
firm’s management. Thus, outside directors having political background would not 
efficiently monitor firm’s management or even be likely to act on behalf of firm’s 
                                                
62 Maeil Business Newspaper, Feb 19, 2007.  
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management.  
 
      The association between outside directors from government official (PUB) 
and earnings quality shows conflicting results. Consistent with the result of POL, the 
coefficient on PUB is negatively related to value-relevance at the 0.10 level and at 
the 0.05 level (-0.026276 and -0.027135), respectively. In the association with 
accruals quality, however, the value of coefficients on PUB is negative at 0.10 level 
(-0.22085 and -0.22068). Unlike POL, PUB efficiently monitors a firm’s 
management. This result can result from their supervisory experiences.  
 
      The third category, outside directors from the lawyer (LAW) negatively affects 
persistence (-0.105087 and -0.110993) and value-relevance (-0.34026 and -0.34593) 
at 0.01 level, but not statistically significant with earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection (e.g., conservatism and accruals quality). As 
discussed in Sub-section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2, regulations and civil liabilities for 
controlling shareholders are reinforced through Korea’s corporate governance 
reforms, similar to the impact of SOX. Similar to the motivation of appointing 
outside directors having a political background, Korean firms expect to minimize 
litigation risks or external influence on a firm’s management by nominating lawyers 
as outside directors. Consistent with the results of POL, LAW negatively affects 
earnings quality.  
 
      The coefficient δ5 presents the impact of outside directors who are financial 
experts (FIN) on earnings quality. FIN is negatively related to persistence, value-
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relevance, and conservatism but is statistically not significant. However FIN, as 
expected, is significantly negative with accruals quality (-0.019026 and -0.019006) at 
0.05 level. Xie et al. (2003), Bryan, Liu, and Tiras (2004), and Moon et al. (2006) 
provide evidence that outside directors who are financial expert increases earnings 
quality due to their strong accounting and finance skills. The result in this study also 
supports that outsider directors from financial expert effectively monitor firm’s 
management, thereby increase earnings quality.  
 
      As discussed in Section 5.2, outside directors who were professors ranked 
second highest in the seven background categories. The coefficient of PRF is 
significantly negative with value-relevance (-0.0273 and -0.027583) at 0.05 level. In 
the association with earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection, outside 
directors from professor (PRF) are positively related to conservatism and negatively 
related to accruals quality but are statistically insignificant. This result can indicate 
that outside directors from professor do not have sufficient knowledge of the firm or 
the firm’s management.  
 
      The sixth category is outside directors who are former employees (FRM) 63. It 
is expected that FRM is closely tied with controlling shareholders and does not 
effectively monitor firm’s management. However, interestingly, FRM is significantly 
positively associated with value-relevance (0.42487 and 0.04195) and negatively 
associated with accruals quality (-0.024872 and -0.024947) at 0.01 and 0.05 level, 
                                                
63 The Korean Securities and Exchange Law prohibits former employee within the preceding two 
years from becoming outside directors on board (Article 54-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act) 
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respectively. Namely FRM positively affects both earnings quality on user needs and 
earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection. This result in this study can be 
interpreted in two ways. First, the influence of the controlling shareholder on former 
employees might be limited since the former employees are no longer tied to 
controlling shareholders. Thus, the independence of former employee as outside 
directors can be reinforced. Second, former employees have sufficient knowledge of 
the firm and its management. Even they can access and interpret internal information 
of the firm. Accordingly, outside directors who are former employees have both 
independence and competency, thereby increasing earnings quality.  
 
      The last category of outside directors is foreigners. In May 1998, foreign 
investment was liberalized in Korea, and foreign shareholders contributed through 
their participation in internal governance mechanisms such as the board. The CGS 
reports that foreign outside directors on board account for 3.9% (59 people out of a 
total 1500 people) as of 2007. Foreign outside directors are expected to have 
independence and competency, thereby increasing earnings quality. Inconsistent with 
this expectation, foreign outside directors (FOR) is negatively related to persistence 
(-0.219581 and -0.212424) and value-relevance (-0.38164) at the 0.01 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. In the association with earnings quality on shareholder/investor 
protection, FOR shows conflicting results. The coefficients of FOR on conservatism 
are 1.115053 (p<0.05) and 1.088807 (p<0.05). FOR is positively associated with 
accruals quality at 0.01 level (0.062357 and 0.062406). Namely, foreign outside 
directors increase conservative accounting practice but decrease accruals quality. 
This conflicting result can be explained in two ways. First, similar to the findings for 
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politicians and professors, foreign outside directors do not have much knowledge and 
information on the firm and its internal information. In addition, foreign outside 
directors are less likely to actively participate in board meetings64. For example, the 
CGS reports that the attendance ratio of foreign outside directors on board meetings 
in Korean firms is 49.3% as of 2007 which is below average65. Therefore, foreign 
outside directors have a limited monitoring influence on a firm’s management. 
Second, as shown in the results of the previous section, foreign shareholders prefer 
financially stable firms, thus foreign outside directors also prefer conservative 
accounting practice to avoid risk.  
 
      Another important internal governance function is the audit committee. The 
role of the audit committee is to ensure the reliability of financial statements by 
overseeing a firm’s financial accounting processes and in a broader sense the 
management. Thus, the audit committee more directly affects earnings quality than 
outside directors (H4). However, the results in this study are inconsistent with this 
prediction. AUDCOM is negatively related to persistence (-0.122616 and -0.119422) 
at the 0.01 level. The coefficient estimates of AUDCOM have a positive relationship 
with accruals quality (0.086436 and 0.086487) at the 0.01 level. Audit committese in 
Korean firms neither increases earnings quality on user needs nor on 
shareholder/protection. Many previous Korean studies (Lee and Lee 2003; Jeon 
2004; Moon et al. 2006) find that the existence of an audit committee does not 
positively affect earnings quality, or firm value. The results in this study add further 
                                                
64 Language would be the biggest constraint. 
65 As of 2007, the average attendance ratio of outside directors on board in Korean firms is 72% (The 
CGS 2008). 
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evidence of audit committee ineffectiveness in Korean firms. As discussed in Sub-
section 2.5.2.2 of Chapter 2, the establishment of an audit committee was only 
enforced to firms with assets of 2 trillion KRW (US$ 2 billion) or more by the 
Korean government. Namely, only a few firms have audit committees, and almost all 
firms establishing audit committees are mandated to operate the audit committee as 
required by the Korean Securities and Exchange Law. As of 2004, only 121 firms 
(18%) out of 671 listed firms on the KSE operated an audit committee (the CGS 
2005). Ball et al. (2003) suggest that higher quality of earnings is determined by the 
incentives of financial statement preparers (controlling family shareholders or firm’s 
owner and management), not by accounting or governance systems. This result 
implies that mandatory enforcement of audit committees is not efficiently operated 
and does not increase earnings quality. Thus, H4 is not accepted. 
 
5.4.3. Results for Earnings Quality and External Governance (H5) 
As discussed in Sub-section 3.5.6.1, audit quality is generally measured as 
auditor brand name (e.g., Big N). Big N are assumed to provide higher audit quality 
due to their high competency and ‘deep pocket’, thereby increasing earnings quality. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) examines the relation between audit quality (Big N) and earnings 
quality. Consistent with this prediction, audit quality is positively related to 
persistence, value-relevance, and conservatism albeit statistically insignificant. 
However, the value of the coefficient of audit quality is significantly negative (-
0.019579) with accruals quality at the 0.05 level. In Section 2.5.3 of Chapter 2 and 
Sub-section 3.5.7 of Chapter 3, the litigation risk for Big N is substantially increased, 
and also civil liability for audit failure is strengthened due to Korea’s corporate 
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governance reforms. This result provides evidence that higher audit quality (Big N) 
increases earnings quality by reducing aggressive and opportunistic financial 
reporting, and thus decreases litigation risk for fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, 
H5 is accepted. 
 
 5.5. TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARE (2SLS) REGRESSION RESULTS 
    As mentioned in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, corporate governance variables 
(ownership and board composition) are endogenously determined (Cho 1998; 
Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). In order to control the potential endogenous 
relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms, this 
study employs two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation model, following Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) and Choi et al. (2007). In the 2SLS estimation model, the four 
measures of earnings quality models are estimated along with three endogenous 
corporate governance variables (family ownership, foreign ownership, and outside 
board of directors). 
 
      Table 5.10 and 5.11 present the findings for the 2SLS estimation. Coefficient 
estimates of Panel A of Table 5.10 and 5.11 indicate that the relation between 
earnings quality and corporate governance remains robust when using instruments 
(lagged ownership and outside directors on board) to reduce the causality problem. 
Using 2SLS actually increases the magnitudes of coefficient estimates for all 
corporate governance variables, compared to those obtained from the pooled-OLS 
method. 
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Table 5.10: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Results for the association between 
Earnings Quality (Proxy of User Needs) and Corporate Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of Equation 4.7: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures 
of earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. InstFAMILY 
is the estimated family ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstPUREFAM is the 
estimated pure family ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstAFFIL is the estimated 
affiliated ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstFOREIGN is the estimated foreign 
ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstOUTBOD is the estimated outside directors on 
the board size at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. The backgrounds of outside directors on board are 
classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 
4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit 
Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit 
committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big 
N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total 
debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative 
earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was 
negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. 
β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Persistence Value- Relevance Persistence 
Value- 
Relevance 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 
Family Ownership 
(InstFAMILY) 
0.030806 
 [0.382469] 
0.004041 
[0.140137] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(InstPUREFAM) 
  
0.242217** 
[2.485600] 
0.015721  
[0.449183] 
β3 
Affiliated Ownership 
(InstAFFIL) 
  
-0.154223* 
[-1.649020] 
-0.008186 
[-0.243576] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(InstFOREIGN) 
0.624592*** 
[4.734138] 
0.250228*** 
[5.336163] 
0.651134*** 
[4.934049] 
0.251746*** 
[5.352757] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(InstOUTBOD) 
0.661311*** 
[3.355566] 
0.177566** 
[2.505907] 
0.647550***  
[3.295369] 
0.176638** 
[2.493824] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.235657*** 
[-2.953455] 
0.030710 
[1.073439] 
-0.207410*** 
[-2.596452] 
0.032246 
[1.124268] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.009300 
[0.208573] 
-0.034414** 
[-2.157736] 
0.000395 
[0.008848] 
-0.034935** 
[-2.184062] 
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δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.154806*** 
[-4.312578] 
-0.042269*** 
[-3.302146] 
-0.160763*** 
[4.479805] 
-0.042649*** 
[-3.324114] 
δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.035054  
[-1.121691] 
-0.007759  
[-0.694562] 
-0.038901  
[-1.245659] 
-0.008015  
[-0.715983] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.063220*  
[-1.49052] 
-0.036827*** 
[-3.001993] 
-0.065976*   
[1.922486] 
-0.037022*** 
[-3.014810] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.061581  
[-1.490822] 
0.035027** 
[2.330895] 
-0.067677 
[-1.639345] 
0.034842** 
[2.316648] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.258287*** 
[-3.871563] 
-0.050550** 
[-2.137676] 
-0.246448*** 
[-3.700246] 
-0.049811**  
[-2.105811] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.175238*** 
[-3.177455] 
0.015183 
[0.766039] 
-0.165336*** 
[-3.004591] 
0.015830 
[0.798893] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.009534 
[0.327148] 
0.001209 
[0.116345] 
0.019095 
[0.654335] 
0.001800 
 [0.172562] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.015592 
[1.168719] 
0.000597 
[0.124351] 
0.023053* 
[1.714901] 
0.001028 
[0.212108] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.037735* 
[1.937712] 
0.007384 
[1.070332] 
0.041117** 
[2.113011] 
0.007539 
[1.091431] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.073819* 
[-1.928600] 
0.019682 
[1.439760] 
-0.065900*  
[-1.722473] 
0.020119 
[1.468553] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.005557* 
[1.894840] 
-0.000291  
[-0.280172] 
0.005345*  
[1.825676] 
-0.000302 
[-0.290604] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.113155 
[1.337594] 
0.043063 
[1.436456] 
0.108435 
[1.284391] 
0.042788 
[1.427197] 
α Constant 
-0.007522 
 [-0.029524] 
0.463310*** 
[5.156268] 
-0.175688 
 [-0.680523] 
0.454018*** 
[4.881997] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.020563 0.046907 0.024618 0.046839 
 F-statistics 4.932149*** 7.633865*** 5.305644*** 7.303400*** 
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Table 5.11: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Results for the association between 
Earnings Quality (Proxy of Shareholder/Investor Protection) and Corporate 
Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of Equation 4.7: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. InstFAMILY is 
the estimated family ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstPUREFAM is the estimated 
pure family ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstAFFIL is the estimated affiliated 
ownership at the first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstFOREIGN is the estimated foreign ownership at the 
first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. InstOUTBOD is the estimated outside directors on the board size at the 
first stage as specified by Equation 4.6. The backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as seven 
category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts 
(FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm 
size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth 
prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) 
is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be 
estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Conservatism Accruals Quality Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 
Family Ownership 
(InstFAMILY) 
0.286117 
[0.392000] 
-0.064659*** 
[-2.959787] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(InstPUREFAM) 
  
-0.028376  
[-0.032063] 
-0.048428* 
[-1.820493] 
β3 
Affiliated Ownership 
(InstAFFIL) 
  
0.538437 
[0.633942] 
-0.080417*** 
[-3.155263] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(InstFOREIGN) 
-0.109318  
[-0.091436] 
0.143943*** 
[3.436702] 
-0.147814 
[-0.123334] 
0.143870*** 
[3.433772] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(InstOUTBOD) 
-0.767396 
[-0.429733] 
0.209804*** 
[3.910745] 
-0.741692 
[-0.415648] 
0.209610*** 
[3.903226] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-1.531373** 
[-2.117984] 
0.012164 
[0.587161] 
-1.572913** 
[-2.168204] 
0.014275 
[0.686903] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.013919 
[0.034450] 
-0.026918** 
[-2.248776] 
0.026487 
[0.065393] 
-0.027723** 
[-2.306739] 
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δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
0.028444 
[0.087453] 
-0.014657 
[-1.511347] 
0.036236 
[0.111197] 
-0.015159 
[-1.558848] 
δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.273180 
[-0.964920] 
-0.024883*** 
[-2.917364] 
-0.268295 
[-0.946264] 
-0.025430*** 
[-2.968528] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
0.090020 
[0.289109] 
-0.019214** 
[-2.070949] 
0.093362 
[0.299614] 
-0.019622** 
[-2.110358] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
0.219045 
[0.574214] 
-0.028694** 
[-2.477793] 
0.225406 
[0.590424] 
-0.029469** 
[-2.537061] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
1.146961* 
[1.897221] 
0.043555** 
[2.344033] 
1.129847* 
[1.867940] 
0.044279** 
[2.382218] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
0.723350 
[1.447373] 
0.074091*** 
[6.057219] 
0.708454 
 [1.417637] 
0.075117*** 
[5.039493] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.134508 
[0.509400] 
-0.020198** 
[-2.539986] 
0.121148 
[0.457179] 
-0.019632** 
[-2.463159] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
-0.228916* 
[-1.893500] 
0.034787*** 
[9.434788] 
-0.239675** 
[-1.963252] 
0.035467*** 
[9.501781] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
-0.259179  
[-1.468703] 
0.008731*  
[1.714505] 
-0.264342  
[-1.495836] 
0.008930* 
[1.751288] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.229940  
[-0.663006] 
0.023560** 
[2.304887] 
-0.242355  
[-0.697585] 
0.024006** 
[2.345173] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
-0.003815  
[-0.143545] 
-0.000897 
[-1.151278] 
-0.003515 
 [-0.132215] 
-0.000893 
[-1.145971] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
-0.170127  
[-0.221929] 
0.019521 
[0.869788] 
-0.163584 
[-0.213360] 
0.018868 
[0.840252] 
α Constant 
4.871533** 
[2.110282] 
-0.619605*** 
[-8.862633] 
5.117488** 
[2.182800] 
-0.634256*** 
[-8.903967] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.006993 0.185464 0.007131 0.184906 
 F-statistics 0.928653 28.58757*** 0.902061 27.37836*** 
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 5.5.1. Result for Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure 
      Consistent with the result of pooled-OLS method, FAMILY still remains 
statistically significantly associated with accruals quality (-0.64659, p<0.01). 
Coefficients of PUREFAM -0.048428) and AFFIL -0.080417) are significantly 
negatively related with accruals quality at the 0.10 and 0.01 levels, which supports 
the result of pooled-OLS method. The same findings of PUREFAM and AFFIL on 
earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection are extended to earnings quality 
on user needs.  PUREFAM remains significantly positive with persistence 
(0.242217) at 0.05 level, and AFFIL is negatively significant with persistent (-
0.154223) at 0.10 level, which is consistent with the results of the pooled-OLS 
method. Thus, this result reinforces H1a, and confirms that the alignment effect of 
family ownership is robust. 
 
      The relation between FOREIGN and earnings quality on user needs 
(persistence and value-relevance) confirms the main result of the pooled-OLS. The 
coefficients of FOREIGN on persistence are 0.624592 and 0.651134 at 0.01 level, 
respectively. FOREIGN is still strongly positive with value relevance (0.250228 and 
0.251746, p<0.01). The results of the 2SLS for the relation between FOREIGN and 
earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection remains unchanged from the 
result of pooled-OLS. FOREIGN is not statistically significantly associated with 
conservatism and positively significant with accruals quality (0.143943 and 0.143870, 
p<0.01).  
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5.5.2. Result for Earnings Quality and Internal Governance 
       In section 5.4.2, earnings quality is estimated as a function of outside 
directors on board and other firm-specific variables. Consistent with the result of the 
pooled-OLS analysis reported in Table 5.8, the result of 2SLS strengthens the 
positive effect of outside directors on the board on earnings quality on user needs. In 
Panel B of Table 5.10, the coefficients of OUTBOD are still strongly positive with 
value-relevance (0.177566 and 0.176638, p<0.01). In the pooled-OLS result reported 
in Table 5.8, OUTBOD has a positive sign with persistence but statistically 
insignificant. However, in the 2SLS result, OUTBOD has statistically strong positive 
coefficients with persistence (0.661311 and 0.647550) at the 0.01 level. This result 
strengthens the basic result represented in Table 5.8 that outside directors on board 
are good for earnings quality on user needs. In contrast to the positive association to 
earnings quality on user needs, the association between OUTBOD and earnings 
quality on shareholder/investor protection reiterates the result in Table 5.9. The 
coefficient of OUTBOD on accruals quality is positive (0.209804 and 0.209610, 
p<0.01). This result confirms the mixed effect of outside directors on the board on 
earnings quality and implies that the boards in Korean firms are still controlled by 
controlling family shareholders despite the recent corporate governance reforms.  
 
     The results of the association between the background of outside directors and 
earnings quality remains unchanged from the results of pooled-OLS method. Outside 
directors having a former high-profile background (POL, PUB, and LAW) negatively 
affect earnings quality on user needs. POL is negatively related to persistence (-
0.235657 and -0.207410, p<0.01), and PUB is negative with value-relevance (-
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0.034414 and -0.034935, p<0.05), respectively. LAW negatively affects both 
persistence (-0.154806 and -0.160763, p<0.01) and value relevance (-0.042269 and -
0.042649, p<0.01). In relation to earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection, 
only PUB has negative coefficients with accruals quality (-0.026918 and -0.027723, 
p<0.05), consistent with the result of the pooled-OLS.  
 
      The negative association between FIN and accruals quality (-0.024883 and -
0.025430, p<0.01) is more significant than the result of the pooled-OLS analysis. 
This result reinforces the expectation that financial experts effectively monitor firm’s 
management through their strong accounting and finance knowledge. 
 
 In the results of the pooled-OLS, FRM increases earnings quality on user 
needs as well as on earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection. The results of 
2SLS on FRM are not changed. FRM is still positively related to value-relevance 
(0.035027 and 0.034842,) and negatively related to accruals quality (-0.028694 and -
0.024947) at the 0.05 level. Bhagat and Black (2002) suggest that gray outside 
directors66 increase firm value due to their operational and firm-specific managerial 
knowledge. Thus, the positive effect of FRM on earnings quality supports the 
proposition of Bhagat and Black (2002). 
 
      The findings of FOR on earnings quality remain the same as the results of 
pooled-OLS. FOR negatively affects earnings quality on user needs: persistence (-
0.258287 and -0.246448, p <0.01) and value-relevance (-0.050550 and -0.049811, 
                                                
66 Outside directors having unclear independence because of their plausible professional connections 
with the firm (Bhagat and Black 2002). 
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p<0.01). In the association of earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection, 
FOR is positive with conservatism (1.146961 and 1.129847, p<0.10) and with 
accruals quality (0.43555 and 0.044279, p<0.05). In contrast to Oxelheim and 
Randøy’s (2003) finding for Swedish firms, foreign shareholders’ participation on the 
board in Korean firms does not improve earnings quality. 
 
      The negative impact of audit committees on earnings quality reported in the 
result of pooled-OLS remains unchanged. The coefficients of AUDCOM are 
significantly negatively related to with persistence (-0.175238 and -0.165336) at 0.01 
level and positive with accruals quality (0.074091 and 0.075117) at 0.01 level, 
respectively. This suggest that what is important is not whether the audit committee 
exists as such, but whether audit committees are independent from controlling family 
shareholders.  
 
 5.5.3. Results for Earnings Quality and External Governance 
      The 2SLS results confirm that higher audit quality (measured by Big N) 
increases earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection. Consistent with the 
results of the pooled-OLS analysis, AUDIT is positively related to persistence, value-
relevance, and conservatism but is statistically insignificant. However, AUDIT 
remains significantly negatively related with accruals quality (-0.020198 and -
0.019632) at the 0.05 level. In contrast to internal governance functions (OUTBOD 
and AUDCOM) that negatively affects on earnings quality on shareholder/investor 
protection, external governance function (AUDIT) increases earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection. Thus, this result supports that Big N auditors, 
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specifically in ‘emerging countries’, play an important corporate governance role in 
more effectively mitigating agency problems between controlling shareholders 
(ultimate owner) and minority shareholders than non-Big N auditors because of their 
superior external monitoring ability (Fan and Wong 2005). In addition, Korea’s 
corporate governance reforms that improve auditor independence and accountability 
were effectively operated, thereby increasing audit quality. 
 
5.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 5.6.1. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Random Effect Model 
       As this study utilizes panel data, panel study methodology should be 
considered. The pooled-OLS, the basic estimation method in this study, treats time-
series data of a firm just as different firms at a point in time, but this method is 
similar to the cross-sectional analyses in that it does not control for unidentified inter-
firm differences. Thus, there are two possible panel study methodology: Fixed Effect 
(FE) and GLS Random Effect (RE) estimation. 
 
      According to Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), the choice of 
ownership structure depends on unobserved firm characteristics such as contractual, 
regulatory, or informational environment. With panel data, one common treatment of 
this unobserved time-constant effect is to use fixed-effect (FE) regression, known as 
least square dummy variable (LSDV) analysis (Wooldridge 2002; Baltagi 2005). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that firm fixed effects estimators should be used in 
examination of the relationship between ownership and firm performance because the 
cross-sectional variation in ownership explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity is 
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a firm fixed effect. However, Zhou (2001) argues that the firm fixed effect model in 
panel data is not appropriate in this setting because ownership typically changes 
slowly from year to year within a firm. Namely, the ownership-firm value 
relationship is likely to be a cross-sectional phenomenon.  
 
      The general way choosing between fixed and random effect is a Hausman 
(1978) test67. This study conducts Hausman’s (1987) specification test for whether a 
RE model is acceptable against the alternative of a FE model. For sample in this 
study, this test shows mixed results. The user need earnings quality proxies (earnings 
persistence and value-relevance) reject RE, while the shareholder/investor protection 
earnings quality proxies (conservatism and accruals quality) do not reject RE. This 
implies that there is a difference between FE and RE estimation. However, this study 
employs RE estimation as a suitable model for this thesis. As mentioned in sub-
section 4.3.4.2, family ownership, including pure family ownership and affiliated 
ownership, has little time variation. In addition, business group dummy instrument is 
also constant across time. Thus, the FE is not utilised in this study.  
 
      Extending Zhou’s (2001) argument, the FE estimation is not suitable for this 
thesis for five reasons. First of all, the FE estimation requires significant within panel 
(firm) variations of the variable values to produce consistent and efficient estimates. 
The inclusion of firm fixed effects essentially removes most cross-sectional 
variations of the dependent variable, thus the effect of other explanatory variables 
(e.g., SIZE, GRW etc.) may not be observed unless ownership and board composition 
                                                
67 Hausman test is not to provide which approach is good but just to provide what they are different 
(Black et al. 2009). 
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measures exhibit substantial time-series variations. Thus, the FE estimates would be 
imprecise. Second, the FE estimates may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity 
due to using so many dummies known as LSDV (Baltagi 2005 p.13). Third, when 
panel data set (observations on 509 firms over 6 years in this study) consists of large 
‘N’ (509 firms) and fixed small ‘T’ (6 years), the FE estimation is inconsistent 
(Baltagi 2005, p.13). Moreover, for large N, the FE estimation would lead to an 
enormous loss of degrees of freedom (Baltagi 2005, p.14). Fourth, the FE has the 
disadvantage of using only information from within-firm variation, while the RE can 
also use information from between-firm differences. Finally, when the sample was 
extracted from a large population (listed firms on the KSE in this study), individual 
specific constant terms regarded as randomly distributed across cross-sectional firms 
(Green 2000). Thus, this study employs GLS random-effect regression (RE) to test 
robustness68.  
 
 5.6.2. Results for GLS Random Effect (RE) Regression 
      As described in above section, the random effect is estimated as an alternative 
method to the fixed-effect estimation. Table 5.12 and 5.13 represent the GLS random 
effect estimation.  
       
                                                
68 The FE model (reported in Appendix II) was also tested. The FE results are highly consistent with 
the results obtained from the random effect model. Compared to the RE model, the FE model 
substantially increases the explanatory power of the four earnings quality models (adjusted R2 
increases up to 0.68), while the coefficients for FAMILY, PUREFAM, OUTBOD, and AUDCOM 
become insignificant. Thus, it is possible that as the FE estimation focuses more on time-series 
rather than cross-sectional variations, and the impact of ownership and board structure on earnings 
quality can become much less observable. This suggestion is confirmed by Zhou’s (2001) argument, 
the relation between insider shareholdings and firm value is more likely to arise from the cross-
sectional variation patterns of the two variables. Thus, the RE model is more suitable for this study 
than the FE model. 
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Table 5.12: GLS Random Effect (RE) Regression Results for the association between 
Earnings Quality (Proxy of User Needs) and Corporate Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the generalized least squares (GLS) Random Effect estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures 
of earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under 
the control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed 
into pure family ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal 
shareholder and his/her families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by 
affiliated firms under the control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity 
shares held by foreign shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The 
backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) 
Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former 
employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the 
presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log 
of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to 
book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. 
YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error 
term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Persistence Value- Relevance Persistence 
Value- 
Relevance 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
-0.124950  
[-1.504820] 
-0.008347 
[-0.325720] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
0.110743 
[0.988891] 
0.039574  
[1.044907] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
-0.264770*** 
[-2.795912] 
-0.031593 
[-1.101421] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.326520** 
[2.526859] 
0.200011*** 
[5.100562] 
0.356914*** 
[2.755126] 
0.205316*** 
[5.221199] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
-0.075066 
 [-0.477476] 
0.049094 
[1.095356] 
-0.054698 
 [-0.347737] 
0.051435 
[1.147449] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.086486 
[-0.912934] 
0.019768 
[0.669391] 
-0.065118  
[-0.685808] 
0.022483 
[0.760385] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.026510 
[0.555936] 
-0.007838 
[-0.568188] 
0.018323 
[0.383801] 
-0.009025 
[-0.653681] 
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.079131* 
[-3.130010] 
0.004224 
[0.341196] 
-0.082777** 
[-2.033561] 
0.004080  
[0.329629] 
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δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.031996  
[-0.934873] 
0.005396 
[0.529233] 
-0.035825 
[-1.046390] 
0.004792 
[0.469853] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.054407 
[-1.444841] 
-0.005707 
[-0.506631] 
-0.055611 
[-1.477218] 
-0.005917 
[-0.525392] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.106510** 
[-2.184223] 
0.020314 
[1.347940] 
-0.112730* 
[-2.310977] 
0.019126 
[1.268288] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.154206* 
[-1.928568] 
0.012068 
[0.468133] 
-0.143909* 
[-1.798717] 
0.014801 
[0.573192] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.044796 
[-0.694778] 
0.026986 
[1.284682] 
-0.041113 
[-0.637687] 
0.027563 
[1.312026] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.022227 
[0.632768] 
0.026207** 
[2.365511] 
0.027458 
[0.780972] 
0.026749**  
[2.413792] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.028574 
[1.641295] 
-0.003306  
[-0.503811] 
0.033652* 
[1.924783] 
-0.003059  
[-0.465814] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.045319** 
[2.466953] 
0.016930*** 
[3.459734] 
0.047838*** 
[2.602919] 
0.017178*** 
[3.510532] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.024153 
[-0.715681] 
0.010664 
[1.196896] 
-0.022241 
[-0.659290] 
0.010487 
[1.177566] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.003329 
[1.586037] 
0.000731 
[1.252375] 
0.003314 
[1.579546] 
0.000745 
[1.276480] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.178080** 
[2.566266] 
0.046625** 
[2.573994] 
0.176871** 
[2.550088] 
0.046778*** 
 [2.583528] 
α Constant 
-0.055289  
[-0.168693] 
0.533838*** 
[4.284349] 
-0.193439 
[-0.585035] 
0.521254*** 
[4.175064] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.014907 0.094900 0.017670 0.095548 
 F-statistics 3.096537*** 15.29296*** 3.383787*** 14.77486*** 
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Table 5.13: GLS Random Effect (RE) Regression Results for the association between 
Earnings Quality (Proxy of Shareholder/Investor Protection) and Corporate 
Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the generalized least squares (GLS) Random Effect estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is the 
percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under the control 
of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed into pure family 
ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal shareholder and his/her 
families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms under the 
control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign shareholders. 
OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The backgrounds of outside directors on board are 
classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) 
Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee 
(AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality 
(AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. 
Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth 
prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is 
return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is 
the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Conservatism Accruals Quality Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
0.495089 
[0.758784] 
-0.049245** 
[-2.106340] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
0.632009 
[0.660553] 
-0.061233* 
[-1.920911] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
0.306000 
[0.419517] 
-0.042890 
[-1.613359] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
1.857544 
[1.892100] 
0.067191* 
[1.744320] 
1.880934*  
[1.908100] 
0.066464* 
[1.723576] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
-0.002004 
[-0.001772] 
0.073453* 
[1.669835] 
0.026565 
[0.023475] 
0.072261 
[1.639677] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.470573  
[-0.640951] 
0.019971 
[0.787457] 
-0.458597 
[-0.623735] 
0.019176 
[0.754422] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
-0.068059 
[-0.195942] 
-0.026709** 
[-2.041305] 
-0.072928 
[-0.209743] 
-0.026264** 
[-2.002527] 
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
0.848156*** 
[2.716754] 
-0.008668 
[-0.758112] 
0.847631*** 
[2.714595] 
-0.008434 
[-0.736755] 
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δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
0.553222** 
[2.146732] 
-0.020259** 
[-2.070957] 
0.550368** 
[2.134648] 
-0.019953** 
[-2.035942] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
0.107151 
[0.378328] 
-0.007834 
[-0.734578] 
0.107474 
[0.379389] 
-0.007668 
[-0.718414] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.171800  
[-0.452843] 
-0.022507 
[-1.622695] 
-0.172440  
[-0.454289] 
-0.022124 
[-1.591563] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
0.134665 
[0.211033] 
0.059375*** 
[2.704866] 
0.145766 
[0.228104] 
0.059167*** 
[2.693590] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.004471 
 [-0.008460] 
0.072582*** 
[3.954589] 
-0.006515  
[-0.012323] 
0.072255*** 
[3.932970] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.637004** 
[2.261054] 
-0.010171 
[-1.014507] 
0.638052** 
[2.263747] 
-0.010380 
[-1.033978] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
-0.299315* 
[-1.776169] 
0.038476 *** 
[7.625811] 
-0.299087* 
[-1.774375] 
0.038207*** 
[7.527825] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.156639 
[1.262027] 
0.005616 
[1.182881] 
0.156666 
[1.261640] 
0.005522 
[1.162040] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
0.129710 
[0.579352] 
0.015553* 
[1.672360] 
0.126610 
[0.565401] 
0.015469* 
[1.662809] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.002080 
[0.140280] 
-0.000484 
[-0.432940] 
0.002069 
[0.139542] 
-0.000482 
[-0.430918] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
-0.275192 
[-0.599870] 
0.007205 
[0.359311] 
-0.277057 
[-0.603831] 
0.007341 
[0.365919] 
α Constant 
4.677376 
[1.460035] 
-0.663658*** 
[-6.983538] 
4.661551 
[1.453261] 
-0.656605*** 
[-6.837787] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.010504 0.077799 0.010479 0.077494 
 F-statistics 1.460596* 10.79370*** 1.393221* 10.32803*** 
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     The negative effect of AFFIL on earnings quality on user needs (earnings 
persistence) is reinforced in GLS (-0.264770, p<0.01), compared to the pooled-OLS 
(-0.147745, p<0.10) and 2SLS (-0.154223, p<0.10), whereas the positive effect of 
PUREFAM on earnings persistence is not significant in GLS. FOREIGN is still 
significantly positive with both persistence and value-relevance, following the 
pooled-OLS and 2SLS results. However, in contrast to the result of pooled-OLS and 
2SLS, in which FOREIGN is positively associated with accruals quality albeit 
statistically insignificant, the coefficients of FOREIGN on accruals quality is 
significantly positive (0.067191 and 0.066464) at 0.10 level in GLS. As discussed in 
Sub-section 5.4.1, the positive effect of foreign ownership on earnings quality (H2) 
should be carefully accepted due to no findings of a positive association with 
earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection (conservatism and accruals 
quality). The result of GLS supports this interpretation on foreign ownership.  
 
      In GLS, the positive effect of OUTBOD on value-relevance is not significant, 
whereas negative effect on accruals quality is still significant despite reducing the 
coefficient magnitude and statistical significance: 0.132246 versus 0.073453 in 
equation. Therefore, the positive role of OUTBOD on earnings quality (H3a) is not 
supported. The results of association between background of outside directors and 
earnings quality show some minor changes in GLS, compared to the pooled-OLS and 
2SLS. In GLS, POL is not significant with all earnings quality measures despite 
consistency with same signs in the pooled-OLS and 2SLS. Even though the 
significance of the negative effect of LAW on earnings quality on user needs is 
reduced, it is still statistically significant. However, in GLS, LAW is significantly 
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positive with conservatism (0.0848156 and 0.847631, p<0.01). Watts (2003a) 
indicates that government regulation of financial reporting induce conservatism since 
regulators are more likely to be faced with criticism when firms overstate net assets 
than when firms understate net assets. In addition, Watts (2003b) argues that courts 
generally tend to punish overstatement of earnings/assets more than understatement 
because shareholders are more likely to suffer losses when earnings/assets are 
overstated. Thus, outside directors who are lawyers due to their occupational mind, 
prefer conservative accounting practice to avoid litigation risk. The most outstanding 
change is FRM in GLS. In the pooled-OLS and 2SLS, FRM positively affects both 
earnings quality on user needs (value-relevance) and on shareholder/investor 
protection (accruals quality). However, in GLS, the positive impact of FRM on value-
relevance and accruals quality is dismissed. Rather FRM is negatively related with 
persistence (-0.106510 and -0.112730, p<0.05). 
 
      In GLS, the coefficients of AUDIT are significant and has a positive sign with 
value-relevance (0.023207 and 0.023749, p<0.05) and conservatism (0.637004 and 
0.638052, p<0.05) even though the significance on accruals quality is dismissed. 
AUDIT positively affects both earnings quality on user needs and on 
shareholder/investor protection, thus the acceptance of H5 should be confirmed.  
 
      Overall, the major findings of the GLS random effect estimation are 
consistent with the results of both pooled-OLS and 2SLS estimation with the 
exception of FRM.  
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5.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
    This chapter reports the empirical findings for testing hypotheses, H1a, H1b, and 
H2, related to RQ1: “How does ownership structure (family ownership and foreign 
ownership) affect earnings quality?”, H3a, H3b, and H4, linked to RQ2: “Does 
internal governance functions (outside directors on the board and audit committee) 
increase earnings quality?”, and H5, related to RQ3: “Does higher audit quality 
increase earnings quality?” The analyses using 2SLS estimation are employed to 
provide additional insights considering the endogenous relation between earnings 
quality and corporate governance mechanisms. Following Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) and Black et al. (2002), endogeneity is addressed by using instruments 
(lagged ownership, lagged outside directors on boards, and a business group dummy). 
The findings for seven hypotheses linked to three research questions are also 
generally robust to different estimation methods (GLS random-effect) 
      
     With regard to hypothesis H1a, H1b, and H2, for the impact of ownership 
structure on earnings quality related to RQ1, a positive relationship is found between 
family ownership and earnings quality. In classifying family ownership into pure 
family ownership and affiliated ownership, the positive impact of pure family 
ownership on earnings quality is more significant, while affiliated ownership is 
related to a decrease in earnigs persistence but to an increase in accruals quality. This 
result is supported by 2SLS and GLS random effect estimation. Overall, family 
ownership positively affects earnings quality, supporting the alignment effect of 
family ownership. Thus, hypothesis H1a is well supported. Foreign ownership is also 
related to increase in earnings quality. Specifically, foreign ownership is only 
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strongly associated with earnings quality on user needs. Therefore, this supports 
hypothesis H2, the active monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership. However, this 
study partially supports hypothesis H2 because it found no evidence for conservatism 
and accruals quality in the results of pooled-OLS and 2SLS estimations and a 
negative impact on accruals quality in the robustness test using RE estimation.  
 
       With respect to hypothesis H3a, H3b, and H4, for the impact of internal 
corporate governance functions on earnings quality related to RQ2, the impact of 
outside directors on earnings quality shows mixed results. Outside directors on board 
positively affect value-relevance but negatively affect accruals quality. In relation to 
outside directors’ role, outside directors in Korea do not effectively monitor a firm’s 
management. This conflicting result implies that outside directors in Korea lack 
independence, and controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner) still dominate 
boards. Contrary to expectation, hypothesis H3a is only partially supported. 
 
      Taken together, with regard to the background (or quality) of outside directors 
on boards, outside directors having former high-profile background (e.g., politician, 
government officer, and lawyer) negatively affect earnings quality. However, there is 
limited evidence that outside directors from government officers and lawyers 
positively affect accruals quality due to their supervisory experiences. Consistent 
with expectation, outside directors with finance expertise (e.g., CPA, CFA, and 
Banker) increase earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection because of their 
outstanding accounting and finance knowledge. Although many Korean firms 
appoint professors as outside directors, they do not improve earnings quality. It is 
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noteworthy that outside directors who are former employees are strongly positively 
related to both earnings quality on user needs and on shareholder/investor protection. 
This result can be interpreted that former employees are reasonably independent from 
controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner) and have good knowledge of the 
firm and its management. Outside directors who are foreigners negatively affect 
earnings quality due to their limited knowledge and lack of commitment to the firm.  
     It is a surprising result that audit committee negatively affects both earnings 
quality on user needs and on shareholder/investor protection. This negative effect of 
audit committee on earnings quality is also confirmed by 2SLS and GLS. 
Accordingly, hypothesis H4 is not supported. 
 
      With regard to hypothesis H5, for the impact of external corporate governance 
functions on earnings quality related to RQ3, high audit quality (Big N) was found to 
positively affect both earnings quality on user needs and on shareholder/investor 
protection. Thus, this supports hypothesis H5. This finding is also confirmed by 2SLS 
and GLS random effect estimation.  
       
The next chapter, Chapter 6, concludes this thesis. It briefly revisits the 
research question, hypotheses and empirical findings followed by a summary of the 
results. Then it offers implications of the findings, highlights the contributions and 
limitations of this research. Finally, it ends by providing direction for further research. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 6.1. INTRODUCTION 
     This chapter reviews the empirical evidence focused on three research 
questions linked to seven hypotheses and addresses conclusions. In Section 6.2, the 
three research questions and their hypotheses and empirical results are summarized. 
Then Section 6.3 describes the major contributions of this study. Section 6.4 
identifies implications of this study. Section 6.5 provides limitations of this study and 
some considerations for future research. Section 6.6 concludes this thesis with 
overviews of the empirical findings and contributions, limitations, and summary. 
 
 6.2. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
     This study investigates the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms based on the Korea’s corporate governance reforms and their impact on 
earnings quality. Four key characteristics of earnings quality are identified in two 
different types of approaches for assessing financial reporting quality: user needs and 
shareholder/investor protection. Sample firms are non-financial firms listed on the 
KSE. In order to examines this, three research questions are proposed: (RQ1) “How 
does ownership structure (family ownership and foreign ownership) affect earnings 
quality?”, (RQ2) “Does internal governance functions (outside directors on boards 
and audit committee) increase earnings quality?”, and (RQ3) “Does higher audit 
quality increase earnings quality?”. The following three subsections (6.2.1, 6.2.2, 
and 6.2.3) summarize the hypotheses, methodology, and major findings relating to 
each of three research questions.  
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These tables are summaries of the more detailed tables of empirical results presented 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 6.1: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Persistence 
Dependent Variable: Earnings Persistence 
Panel A: The Pooled-OLS Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 1) 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No -0.020436  
PUREFAM +/- + Yes  0.152552* 
AFFIL - - Yes  -0.147745* 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.492023*** 0.517302*** 
OUTBOD + + No 0.137270 0.157340 
POL +/- - Yes -0.189072** -0.167599** 
PUB +/- + No 0.043416 0.034078 
LAW +/- - Yes -0.105087*** -0.110993*** 
FIN +/- + No 0.002419 -0.002249 
PRF +/- - No -0.029472 -0.032075 
FRM +/- - No -0.061521 -0.067337 
FOR +/- - Yes -0.219581*** -0.212424*** 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - Yes -0.122616** -0.119422** 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.015234 0.021938 
SIZE  +/- + Yes 0.020628* 0.026335** 
LEV  - + Yes 0.034104* 0.037698** 
LOSS  - - No -0.057412 -0.050636 
GRW  + + No 0.002943 0.002857 
ROA  + + Yes 0.142398* 0.139726* 
Constant  +/- + No -0.177707 -0.132400 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.021861 0.025009 
F-Statistics     4.096425*** 4.399307*** 
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares Method (2SLS) 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
2SLS 
(Model 1) 
2SLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No 0.030806  
PUREFAM +/- + Yes  0.242217** 
AFFIL - - Yes  -0.154223* 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.624592*** 0.651134*** 
OUTBOD + + Yes 0.661311*** 0.647550*** 
POL +/- - Yes -0.235657*** -0.207410*** 
PUB +/- + No 0.009300 0.000395 
LAW +/- - Yes -0.154806*** -0.160763*** 
FIN +/- - No -0.035054 -0.038901 
PRF +/- - Yes -0.063220* -0.065976* 
FRM +/- - No -0.061581 -0.067677 
FOR +/- - Yes -0.258287*** -0.246448*** 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - Yes -0.175238*** -0.165336*** 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.009534 0.019095 
SIZE  +/- + No 0.015592 0.023053* 
LEV  - + Yes 0.037735* 0.041117** 
LOSS  - - Yes -0.073819* -0.065900* 
GRW  + + Yes 0.005557* 0.005345* 
ROA  + + No 0.113155 0.108435 
Constant  +/- - No -0.007522 -0.175688 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.020563 0.024618 
F-Statistics     4.932149*** 5.305644*** 
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Table 6.1 continued 
Panel C: GLS Random-Effect (RE) Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 1) 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No -0.124950  
PUREFAM +/- + No  0.110743 
AFFIL - - Yes  -0.264770*** 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.326520** 0.356914*** 
OUTBOD + + No -0.075066 -0.054698 
POL +/- - No -0.086486 -0.065118 
PUB +/- + No 0.026510 0.018323 
LAW +/- - Yes -0.079131* -0.082777** 
FIN +/- - No -0.031996 -0.035825 
PRF +/- - No -0.054407 -0.055611 
FRM +/- - Yes -0.106510** -0.112730* 
FOR +/- - Yes -0.154206* -0.143909* 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - No -0.044796 -0.041113 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.022227 0.027458 
SIZE  +/- + No / Yes 0.028574 0.033652* 
LEV  - + Yes 0.045319** 0.047838*** 
LOSS  - - No -0.024153 -0.022241 
GRW  + + No 0.003329 0.003314 
ROA  + + Yes 0.178080** 0.176871** 
Constant  +/- - No -0.055289 -0.193439 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.014907 0.017670 
F-Statistics     3.096537*** 3.383787** 
 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Table 6.2: The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Value-Relevance 
Dependent Variable: Value-Relevance 
Panel A: The Pooled-OLS Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 1) 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No -0.024544  
PUREFAM +/- + No  -0.009353 
AFFIL - - No  -0.036057 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.196690*** 0.199062*** 
OUTBOD + + Yes  0.173143*** 0.175299*** 
POL +/- - No 0.033840 0.035599 
PUB +/- - Yes -0.026276* -0.027135** 
LAW +/- - Yes -0.034026*** -0.034593*** 
FIN +/- - No -4.47E-05 -0.000498 
PRF +/- - Yes -0.027300** -0.027583** 
FRM +/- + Yes 0.042487*** 0.041951*** 
FOR +/- - Yes /No -0.038164* -0.037550 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ + No 0.002250 0.002539 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.012457 0.013040 
SIZE  +/- + No 0.001157 0.001645 
LEV  - + No 0.006658 0.006957 
LOSS  - + Yes 0.024674* 0.025322* 
GRW  + - No -0.000368 -0.000375 
ROA  + + No 0.037109 0.036927 
Constant  +/- + Yes 0.445318*** 0.433248*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.045944 0.045829 
F-Statistics     7.564636*** 7.262720*** 
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares Method (2SLS) 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
2SLS 
(Model 1) 
2SLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No 0.004041  
PUREFAM +/- + No  0.015721 
AFFIL - - No  -0.008186 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.250228*** 0.251746*** 
OUTBOD + + Yes 0.177566** 0.176638** 
POL +/- - No 0.030710 0.032246 
PUB +/- + Yes -0.034414** -0.034935** 
LAW +/- - Yes -0.042269*** -0.042649*** 
FIN +/- - No -0.007759 -0.008015 
PRF +/- - Yes -0.036827*** -0.037022*** 
FRM +/- - Yes 0.035027** 0.034842** 
FOR +/- - Yes -0.050550** -0.049811** 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - No 0.015183 0.015830 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.001209 0.001800 
SIZE  +/- + No 0.000597 0.001028 
LEV  - + No 0.007384 0.007539 
LOSS  - + No 0.019682 0.020119 
GRW  + - No -0.000291 -0.000302 
ROA  + + No 0.043063 0.042788 
Constant  +/- + Yes 0.463310*** 0.454018*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.046907 0.046839 
F-Statistics     7.633865*** 7.303400*** 
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Table 6.2 continued 
Panel C: GLS Random-Effect (RE) Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 1) 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No -0.008347  
PUREFAM +/- + No  0.039574 
AFFIL - - No  -0.031593 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + Yes 0.200011*** 0.205316*** 
OUTBOD + + No 0.049094 0.051435 
POL +/- - No 0.019768 0.022483 
PUB +/- + No -0.007838 -0.009025 
LAW +/- - No 0.004224 0.004080 
FIN +/- - No 0.005396 0.004792 
PRF +/- - No -0.005707 -0.005917 
FRM +/- - No 0.020314 0.019126 
FOR +/- - No 0.012068 0.014801 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - No 0.026986 0.027563 
AUDIT RQ3 + + Yes 0.026207** 0.026749** 
SIZE  +/- - No  -0.003306 -0.003059 
LEV  - + Yes 0.016930*** 0.017178*** 
LOSS  - + No 0.010664 0.010487 
GRW  + + No 0.000731 0.000745 
ROA  + + Yes 0.046625** 0.046778*** 
Constant  +/- + Yes 0.533838*** 0.521254*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.094900 0.095548 
F-Statistics     15.29296*** 14.77486*** 
   
  * Significant at the 0.10 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table 6.3: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Conservatism 
Dependent Variable: Conservatism 
Panel A: The Pooled-OLS Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 1) 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - No -0.124369  
PUREFAM +/- - No  -0.800050 
AFFIL - + No  0.328817 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + No 0.301389 0.203620 
OUTBOD + - No -0.368982 -0.445402 
POL +/- - Yes -1.456633** -1.538586** 
PUB +/- + No 0.122438 0.158542 
LAW +/- + No 0.082032 0.103916 
FIN +/- - No -0.249841 -0.232138 
PRF +/- + No 0.262544 0.271803 
FRM +/- + No 0.292105 0.314954 
FOR +/- + Yes 1.115053* 1.088807* 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ + No 0.274747 0.263050 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.318699 0.293611 
SIZE  +/- - Yes -0.254787** -0.276369** 
LEV  +/- - No -0.216036 -0.230340 
LOSS  +/- - No -0.374989 -0.402626 
GRW  +/- + No 0.004820 0.005142 
ROA  +/- - No -0.189270 -0.179512 
Constant  +/- + Yes 5.101237** 5.640327** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.007238 0.007818 
F-Statistics     1.003130 1.036645 
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares Method (2SLS) 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
2SLS 
(Model 1) 
2SLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- + No 0.286117  
PUREFAM +/- - No  -0.028376 
AFFIL - + No  0.538437 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ - No -0.109318 -0.147814 
OUTBOD + - No -0.767396 -0.741692 
POL +/- - Yes -1.531373** -1.572913** 
PUB +/- + No 0.013919 0.026487 
LAW +/- + No 0.028444 0.036236 
FIN +/- - No -0.273180 -0.268295 
PRF +/- + No 0.090020 0.093362 
FRM +/- + No 0.219045 0.225406 
FOR +/- + Yes 1.146961* 1.129847* 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ + No 0.723350 0.708454 
AUDIT RQ3 + + No 0.134508 0.121148 
SIZE  +/- - Yes -0.228916* -0.239675** 
LEV  +/- - No -0.259179 -0.264342 
LOSS  +/- - No -0.229940 -0.242355 
GRW  +/- - No -0.003815 -0.003515 
ROA  +/- - No -0.170127 -0.163584 
Constant  +/- + Yes 4.871533** 5.117488** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.006993 0.007131 
F-Statistics     0.928653 0.902061 
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Table 6.3 continued 
Panel C: GLS Random-Effect (RE) Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 1) 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- + No 0.495089  
PUREFAM +/- + No  0.632009 
AFFIL - + No  0.306000 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
+ + No 1.857544 1.880934* 
OUTBOD + - No -0.002004 0.026565 
POL +/- - No  -0.470573 -0.458597 
PUB +/- - No -0.068059 -0.072928 
LAW +/- + Yes 0.848156*** 0.847631*** 
FIN +/- + Yes 0.553222** 0.550368** 
PRF +/- + No 0.107151 0.107474 
FRM +/- - No -0.171800 -0.172440 
FOR +/- + No 0.134665 0.145766 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
+ - No -0.004471 -0.006515 
AUDIT RQ3 + + Yes 0.637004** 0.638052** 
SIZE  +/- - Yes -0.299315* -0.299087* 
LEV  +/- + No 0.156639 0.156666 
LOSS  +/- + No 0.129710 0.126610 
GRW  +/- + No 0.002080 0.002069 
ROA  +/- - No -0.275192 -0.277057 
Constant  +/- + No 4.677376 4.661551 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.0010504 0.010479 
F-Statistics     1.460596* 1.393221* 
 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Table 6.4: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Accruals Quality 
Dependent Variable: Accruals Quality 
Panel A: The Pooled-OLS Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 1) 
Pooled-OLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - Yes -0.070881***  
PUREFAM +/- - Yes  -0.070372*** 
AFFIL + - Yes  -0.072091*** 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
- + No 0.052259 0.052323 
OUTBOD - + Yes  0.132246*** 0.132275*** 
POL +/- + No 0.016927 0.017049 
PUB +/- - Yes -0.022085* -0.022068* 
LAW +/- - No -0.008735 -0.008729 
FIN +/- - Yes -0.019026** -0.019006** 
PRF +/- - No -0.014369 -0.014394 
FRM +/- - Yes -0.024872** -0.024947** 
FOR +/- + Yes 0.062357*** 0.062406*** 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
- + Yes 0.086436*** 0.086487*** 
AUDIT RQ3 - - Yes -0.019581** -0.019579** 
SIZE  +/- + Yes 0.037451*** 0.037477*** 
LEV  +/- + No 0.008003 0.008003 
LOSS  +/- + Yes 0.020633** 0.020642** 
GRW  +/- - No -0.000444 -0.000443 
ROA  +/- + No 0.017532 0.017490 
Constant  +/- - Yes -0.649761*** -0.650361*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.188766 0.188503 
F-Statistics     28.01316*** 26.79439*** 
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares Method (2SLS) 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
2SLS 
(Model 1) 
2SLS 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY RQ 1 +/- - Yes -0.064659***  
PUREFAM  +/- - Yes  -0.048428* 
AFFIL  + - Yes  -0.080417*** 
FOREIGN  - + Yes 0.143943*** 0.143870*** 
OUTBOD RQ2 - + Yes  0.209804*** 0.209610*** 
POL  +/- - No 0.012164 0.014275 
PUB  +/- - Yes -0.026918** -0.027723** 
LAW  +/- - No -0.014657 -0.015159 
FIN  +/- - Yes -0.024883*** -0.025430*** 
PRF  +/- - Yes -0.019214** -0.019622** 
FRM  +/- - Yes -0.028694** -0.029469** 
FOR  +/- + Yes 0.043555** 0.044279** 
AUDCOM  - + Yes 0.074091*** 0.075117*** 
AUDIT RQ3 - - Yes -0.020198** -0.019632** 
SIZE  +/- + Yes 0.034787*** 0.035467*** 
LEV  +/- + Yes 0.008731* 0.008930* 
LOSS  +/- + Yes 0.023560** 0.024006** 
GRW  +/- - No -0.000897 -0.000893 
ROA  +/- + No 0.019521 0.018868 
Constant  +/- - Yes -0.619605*** -0.634256*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.185464 0.184906 
F-Statistics     28.58757*** 27.37836*** 
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Table 6.4 continued 
Panel C: GLS Random-Effect (RE) Method 
Independent 
Variables 
Research 
Question 
Expected 
Sign Observation Significance 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 1) 
GLS 
Random-Effect 
(Model 2) 
FAMILY +/- - Yes -0.049245**  
PUREFAM +/- - Yes  -0.061233* 
AFFIL + - No  -0.042890 
FOREIGN 
RQ 1 
- + Yes 0.067191* 0.066464* 
OUTBOD - + Yes / No 0.073453* 0.072261 
POL +/- + No 0.019971 0.019176 
PUB +/- - Yes -0.026709** -0.026264** 
LAW +/- - No -0.008668 -0.008434 
FIN +/- - Yes -0.020259** -0.019953** 
PRF +/- - No -0.007834 -0.007668 
FRM +/- - No -0.022507 -0.022124 
FOR +/- + Yes 0.059375*** 0.059167*** 
AUDCOM 
RQ2 
- + Yes 0.072582*** 0.072255*** 
AUDIT RQ3 - - No -0.010171 -0.010380 
SIZE  +/- + Yes 0.038476*** 0.038207*** 
LEV  +/- + No 0.005616 0.005522 
LOSS  +/- + Yes 0.015553* 0.015469* 
GRW  +/- - No -0.000484 -0.000482 
ROA  +/- + No 0.007205 0.007341 
Constant  +/- - Yes -0.663658*** -0.656605*** 
Year dummies     Included Included 
Adj R2     0.077799 0.077494 
F-Statistics     10.79370*** 10.32803*** 
 
  * Significant at the 0.10 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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  6.2.1. Ownership Structure and Earnings Quality 
      RQ1 addresses the impact of ownership structure (family ownership and 
foreign ownership) on earnings quality. Specifically, family ownership, which is 
further decomposed into pure family ownership and affiliated ownership, and 
together with foreign ownership are examined in the context of Korea’s corporate 
governance reforms and their affect on earnings quality. Thus, the objective of RQ1 
is to provide the evidence as to whether the two major ownership classes are related 
to earnings quality.  
 
       First, the empirical findings of family ownership show that family 
ownership has significant and positive effects om earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection (accruals quality). Specifically, pure family 
ownership is more strongly positive with both earnings quality on user needs 
(persistence) and on shareholder/investor protection (accruals quality). As reported in 
Panel A of Tables 6.1 and 6.4, the results for the basic estimation method, pooled-
OLS, family ownership is related to higher accruals quality, and pure family 
ownership is related to higher both earnings persistence and accruals quality. Even 
though affiliated ownership is related to weaker earnings persistence, it is related to 
higher accruals quality. This is also the case with pure family ownership. The positive 
effect of family ownership including pure family ownership on earnings quality is 
also confirmed by 2SLS and GLS random-effect estimation. Overall, the alignment 
effect of family ownership is supported in Korea, thus hypothesis H1a is well 
supported.  
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       Second, the positive impact of foreign ownership on earnings quality is 
evident. Specifically, foreign ownership is strongly significant and positively related 
to earnings quality on user needs perspective (earnings persistence and value-
relevance). This result suggests that as institutional investors (outside blockholders), 
foreign shareholders play an important role in monitoring management to supplement 
domestic institutional investor in an emerging market, consistent to Sachs and Warner 
(1995) and Khanna and Palepu (2000). Accordingly, the active monitoring hypothesis 
of foreign shareholders is supported in Korea, and thereby hypothesis H2 is well-
supported in this respect. However, as discussed in sub-section 5.4.1 and 5.6.1 of 
Chapter 5, there are no evidence of foreign ownership impacting on earning quality 
on shareholder/investor protection (conservatism and accruals quality) and the 
negative effect on accruals quality in GLS. Therefore careful acceptance of 
hypothesis H2 is required.  
 
  6.2.2. Internal Governance Function and Earnings Quality 
     RQ2 addresses the impact of internal governance functions (e.g., outside 
directors on boards and audit committee), initially introduced in Korea after the 
Asian financial crisis, on earnings quality. Outside directors on boards and audit 
committee were stipulated by the IMF as one of the bailout conditions. As discussed 
in section 2.3 of Chapter 2, internal governance functions were initiated by external 
pressure (the IMF and the World Bank) not by voluntary domestic needs and 
represent a partially transplanted common-law regime. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate whether newly introduced internal governance functions in Korea have 
had the effect external bodies had suggested.  
 210
     Hypothesis H3a, suggesting a positive association between outside directors 
on board and earnings quality, is initially evaluated using pooled-OLS regression. 
The results in Table 6.2 and 6.4 indicate that outside directors in Korea positively 
affect earnings quality on user needs (value-relevance) but negatively affect earnings 
quality on shareholder/investor protection (accruals quality). Accordingly, hypothesis 
H3a is partially supported. This result shows that the role of outside directors on board 
in Korea is partially inconsistent to expectation, and implies that controlling family 
shareholders (or ultimate owner) still influence the board.  
 
     Earnings quality depends on the background (quality) of outside directors 
(hypothesis H3b). As shown in Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, outside directors having a 
former high-profile background (e.g., politician, government officer, and lawyer) 
negatively affect earnings quality. However, as limited evidence, government officers 
and lawyers positively affects earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection 
(conservatism and accruals quality) due to their supervisory experience and 
occupational background. As predicted, outside directors who are finance experts 
(e.g., CPA, CFA, and Banker) positively affect earnings quality on 
shareholder/investor protection, consistent with previous research (Xie et al. 2003; 
Moon et al. 2006). This result is also confirmed by 2SLS and the GLS method. 
Although many Korean firms appoint professors as an outside director, the positive 
impact of these outside directors is not supported suggesting their insufficient 
knowledge of the firm or firm’s management. Interestingly, outside directors who are 
former employees positively affect both earnings quality on user needs and 
shareholder/investor protection. This results from their sufficient operational skills 
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and firm-specific managerial knowledge and perhaps independence from controlling 
family shareholders (or ultimate owner). In contrast to the positive impact of foreign 
shareholders on earnings quality, foreign outside directors negatively affect earnings 
quality suggesting their insufficient knowledge of firm and firm’s management and 
perhaps neglect of responsibilities due to language barriers.  
 
       Finally, with regard to hypothesis H4, the positive impact of an audit 
committee on earnings quality is not supported. Contrary to the expectations, an audit 
committee negatively affects both earnings quality on user needs (persistence) and 
earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection (accruals quality) and this is 
confirmed by 2SLS and GLS. Thus, mere introduction of an audit committee by 
regulatory enforcement does not increase earnings quality. Generally, the result of 
outside directors on the board, an audit committee lacks of independence and 
supports domination by controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner). 
   
       In answer to RQ2, overall, it is noteworthy that internal governance 
functions in Korean firms do not have a consistent relationship to earnings quality. 
Ball et al. (2003) argues that higher quality of earnings is determined by the 
incentives of financial statement preparers (controlling family shareholders or 
ultimate owner), not by legal/judicial or accounting regimes. Accordingly, the 
negative impact of internal governance functions in Korea supports Ball et al.’s 
(2003) suggestion. This study also suggests that mere introduction of outside 
directors and audit committee by regulatory enforcement does not increase the 
reliability of financial accounting information.  
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 6.2.3. External Governance Function and Earnings Quality. 
     RQ3 addresses the impact of external governance function (audit quality) on 
earnings quality. Typically, audit quality is measured as auditor brand name (e.g., Big 
N) due to their high competency and ‘deep pockets’. As expected, hypothesis H5, the 
positive effect of audit quality on earnings quality, is well supported. High audit 
quality positively affects earnings quality on shareholder/investor protection 
(accruals quality). This positive impact of high audit quality remains unchanged in 
2SLS. As robustness check using GLS, high audit quality has also a positively 
influence on both earnings quality on user needs (value-relevance) and on 
shareholder/investor protection (conservatism).  
 
      In answer to RQ3, external governance in Korean firms is effectively 
operated. As discussed in Sub-Section 2.5.3 of Chapter 2, reinforced financial and 
legal liabilities and practices of the CPA profession in Korea and increased auditor 
independence as a major part of Korea’s corporate governance increases audit quality, 
thereby providing higher earnings quality. Khurana and Raman (2004) find that 
higher audit quality (e.g. Big N) increases accounting information credibility by 
reducing aggressive and opportunistic financial reporting, and thus decreases 
litigation risk for fraudulent financial reporting. Specifically, in emerging countries, 
higher audit quality (Big N) plays a vital role in the external corporate governance, 
thereby diminishing agency problems between controlling family shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Fan and Wong 2005). This study adds evidence on the 
positive impact of higher audit quality on earnings quality. 
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 6.3. CONTRIBUTIONS 
     This study contributes to the academic literature in several ways. First, in terms 
of family ownership, this study measures family ownership as three different ways: 
family ownership, pure family ownership, and affiliated ownership. Jang et al. (2002) 
suggest that controlling family ownership using pyramidal structures is the most 
common features in Korea as well as almost all East-Asian countries. Previous 
Korean study (Kim and Yi 2006) shows that a higher affiliated ownership was 
prevalent in Korea, thereby exacerbating agency problems and leading to low 
earnings quality. It is important to classify family ownership into pure family 
ownership and affiliated ownership because pure family ownership and affiliated 
ownership can affect earnings quality differently. Thus, results of this study are 
important not only for the Korean context, but will also contribute to understanding 
of family ownership and earnings quality in other East Asian countries. 
 
      Second, this study extends knowledge on the effect of foreign ownership on 
earnings quality. As a major institutional investor due to sustained globalization, the 
governance role of foreign shareholders has been increased. Specifically, in emerging 
countries, foreign shareholders supplement domestic institutional shareholders as 
outside monitors of corporate governance activities. After the Asian financial crisis, 
the ceiling on foreign equity ownership was removed, and Korea ranked the third 
highest foreign investment country in the emerging markets in 2007. Thus, this study 
provides evidence as to how rapidly increased foreign ownership and participation in 
the board of directors affect earnings quality.  
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       Third, with regard to the literature on the relationship between earnings 
quality and corporate governance, this study extends prior research by 
comprehensively exploring the effects of corporate governance characteristics on 
earnings quality. Rezaee (2002) argues that corporate governance is a monitoring 
mechanism for assessing corporate responsibility and accountability through boards 
of directors, audit committees, management, and auditors to serve and protect 
investors. Based on Rezaee (2002) and Korea’s corporate governance reforms, this 
study classifies corporate governance functions into three major categories: 1) 
ownership structure, 2) internal governance functions, and 3) external governance 
function. Balsam et al. (2003) argue that earnings quality is not exclusively defined 
but the most comprehensive measure for assessing quality of financial reporting. This 
study follows the approach of Jonas and Blanchet (2000) and classifies earnings 
quality into two types of approaches for assessing financial reporting quality: user 
needs, measured as earnings persistence and value-relevance and 
shareholder/investor protection, measured as conservatism and accruals quality. 
Therefore, this comprehensive investigation provides more detailed insights into the 
role of corporate governance in improving earnings quality (financial reporting 
quality).  
 
       Finally, as far as it could be ascertained, this appears to be the first Korean 
study to comprehensively test the effect of corporate governance on earnings quality 
and to control endogeneity between corporate governance and earnings quality. 
Although Black et al. (2006) control endogeneity of corporate governance variables 
as Korean study, they examine the association between corporate governance and 
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firm value (Tobin’s Q). Unlike this study, they used the Korean Corporate 
Governance Index (KCGI)69 score as a proxy for corporate governance variables.  
 
 6.4. IMPLICATIONS 
     This study offers some useful insights for regulators and policy makers. 
Specifically for the IMF and the World Bank, the findings of this study provide 
important policy implications. First of all, to the extent that introduction of outside 
directors on boards and audit committee (as tested via RQ2) do not increase earnings 
quality, it suggests that the internal governance function without substantial 
independence from controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner) does not 
work effectively. This result re-confirms that higher earnings quality is achieved by 
financial statement preparers (controlling family shareholders or ultimate owner) and 
not by regulation. Thus, regulator and policy makers should prudently evaluate the 
effective of Korea’s corporate governance reforms. The findings of this study suggest 
that corporate governance reforms should be voluntarily induced by the private sector 
and not by government.  
 
      Many East-Asian studies find a negative effect of family ownership on 
earnings quality or firm value, but family ownership, specifically pure family 
ownership in Korea is identified to positively affect earnings quality. However, as 
shown in the result of RQ2, family ownership dominates internal governance 
functions. Foreign shareholders appear to be partially outside monitors and partially 
                                                
69 The KCGI was developed by the Korean Corporate Governance Service (the KCGS). The KCGI 
(scores from 0 to 100) consists of five equally weighted sub-indices: 1) The protection of 
shareholder interests, 2) The board of directors, 3) Disclosure, 4)The auditing body, and 5) 
Distribution of operational procedures. The KCGS changes its survey questions each year.  
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transient investors. Therefore, the findings related to RQ1 also imply that regulator or 
policy maker should consider both the positive and negative sides of family 
ownership and foreign ownership. 
 
Strong investor protection and a high quality judicial system reduce the 
information asymmetry between insider (management) and outsider (financial 
statement users) and increase earnings quality, thereby protecting 
shareholders/investors (Bushman and Piotroski 2006). In addition, enforced 
securities laws and strong investor protection institutions decrease earnings 
management and increase earnings informativeness (DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant 
2007). As shown in the findings related to RQ1 and RQ3, the reinforced legal system 
to strengthen accountability of management and external auditor should be a key 
object of the Korean governance reform to increase earnings quality. Specifically, 
strengthened litigation of management (family ownership) and external auditors 
significantly increase earnings quality for both user needs and shareholder/investor 
protection. Thus, strong investor protection and the judicial system should be 
continuously reinforced and improved. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.1., the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission 
(KFSC) was organized as a special committee and was charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the Korean accounting and auditing systems. The role of 
the KFSC is equivalent to that of the U.S. SEC. La Porta et al. (2003) argues that a 
motivated public enforcer (e.g., the U.S. SEC) is needed to fill the gaps when private 
enforcements are insufficient. They suggest that efficacy of public enforcement is 
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premised on four critical aspects of the public enforcer: 1) freedom from political 
interference, 2) investigative powers, 3) scope to impose non-criminal sanction, and 
4) scope to impose criminal sanctions. Thus, the KFSC should fulfill four critical 
aspects to play an important role in achieving transparency, credibility, and 
international comparability of the Korean accounting systems and corporate 
governance practices. 
 
      By testing RQ2 (via H3b), earnings quality depends on the background 
(quality) of outside directors. The Securities and Exchange Act and the Code of Best 
Practice for Corporate Governance only guide the requirement for persons prohibited 
from becoming an outside director. Thus, the specialty and ability of outside directors 
on boards are not considered. Since many Korean firms expect an outside director to 
be a safeguard, the appointment of an outside director is mainly a specific person 
who was formerly high-profile figure. Therefore, better refining guidelines reflecting 
the quality of an outside director should be required to increase efficient and effective 
monitoring over management.  
 
      Overall, Korea’s corporate governance reforms to increase the credibility and 
transparency of financial accounting information of Korean firms are still 
progressing. Thus, the major implication of this study is that any policy 
recommendation on corporate governance should not be based on an isolated 
consideration by government but should be based on the whole economic 
environment.  
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 6.5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
     There are several potential limitations in this study. First of all, the four 
measures of earnings quality have been selectively measured. In addition, four 
measures of earnings quality do not fully reflect all aspects of earnings quality. Thus, 
in a future work, more various sets of measures that may better represent the earnings 
quality should be considered.  
 
      Second, this study assumes a linear impact of family ownership. However, 
prior research (e.g. Demsetz 1983; Mørck et al. 1988) suggests that an increase in 
insider shareholding (family shareholding) could increase management entrenchment. 
Accordingly, future research should seek to identify a non-linear relationship 
between family ownership and earnings quality. Although this study decomposes 
family ownership pure family ownership and affiliated ownership, future work could 
be done using other measures of family ownership measures such as founding family 
ownership, family managerial ownership, and descendant family ownership etc.  
 
     Third, this study only considers foreign shareholders as institutional 
shareholders. In Korea, traditional institutional shareholders (outside blockholders) 
are commercial banks and government. Thus, this study does not test the different 
effects on earnings quality across other institutional shareholders. In a future work, 
different dimensions of incentives among institutional investors affecting earnings 
quality could be investigated to fill these gaps. 
 
     Fourth, similar to prior studies, this study measures audit quality as an 
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auditor brand name (Big N). However, audit quality can also be measured by 
different characteristics such as audit industry specialization and audit independence 
etc. In a future work, different measures of audit quality could be considered. 
 
     Finally, although this study attempts to control the factors affecting the 
earnings quality of a firm, there could be omitted variables that affect the association 
between corporate governance and earnings quality. 
 
 6.6 CONCLUSION 
     This study explores the relationship between corporate governance (proxied by 
three characteristics based on Korea’s corporate governance reforms) and the quality 
of financial reporting (proxied by four earnings qualities). Korea’s corporate 
governance reforms are mainly classified into three major categories: 1) ownership 
structure (e.g., family ownership and foreign ownership), 2) internal governance 
(outside directors on boards and audit committee), and 3) external governance (audit 
quality). Following Jonas and Blanchet (2000), this study classifies earnings quality 
into two types of approaches for assessing financial reporting quality: user needs and 
shareholder/invesetor protection. From the standpoint of user needs, earnings quality 
is associated with the relevance of the financial information and measured as 
earnings persistence and value-relevance, while earnings quality in the view of 
shareholder/investor protection is related with reliability of financial information and 
measured as conservatism and accruals quality. 
 
      Using data from Korean firms listed on the KSE during 2000 to 2005, this 
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study documents evidence that ownership structure (family ownership and foreign 
ownership) is associated with higher earnings quality. This results is consistent with 
the alignment effect of family ownership and the active monitoring effect of foreign 
ownership. As for internal governance functions, the results between outside 
directors on boards and earnings quality are mixed. Outside directors on boards are 
positively related to value-relevance but negatively affect accruals quality. Audit 
committee negatively affects both persistence and accruals quality. Thus, in Korea, it 
can be interpreted that the domination of controlling family shareholders (or ultimate 
owner) has the potential to negate the impact of the internal governance reforms. In 
addition, earnings quality depends on the background (quality) of outside directors 
on boards. This study also finds that external governance function (Big N) positively 
affects accruals quality, a finding consistent with their “public watch dog” function. 
 
     There are two major limitations in this study. First, the four proxies of earnings 
quality in this study do not necessarily reflect all aspects of earnings quality. For 
instance, in this study, the results between outside directors on boards and earnings 
quality are mixed, based on the four proxies used. Thus, the results based on the 
association between corporate governance and earnings quality could depend on how 
earnings quality is defined. Second, although this study attempts to control factors 
affecting earnings quality of the firm, there may still be some omitted variables that 
have not been controlled. 
 
     This study contributes to the literature on ownership structure and earnings 
quality. In addition, this study adds to the relationship between corporate governance 
 221
mechanisms and earnings quality by focusing on both internal governance and 
external governance functions. 
 
      In summary, the findings of this study indicate that in order to achieve high 
quality financial reporting (reliable and relevant accounting earnings quality), well-
balanced corporate governance mechanisms are required. In addition, high quality 
financial reporting is achieved by financial statement preparers (e.g., controlling 
family shareholders or ultimate owner) not simply by regulations. Thus, the ultimate 
conclusion is that corporate governance reform should be based on the whole 
economic environment. At this stage, some of the hastily introduced reforms 
following the 1997/8 financial crisis do not appear to be working as intended in the 
Korean environment.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AIMR Association of Investment Management and Research 
ASX Australian Stock Exchange 
BRC Blue Ribbon Committee 
BvDEP Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing 
CCG Committee on Corporate Governance 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFA Certified Financial Analyst 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CGS Corporate Governance Service 
CPA Certified Public Accountant 
DART Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FE Fixed-Effect 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principle 
GLS Generalized Least Squares 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IMD International Institute for Management Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
KFSC Korean Financial Supervisory Commission 
KICPA Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountant 
KIS Korean Information Service 
KOSDAQ Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
KRW Korean Won (Korean Currency) 
KSE Korean Stock Exchange 
LSDV Least Square Dummy Variable 
M&A Mergers and Acquisitions 
MOFE Ministry of Finance and Economics 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
R&D Research and Development 
RE Random-Effect 
RQ Research Question 
SAL Structural Adjustment Loan 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFAC Statement of Financial Accounting Concept 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
TSLS (2SLS) Two Stage Least Squares 
S&P Standard & Poor’s 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
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APPENDIX II 
Table II.1: Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Association between Earnings 
Quality (Proxy of User Needs) and Corporate Governance 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the firm Fixed-Effect (FE) estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures 
of earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is 
the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under 
the control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed 
into pure family ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal 
shareholder and his/her families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by 
affiliated firms under the control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity 
shares held by foreign shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The 
backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) 
Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former 
employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the 
presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log 
of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to 
book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. 
YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error 
term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Persistence Value- Relevance Persistence 
Value- 
Relevance 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
-0.099722  
[-0.599091] 
-0.000822  
[-0.028361] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
-0.007684  
[-0.041435] 
0.068472  
[1.438773] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
-0.405080*** 
[-3.182956] 
-0.027470  
[-0.858758] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.141683 
[0.834261] 
0.216676*** 
[4.956356] 
0.173909 
[1.019967] 
0.222820*** 
[5.084792] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
-0.156651  
[-0.826026] 
0.019093 
[0.398547] 
-0.162927  
[-0.859460] 
0.018335 
[0.382870] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
0.080696  
[0.630854] 
0.009612  
[0.289246] 
0.086858 
[0.679205] 
0.011136 
[0.335169] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.001976 
[0.033812] 
-0.001209 
[-0.081595] 
-0.003815  
[-0.065233] 
-0.002861  
[-0.192815] 
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δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.047573  
[-0.880479] 
0.017082 
[1.246413] 
-0.046720  
[-0.865153] 
0.017347 
[1.266279] 
δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.076511*  
[-1.737025] 
0.007061  
[0.634092] 
-0.078347*  
[-1.779160] 
0.006363 
[0.571394] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.081886*  
[-1.689442] 
0.000573 
[0.046460] 
-0.083488*  
[-1.722981] 
-2.26E-05 
[-0.001835] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.193527**  
[-2.918340] 
0.009333 
[0.551411] 
-0.197288** 
[-2.976490] 
0.008232 
[0.486375] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.084549  
[-0.742165] 
0.036719  
[1.222535] 
-0.071353 
[-0.625568] 
0.040635 
[1.350283] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
0.093977 
[0.956080] 
0.046253* 
[1.828189] 
0.083104 
[0.844623] 
0.044085*  
[1.741523] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.015270 
[0.303878] 
0.031137** 
[2.458146] 
0.015227 
[0.303203] 
0.031122** 
[2.458220] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.071003 
[1.542502] 
0.007757 
[0.661044] 
0.053037 
[1.130386] 
0.003538 
[0.296226] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.056436** 
[2.802392] 
0.018376*** 
[3.641589] 
0.056526** 
[2.808494] 
0.018405***  
[3.649316] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.001043  
[-0.028944] 
0.007888 
[0.865913] 
-0.002246 
[-0.062343] 
0.007543 
[0.828262] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.003168 
[1.291649] 
0.000933  
[1.518026] 
0.003390 
[1.381339] 
0.000983 
[1.597301] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.182004** 
[0.0140] 
0.046257** 
[2.490383] 
0.188629** 
[2.547004] 
0.047731** 
[2.568529] 
α Constant 
-0.177707 
[0.033346] 
0.313695 
[1.389599] 
-0.477414  
[-0.531166] 
0.384983* 
[1.682549] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.329252 0.681478 0.330006 0.681796 
 F-statistics 3.822983*** 13.12922*** 3.827301*** 13.12408*** 
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Table II.2: Fixed Effect Regression Results for the Association between Earnings 
Quality (Proxy of Shareholder/Investor Protection) and Corporate Governance 
2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the firm Fixed-Effect (FE)estimates of Equation 4.5: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is the 
percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under the 
control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed into 
pure family ownership (PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal shareholder 
and his/her families and affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms 
under the control of the largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The backgrounds of outside directors 
on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) 
Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner 
(FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of 
audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is 
Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is 
total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative 
earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was 
negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, 
δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
 Variables Conservatism Accruals Quality Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
0.483953  
[0.662078] 
-0.009459  
[-0.297696] 
  
β2 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
  
0.966480  
[0.821690] 
-0.016900  
[-0.326775] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL)   
0.155811 
[0.193022] 
-0.007567  
[-0.216102] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
2.178199** 
[2.023521] 
0.076092 
[1.588616] 
2.239352** 
[2.070681] 
0.075693 
[1.578184] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
0.172035  
[0.143112] 
0.005166 
[0.098566] 
0.192392  
[0.159995] 
0.005423 
[0.103408] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.105622  
[-0.130265] 
0.011735 
[0.355347] 
-0.089824 
[-0.110731] 
0.011674 
[0.353372] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
-0.080938 
[-0.218496] 
-0.031479** 
[-2.000779] 
-0.093730  
[-0.252673] 
-0.031326** 
[-1.986873] 
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δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
1.094542*** 
[3.195864] 
-0.016118  
[-1.078685] 
1.09716*** 
[3.202918] 
-0.016142 
[-1.080033] 
δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
0.786541***  
[2.817062] 
-0.024366* 
[-1.952647] 
0.781308*** 
[2.797064] 
-0.024293* 
[-1.945518] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
0.092311 
[0.300455] 
-0.003917  
[-0.289785] 
0.090734 
[0.295194] 
-0.003844 
[-0.284217] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.376922  
[-0.896688] 
-0.013944 
[-0.758190] 
-0.379505  
[-0.902622] 
-0.013797 
[-0.748981] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.180269  
[-0.249635] 
0.058273* 
[1.960148] 
-0.152027  
[-0.210122] 
0.058191* 
[1.956750] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
0.115327 
[0.185101] 
0.022968 
[0.837241] 
0.089669 
[0.143673] 
0.023167 
[0.843085] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.742972** 
[2.332577] 
0.006186 
[0.443613] 
0.740359***  
[2.324060] 
0.006174 
[0.442682] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
-0.233318  
[-0.799693] 
0.016369 
[1.242480] 
-0.271194 
[-0.911303] 
0.016862 
[1.251069] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.224276* 
[1.756916] 
0.003014 
[0.586522] 
0.223504*  
[1.750654] 
0.003020 
[0.587496] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
0.185237 
[0.810901] 
0.011847 
[1.194512] 
0.180666 
[0.790659] 
0.011857 
[1.195248] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.000829 
[0.053305] 
-0.001370  
[-0.690583] 
0.001149 
[0.073807] 
-0.001372 
[-0.691871] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
-0.319903  
[-0.681742] 
0.008378 
[0.391864] 
-0.310552 
[-0.66106] 
0.008233 
[0.384827] 
α Constant 
3.097130 
[2.305708] 
-0.230187  
[-0.903681] 
3.769453 
[0.661245] 
-0.238666 
[-0.919841] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.683943 0.489048 0.683847 0.488809 
 F-statistics 13.44902*** 5.859869*** 13.42008*** 5.845587*** 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Table III.1: Results for Non-linear Impact of Family Ownership on Earnings 
Quality 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. FAMILY is the 
percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under the 
control of the largest-shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY2 is a squared value of 
FAMILY to test a non-linear impact of family ownership on earnings quality. FOREIGN is the percentage of 
equity shares held by foreign shareholders. OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The 
backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) 
Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former 
employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the 
presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the 
total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio 
of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious 
year’s net income was negative, and zero otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time 
dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  User Needs Shareholder/Investor Protection 
 Variables Persistence Value-Relevance Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 Family Ownership (FAMILY) 
-0.188610  
[-0.917944] 
-0.063834  
[-0.855142] 
-5.972496*** 
[-3.118551] 
-0.112649  
[-1.931710] 
β2 
Squared Family Ownership 
(FAMILY2) 
0.241060 
[0.867085] 
0.056327  
[0.557365] 
8.382802***  
[3.234975] 
0.059733 
[0.758215] 
β3 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.500128*** 
[4.562356] 
0.198516*** 
[4.999127] 
0.583207 
[0.570731] 
0.054345 
[1.551728] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
0.144527  
[1.009203] 
0.174905*** 
[3.368044] 
-0.115984  
[-0.086886] 
0.134014***  
[3.315271] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.188314**  
[-2.43828] 
0.033970 
[1.211241] 
-1.430446** 
[-1.986921] 
0.017162 
[0.835539] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.040456 
[0.958213] 
-0.026876* 
[-1.756776] 
0.019312  
[0.049071] 
-0.022708* 
[-1.930563] 
 
 245
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.104679***  
[-3.117400] 
-0.033917*** 
[-2.794917] 
0.096064 
[0.306922] 
-0.008600 
[-0.908194] 
δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
0.003803  
[0.131751] 
0.000280  
[0.026823] 
-0.201966  
[-0.750713] 
-0.018588** 
[-2.256802] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.059062  
[-0.886605] 
-0.026952**  
[-2.338797] 
0.305894 
[1.031179] 
-0.013963 
[-1.545074] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.376922  
[-1.486911] 
0.043071***  
[2.998860] 
0.377362  
[1.019278] 
-0.024215** 
[-2.116429] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.223754***  
[-3.499587] 
-0.039142* 
[-1.702717] 
0.969846  
[1.627228] 
0.061455*** 
[3.401550] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.120909**  
[-2.385434] 
0.002673 
[0.145176] 
0.334189 
[0.707301] 
0.086993***  
[6.087701] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.014361 
[0.520075] 
0.012210 
[1.223573] 
0.288533  
[1.121083] 
-0.01973**  
[-2.487136] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.019307  
[1.527679] 
0.000853 
[0.185200] 
-0.300732** 
[-2.552664] 
0.037064*** 
[10.14422] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.032606* 
[1.712549] 
0.006309 
[0.922695] 
-0.268156  
[-1.510902] 
0.007623 
[1.497949] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.059282*  
[-1.654157] 
0.024198* 
[1.865976] 
-0.440255  
[-1.317945] 
0.020170** 
[1.985510] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.002939 
[1.507512] 
-0.000370  
[-0.528686] 
0.004669 
[0.256954] 
-0.000429 
[-0.556998] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.142282**  
[1.892330] 
0.037053 
[1.372071] 
-0.193541  
[-0.276140] 
0.017302 
[0.773156] 
α Constant 
-0.124036 
[2.305708] 
0.322007***  
[3.679693] 
6.775790***  
[3.026636] 
-0.671260***  
[-9.659889] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.021781 0.045723 0.003140 0.188630 
 F-statistics 3.950686*** 7.247570*** 1.417519* 26.81569*** 
 
 
 246
Table III.2: Results for Non-linear Impact of Pure Family Ownership on 
Earnings Quality 2000 to 2005 
This table presents the results of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable Earnings Quality is four measures of 
earnings quality: 1) Persistence, 2) Value-Relevance, 3) Conservatism, and 4) Accruals Quality. PUREFAM is the 
percentage of equity shares owned by the largest shareholder and his/her family. PUREFAM2 is a squared value 
of PUREFAM to test a non-linear impact of family ownership on earnings quality. AFFIL is the percentage of 
equity shares held by affiliated firms. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign shareholders. 
OUTBOD is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The backgrounds of outside directors on board are 
classified as seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) 
Financial experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit 
Committee (AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. 
Audit Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm 
and zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by 
total assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero 
otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ 
are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  User needs Shareholder/Investor Protection 
 Variables Persistence Value-Relevance Conservatism 
Accruals 
Quality 
  Co-efficient [t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Co-efficient 
[t-stats] 
Panel A: Explanatory variables     
 Ownership Structure     
β1 
Pure Family Ownership 
(PUREFAM) 
-0.006414 
[-0.028387] 
-0.117443 
[-1.435825] 
-4.739436**  
[-2.245044] 
-0.159799**  
[-2.481418] 
β2 
Squared Pure Family 
Ownership (PUREFAM2) 
0.326919 
[2.023521] 
0.222789 
[1.428038] 
8.101557** 
[2.015514] 
0.182782  
[1.499427] 
β3 Affiliated Ownership (AFFIL) 
-0.152782* 
[-1.941613] 
-0.039511 
[-1.383163] 
0.204061 
[0.277499] 
-0.074986***  
[-3.393196] 
β4 
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN) 
0.521530*** 
[4.764994] 
0.202104*** 
[5.087063] 
0.308339 
[0.301454] 
0.056705 
[1.618509] 
 Internal Governance      
δ1 
Outside Directors on Board 
(OUTBOD) 
0.151768 
[1.060889] 
0.172136*** 
[3.313987] 
-0.582972  
[-0.436087] 
0.129094*** 
[3.188251] 
δ2 Politician (POL) 
-0.168879** 
[-2.182040] 
0.034771 
[1.236167] 
-1.570449** 
[-2.171332] 
0.016485 
[0.800318] 
δ3 Government Official (PUB) 
0.033231  
[0.788832] 
-0.027643* 
[-1.806574] 
0.137392 
[0.349003] 
-0.022327* 
[-1.896851] 
δ4 Lawyer (LAW) 
-0.110132**  
[-3.278801] 
-0.034051*** 
[-2.800688] 
0.125113 
[0.398610] 
-0.008287 
[-0.873398] 
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δ5 Financial Expert (FIN) 
-0.000835  
[-0.028910] 
0.000423  
[0.040502] 
-0.197318  
[-0.731461] 
-0.018182** 
[-2.201000] 
δ6 Professor (PRF) 
-0.030929  
[-0.972928] 
-0.026814 
[-2.327155] 
0.299989 
[1.009930] 
-0.013440 
[-1.484288] 
δ7 Former Employee (FRM) 
-0.063988  
[-1.606242] 
0.044134***  
[3.061453] 
0.397736 
[1.068499] 
-0.022701** 
[-1.968541] 
δ8 Foreigner (FOR) 
-0.215270*** 
[-3.373970] 
-0.039561* 
[-1.722178] 
1.018213*  
[1.707677] 
0.060483*** 
[3.346538] 
λ1 Audit Committee (AUDCOM) 
-0.118222**  
[-2.336298] 
0.003222 
[0.175059] 
0.292869 
[0.619321] 
0.086922*** 
[6.086956] 
 External Governance     
γ1 Audit Quality (AUDIT) 
0.021143 
[0.764761] 
0.012522 
[1.252128] 
0.274075 
[1.060961] 
-0.020112**  
[-2.529733] 
 Control     
ζ1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
0.025785**  
[2.035607] 
0.001264 
[0.273379] 
-0.290035** 
[-2.450159] 
0.037037*** 
[10.09141] 
ζ2 Leverage (LEV) 
0.036725* 
[1.932431] 
0.006290 
[0.920563] 
-0.254476  
[-1.432849] 
0.007428 
[1.461346] 
ζ3 
Firm with negative earnings 
(LOSS) 
-0.052148  
[-1.455564] 
0.02423* 
[1.866191] 
-0.440271  
[-1.315122] 
0.019733* 
[1.940443] 
ζ4 Growth Prospects (GRW) 
0.002837 
[1.457524] 
-0.000390 
[-0.556848] 
0.004660 
[0.256181] 
-0.000455 
[-0.591500] 
ζ5 Return on Assets (ROA) 
0.137818* 
[1.834731] 
0.035588 
[1.317281] 
-0.226993 
[-0.323368] 
0.016042 
[0.716246] 
α Constant 
-0.286242  
[-1.193310] 
0.314464***  
[3.593519] 
6.322516*** 
[2.820464] 
-0.668955*** 
[-9.611852] 
Ψ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Model fits     
 Adjusted R2 0.024873 0.046162 0.001287 0.188903 
 F-statistics 4.239476*** 7.047508*** 1.163719 25.78430*** 
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Table IV.1: Results for the Association between Conservatism and Corporate 
Governance using Accruals-Based Measure Model (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) 
This table presents the results of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates: 
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Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period. The dependent variable ACC is total accruals (net income + 
depreciation - cash flow from operations). NCFO is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if CFO is negative, CFO 
is cash flow from operations. NCFO*CFO is the interaction form. FAMILY is the percentage of equity shares 
owned by the largest shareholder and associated shareholders who are under the control of the largest-
shareholder family, including stock held by affiliated firms. FAMILY is decomposed into pure family ownership 
(PUREFAM), the percentage of equity shares owned by the largest personal shareholder and his/her families and 
affiliated ownership (AFFIL), the percentage of equity shares owned by affiliated firms under the control of the 
largest-shareholder family. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign shareholders. OUTBOD 
is the ratio of outside directors on the board size. The backgrounds of outside directors on board are classified as 
seven category dummies: 1) Politician (POL), 2) Government officials (PUB), 3) Lawyer (LAW), 4) Financial 
experts (FIN), 5) Professor (PRF), 6) Former employee (FRM), and 7) Foreigner (FOR). Audit Committee 
(AUDCOM) is a dummy variable that takes the presence (one) or absence (zero) of audit committee. Audit 
Quality (AUDIT) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s auditor is Big N audit firm and 
zero otherwise. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural log of the total assets. Leverage (LEV) is total debt scaled by total 
assets. Growth prospects (GRW) is market to book ratio of equity. Firm with negative earnings (LOSS) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm’s pervious year’s net income was negative, and zero 
otherwise. Profitability (ROA) is return on assets. YEAR is a time dummy. α is the constant. χ, β, δ, λ, γ, ζ, and Ψ 
are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the error term. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-Statistic 
 Panel A: Explanatory variables    
χ1  NCFO + 0.041811 1.284146
χ2 CFO - -0.288210** -2.244368
χ3 NCFO * CFO + 0.164514 0.385560
 Ownership Structure   
β1 FAMILY ? -0.005952 -0.268030
β2 FAMILY * CFO ? -0.511576*** -5.771830
β3 FAMILY * NCFO ? 0.013787 0.286773
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β4 FAMILY * NCFO * CFO ? 1.928727 1.299706
β5 FOREIGN ? 0.074880** 2.197894
β6 FOREIGN * CFO ? 0.884334*** 8.851242
β7 FOREIGN * NCFO ? 0.154940 1.329121
β8 FOREIGN * NCFO * CFO + 1.433714 0.705439
 Internal Governance   
δ1 OUTBOD ? -0.013145 -0.279959
δ2 OUTBOD * CFO ? -0.380172*** -4.174567
δ3 OUTBOD * NCFO ? 0.021552 0.216088
δ4 OUTBOD * NCFO * CFO + 4.040500* 1.713330
δ5 POL ? -0.030959 -1.079055
δ6 POL * CFO ? 0.589556*** 9.248150
δ7 POL * NCFO ? 0.026452 0.379640
δ8 POL * NCFO * CFO - -1.504307 -1.747430
δ9 PUB ? 0.059001*** 4.310208
δ10 PUB * CFO ? -0.265691*** -9.352822
δ11 PUB * NCFO ? -0.104852*** -3.049509
δ12 PUB * NCFO * CFO - -1.472139* -1.891933
δ13 LAW ? -0.008032 -0.734208
δ14 LAW * CFO ? 0.205673*** 8.134834
δ15 LAW * NCFO ? -0.001207 -0.049551
δ16 LAW * NCFO * CFO + -0.469001 -0.862880
δ17 FIN ? 0.004952 0.532068
δ18 FIN * CFO ? 0.062565** 2.175421
δ19 FIN * NCFO ? -0.009202 -0.436830
δ20 FIN * NCFO * CFO + -1.002798 -1.087185
δ21 PRF ? 0.020171** 1.982442
δ22 PRF * CFO ? -0.117009*** -8.070548
δ23 PRF * NCFO ? -0.014968 -0.664721
δ24 PRF * NCFO * CFO + 0.899136* 1.863734
δ25 FRM ? 0.042947*** 3.324930
δ26 FRM * CFO ? -0.560742*** -14.03571
δ27 FRM * NCFO ? -0.044597 -1.528222
δ28 FRM * NCFO * CFO - 0.685827 0.894112
δ29 FOR ? -0.025113 -1.213318
δ30 FOR * CFO ?  -0.003184 -0.083587
δ31 FOR * NCFO ? 0.048102 0.773111
δ32 FOR * NCFO * CFO + 4.237308*** 4.313647
λ1 AUDCOM ? 0.055240*** 3.288704
λ2 AUDCOM * CFO ? -0.496672*** -13.40648
λ3 AUDCOM * NCFO ? -0.057571 -1.439975
λ4 AUDCOM * NCFO * CFO + 0.185669 0.210911
 External Governance   
γ1 AUDIT ? -0.001427 -0.154062
γ2 AUDIT * CFO ? -0.085040 -0.764318
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γ3 AUDIT * NCFO ? -0.013753 -0.709870
γ4 AUDIT * NCFO * CFO + 1.959148** 2.185091
 Control Variables   
ζ1 SIZE ? -0.006181 -1.552582
ζ2 LEV ? 0.005492 1.055877
ζ3 GRW ? -0.000403 -0.674583
ζ4 LOSS ? -0.058927*** -5.801097
ζ5 ROA ? 0.103131*** 4.582588
α Constant ? 0.107782*** 1.438312
Ψ Year Dummies  Yes  
 Panel B: Model Fits   
 Adjusted R2 0.779828   
 F - Statistics 190.4281***   
 
